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“Before I built a wall I'd ask to know 
What I was walling in or walling out, 
And to whom I was like to give offense [...] 
Bringing a stone grasped firmly by the top 
In each hand, like an old-stone savage armed. 
He moves in darkness as it seems to me, 
Not of woods only and the shade of trees. 
He will not go behind his father's saying, 
And he likes having thought of it so well 









                                                           
1
 Robert Frost, “Mending Wall” (1914)., available at http://www.poets.org/viewmedia.php/prmMID/15719 (accessed 21 
July 2012). 
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Abstract 
The emergence of ‘transnational refugee theory’ and the rubric of the ‘refugee diaspora’ have 
reignited refugee studies, and elicited an exciting theoretical vantage-point from which to explore 
refugee communities. This paper seeks to disentangle the core precepts of transnational refugee 
theory and, drawing upon compelling empirical evidence strengthen our understanding of the 
dynamic interaction between the refugee diaspora and the environment within which it evolves – 
in particular how the entrenched international refugee regime ontology impacts directly the effective 
functioning of the refugee community.  
Echoing Giddens’ Structuration Theory, what is proposed is that the refugee community exists within 
a ‘middle space’ – a synthesis of endogenous and exogenous factors that together establish the 
‘boundaries’ that shape the diaspora space, and ultimately support or undermine the activities of 
those communities located within it. Accordingly, a refugee ‘middle space model’ is outlined, which 
defines a core set of economic, political and socio-cultural activities, and the endogenous and 
exogenous factors that shape their realisation in situ.  
This theoretical construct is applied to two case studies. Firstly, the ‘bounded’ space of Dadaab and 
Kakuma refugee camps in Kenya is shown to not only disregard but also actively undermine the 
transnational character of refugee displacement. Moreover, while the refugee community remains 
active in circumventing these boundaries, there remains an inherent ambiguity in this transnational 
activism, giving rise to a perversion or ‘transmutation’ of the bounded refugee space.  In stark 
contrast, the Free Movement Protocols of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) are 
establishing a fluid ‘moebius’ space that both acknowledges and facilitates the transnational 
foundations of the refugee diaspora – as both a ‘bottom-up’ (endogenous) and ‘top-down’ 
(exogenous) process. However, the nascent UNHCR-ECOWAS partnership remains mired in an 
incoherent demarcation of responsibilities and a dearth of cohesive regional processes.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, the moebius middle space clearly offers an invigorating 
alternative to the prevailing UNHCR containment model – providing a truly ‘durable solution’ for 
those transnational communities dispersed across the refugee diaspora.  
 
Note: Monetary figures in this paper are primarily quoted in local Kenyan Shillings (KES). As of January 2013, 
just over KES85 equates to US$1. See http://www.xe.com/ucc/ (accessed 27 January 2013). 
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Introduct ion :   
the  re fu gee  –  d is located  in  spa ce  and  t i me 
 
The ‘Problem' with the Refugee 
The UNHCR has for more than half a century been mandated with “providing international 
protection [...] and of seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees”. 2 Accordingly, the 
international ‘durable solutions’ refugee response framework was conceived of as either a 
reclamation of nationality (repatriation to the homeland), or the acquisition of a new nationality (as 
integration within the country of asylum, or resettlement into a third country). 3 Furthermore, these 
three solutions were explicitly aligned with three distinct physical locations – the home country, the 
host country of asylum, and resettlement countries located (in general) further afield.  4 And as the 
central pillar to a global refugee response framework, the UNHCR emphasised short-term protection 
and targeted support en masse in formal ‘camps’, located within states of first asylum.  
This ‘warehousing’ or ‘containment’ approach to refugees remains the standard approach – in many 
ways for want of a better alternative. Indeed, in the “triptych of a refugee’s life, camps are the 
central panel”. 5 However, as Van Hear succinctly notes, “the real world is messier than in this ideal 
scheme”. 6 Firstly, the ‘temporary’ nature of displacement is proving to be a fallacy. Prolonged 
conflict and displacement is the refugee condition du jour,  as exemplified by the burgeoning and 
entrenched incidence of Protracted Refugee Situations (or PRS). 7 Secondly, the achievement of 
successful integration in host countries is becoming increasingly difficult, with those displaced 
                                                           
2
 ("Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees," 14 December 1950) Chpt.. 1 (1). 
3
 (Kibreab, 1999), p. 389. See also (Chimni, 2004); and (Van Hear, 2003). 
4
  (Van Hear, 2003), p. 2. 
5
 (Verdirame, 2011), p. 270. See also (Harrell-Bond, 1995). 
6
 (Van Hear, 2003), p. 2. 
7
 A PRS is a situation “in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five years or more 
in any given asylum country.” ("Global Trends 2011," 2011), p. 12. See also the UNHCR Conclusion on Protracted Refugee 
Situations No. 109 (LXI) (2009), available at www.unhcr.org/4b332bca9.html (accessed 23 January 2013). As at the end of 
2011, of the estimated 10.4 million refugees receiving assistance from the UNHCR, almost three quarters (7.1 million) were 
living in a PRS. Moreover, while the average length of stay in a refugee camp in the 1990s was nine years, that average is 
now twenty. See ("Global Trends 2011," 2011), p. 12., and (Milner & Loescher, 2011), p. 3. 
mir 2013 | 10 | andrew slater 
 
developing “ambiguous relationships towards the places in which they find themselves.” 8 And 
thirdly, resettlement as a ‘durable solution’ remains a privilege for a profoundly limited number of 
refugees. According to the UNHCR, in 2011 less than 1% of refugees were given the opportunity to 
resettle.9  
It would appear therefore, that the successful ‘resolution’ of refugee situations remains the 
exception to the rule rather than the norm, the victim of a parsimonious ontology which 
‘compartmentalises’ the highly-complex refugee phenomenon into discrete locations, categories  
and conditions. 10 While there is nothing inherently wrong with making theoretical distinctions  – 
indeed they serve as vital mechanisms for understanding the world around us – any  assumption 
creates a “set of expectations of the people and territories involved”, and can have both positive and 
negative outcomes for the lived realities of the individuals and communities described. 11 As a 
consequence, and despite the best efforts and intentions of the UNHCR and international 
community, “[c]hronic and stagnating refugee situations have been a long-standing challenge to the 
international community over the past six decades”. 12   
The ‘Transnational’ Refugee and the Refugee Diaspora 
Within the past two decades, the emergence of ‘transnational refugee theory’, and the rubric of the 
refugee ‘diaspora’ has elicited an exciting new theoretical vantage-point from which to explore, and 
understand the refugee. The notion of a transnational refugee emphasises engagement with the 
global geo-political, economic and social landscape – not as a passive victim ‘in exile’, but rather as a 
dynamic actor embedded within and supported by a complex web of networks that link individuals 
and communities across time and space. Moreover, it is increasingly being acknowledged that 
notwithstanding the forced nature of displacement, one of the most vital mechanisms for refugee 
protection and support is engagement with this wider diaspora. 13  Indeed, “transnational networks”, 
                                                           
8
 (Van Hear, 2003), p. 2. See also ("The State of The World's Refugees 1997: A Humanitarian Agenda," 1997), Chpt. 2, p. 5. 
9
 ("Global Trends 2011," 2011), p. 17. 
10
 Rosenau describes an ontology as “the broad assumptions that people make about the nature of reality”, which form the 
“social construction of reality”. See (Rosenau, 1999), p. 289.     
11
 (Van Hear, 2003), p. 14. See also (Moore, 2000)   
12
 (Milner & Loescher, 2011), p. 8. 
13
 See for example (Al-Ali, Black, & Koser, 2001); (Harvey, 1990); (Portes, Guarnizo, & Landolt, 1999); (Van Hear, 2003); and 
(Wahlbeck, 2002). 
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Horst argues, “and the flows of resources, people and information that they enable, are crucial to an 
understanding of any refugee situation”. 14  
The Refugee Diaspora as a Middle Space – ‘Bounded’ and ‘Moebius’ space 
Fundamental to an understanding of transnationalism is a recognition that it is not a `state of being’, 
but “is itself a dynamic process.” 15 For the refugee in particular, this process embraces a set of 
unique factors that together can facilitate or undermine the functioning of the diaspora, and impact 
directly the activities of the refugee community during displacement. As such, Van Hear argues that 
rather than a fragmented, ‘piece-meal’ approach to elucidating the mechanisms that underpin the 
refugee diaspora, a more holistic and integrated perspective is necessary – “both to understand the 
societies concerned and to help devise appropriate policy interventions.” 16   
This paper aims to further our understanding of the convergence of the refugee diaspora and the 
contextual environment within which it is created – in particular how different state policies impact 
upon the activities of the refugee community during regional displacement. What is proposed is that 
the refugee exists within a ‘middle space’ – a synthesis of multiple endogenous (individual, 
household and community-level motivations and strategies) and exogenous factors (the structural 
characteristics of the state, refugee regime and international community). These myriad factors 
together establish the ‘boundaries’ that shape the diaspora ‘space’, and ultimately support or 
undermine the functioning of the refugee communities within it.  
This paper will explore and contrast this ‘middle space’ refugee model through two empirical case 
studies: firstly, the ‘bounded’ space of the prevailing refugee encampment policy noted above, and 
thereafter the more ‘fluid’ and dynamic space encapsulated by the Economic Community of West 
Africa (ECOWAS). This paper proposes that in contrast to the restrictions and limitations of the 
former, the ECOWAS space facilitates refugee transnationalism through its Free Movement 
Protocols. While much remains to be done to ensure the in praxis reality of this ideal, such a regional 
fluidity or ‘permeation’ of the state and refugee space, greatly enhances refugee support and 
protection by bolstering the activities and agency of those transnational communities displaced 
across the refugee diaspora. 
                                                           
14
 (Horst, 2006b), p. 208. 
15
 (Al-Ali et al., 2001), p. 633. 
16
 (Van Hear, 2006), p. 11. 
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Drawing on Agamben’s ‘model of new international relations’, such a refugee space “would not 
coincide with any homogeneous national territory, nor with their topographical sum, but would act 
on these territories, making holes in them and dividing them topologically like in a Leiden jar or in a 
Moebius strip, where exterior and interior are indeterminate.” 17  
Paper Outline 
This paper will firstly explore the development of transnational migration theory, and how this 
paradigm has been applied to refugee displacement. It will then locate the ‘transnational refugee’ 
within the wider refugee diaspora, and examine how endogenous and exogenous factors interact to 
shape and transform this tripartite space. A refugee ‘middle space model’ will then be outlined, 
which defines the primary economic, political and socio-cultural activities of the refugee community 
and the environmental factors that shape (or ‘bind’) their realisation in situ.  
In the second and third sections, this middle space model will be applied to two refugee ‘domains’ 
within the near diaspora – specifically the Kenyan refugee camp and the ECOWAS regional body – in 
order to assess how each supports and obstructs, and ultimately shapes the refugee community and 
its embeddedness within the wider diaspora. This empirical research will reveal how the 
‘boundaries’ created by the prevailing UNHCR-based refugee response framework fail to 
acknowledge the vital transnational character of refugee displacement, and undermine the creation 
of effective and functional refugee communities. In contrast, the fluid boundaries that demarcate 
the ‘moebius’ ECOWAS space engenders a more dynamic and supportive environment for the 
refugee community, and more accurately reflects the transnational identity of those dispersed 
across the refugee diaspora. 
Such a conclusion is of profound significance for the international community. For if we are to fully 
embrace the rhetoric of the transnational refugee, we must transform the practical realities of our 
theoretical understanding, and shift from the institutionalised approach of the bounded refugee 
camp model to one that embodies the fluidity of a regional moebius space. While this requires a 
dramatic paradigm shift, it is however absolutely vital if the international community is to realise 
truly durable ‘solutions’ for the millions that are languishing in bounded refugee spaces across the 
globe.  
 
                                                           
17
 (Agamben, 1995), p. 118. (Emphasis in original.) 
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sect ion  on e:  
–  t he  t ransnat ional  re fu gee  as  a  theoret ica l  construct  –  
 
 
Arendt and the ‘Refugee Vanguard’ 
First published in 1943, Hannah Arendt’s ‘We Refugees’ provides a vivid description of the struggle 
of Jewish ‘newcomers’ who, having fled Nazi Germany attempt to forge new lives in the ‘West’: 
“We lost our home, which means the familiarity of daily life. We lost our occupation, which 
means the confidence that we are of some use in this world. We lost our language, which 
means the naturalness of reactions, the simplicity of gestures, the unaffected expression of 
feelings. We left our relatives in the Polish ghettos and our best friends have been killed in 
concentration camps, and that means the rupture of our private lives.” 18 
In being ‘saved’, Arendt describes navigating the path between ‘conscious pariah’ and parvenu, 
requiring the disassociation from, and even abrogation of the past and the creation of a people sans 
history. “The less we are free to decide who we are or to live as we like” she argues, “the more we 
try to put up a front, to hide the facts, and to play roles” – becoming the world’s first ‘prisonniers 
volontaires’.19 
In response, Arendt describes how many of those displaced fought “like madmen for private 
existences with individual destinies”, in order to not become “part of that miserable lot of 
schnorrers” (‘beggar’ or free-loader). 20 For these few individuals, “history is no longer a closed book 
to them and politics is no longer the privilege of the Gentiles.” Instead, these refugees “represent 
the vanguard of their peoples”. 21 
Such an emotive essay describes clearly the transnational character of forced displacement – 
whereby the refugee exists not in a single  geographically-defined space, but in the socially-created 
                                                           
18
 (Arendt, 1994), p. 110. 
19
 (Arendt, 1994), p. 115.  
20
 (Arendt, 1994), p. 114. 
21
 (Arendt, 1994), p. 119. 
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duality of both homeland and host country realities. Yet despite these early insights, and ongoing 
efforts by an array of scholars from Agamben to Zetter who have argued for a revitalised theoretical 
and practical approach to forced displacement, the refugee has remained for most of the 21st 
century a highly misunderstood anomaly in the prevailing international state system. 22 Indeed, 
while migration (forced or otherwise) has emerged as a fundamental feature of international 
relations, “popular thinking remains mired in nineteenth-century concepts, models, and 
assumptions.” 23 Furthermore, any development that has occurred, has done so in relative isolation, 
leading to a fragmented array of not only migration theories, but also policies and practices of states 
and institutions.  
Rather, what is required for a comprehensive understanding of contemporary migration – and in 
particular refugee displacement – is a “sophisticated theory that incorporates a variety of 
perspectives, levels, and assumptions.” 24 And almost three-quarters of a century after Arendt’s We 
Refugees, it would appear that transnationalism offers just such an analytical tool, reconciling the 
dislocated refugee with temporal, geographic and socio-political space. Let us now briefly examine 
the evolution of transnational theory, and then explore how it has influenced the study of forced 
migration.  
Migr at ion  Theory:   
reconci l in g d iscrete  concepts  
 
A Synthesis of Migration Models 
Traditional theories that sought to explain the international movement of people across borders 
highlighted those variables that operated at distinct ‘levels’, including the individual, household, 
community, nation-state and international. Notably, ‘neo-classical economics’ emphasises the wage 
and employment differentials that exist between countries, explaining movement as an individual 
                                                           
22
 See (Agamben, 1995); (Bauböck, 2010);  (Horst, 2006b), p. 177.;  and (Zetter, 2011). As Agamben notes, the refugee 
“unhinges the old trinity of state-nation-territory “, and as such “deserves instead to be regarded as the central figure of 
our political history.” (Agamben, 2008), p. 93. 
23
 (Massey et al., 1993), pp. 431-432. 
24
 (Massey et al., 1993), p. 432. 
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decision for income ‘maximization’. 25  Emerging from this minimalist model, the ‘new economics of 
migration’ offers a more comprehensive approach which embraces multiple ‘markets’ – not simply 
labour – and views migration as a household decision which draws upon an adaptive, dynamic 
migration ‘portfolio’ as a means to minimise collective risk and maximise collective gains. 26 
However, both these models operate primarily at the ‘micro-level’, placing emphasis on the 
individual or household as the referent who seeks to maximise utility through rational decision-
making processes. By way of contrast,  ‘Dual Labour Market Theory’ and ‘World Systems Theory’ 
move beyond micro-level factors, focusing on ‘higher levels of aggregation’. 27  The former places 
migration at the state-level, as a response to the structural requirements of industrialised 
economies, while the latter operates at an even higher level of analysis – placing migration as a 
consequence of international capitalist market globalisation. International migration is therefore 
envisaged as an inevitable consequence of macro-level structural properties that are bounded within 
historic social, economic and political developments, rather than individual or household decision-
making processes.  
While useful for elucidating the various factors operating at both the micro- and macro-level, these 
discrete perspectives fail to adequately embrace the complex and dynamic nature of international 
migration. Indeed, as migration proceeds a number of new factors arise that “come to function as 
independent causes themselves”, and precipitate subsequent movement in a process referred to as 
‘cumulative causation’.  28 
‘Cumulative Causation’ and Network Theory 
International migration sustains itself through a process of continual ‘feedback’, which Myrdal refers 
to as ‘circular and cumulative causation’. 29 Feedback is cumulative in that “each act of migration 
alters the social context within which subsequent migration decisions are made, typically in ways 
that make additional movement more likely.” 30  This introduces an ‘inter-temporal dependency’ to 
                                                           
25
 (Massey et al., 1993), p. 432. See also (Todaro, 1969); and (Todaro, 1980).  
26
 See (Stark & Bloom, 1985). 
27
 (Massey et al., 1993), pp. 443-444. See also (Wallerstein, 2004); and (Wallerstein, 2011), available at 
http://monthlyreview.org/2011/03/01/structural-crisis-in-the-world-system (accessed 22 January 2013). 
28
 (Massey et al., 1993), p. 448. 
29
 (Myrdal, 1958). See also (Massey, 1990). 
30
 (Massey et al., 1993), p. 451. 
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the multi-level characteristics (i.e. individual, household and structural) of international migration, 
which gives rise to a powerful ‘internal momentum’. 31  
Actions are therefore not undertaken by atomised migrants, but “are embedded in ongoing 
networks of personal relationships” 32 These ‘migrant networks’ link homes and destinations, and act 
as powerful channels for support between individuals and communities. 33 As Charles Tilly famously 
noted, ‘networks migrate’ and rather than individuals, households or structures, it can be argued 
that the ‘effective units of migration’ are therefore “sets of people linked by acquaintance, kinship, 
and work experience.” 34  
By providing a form of ‘social capital’, these networks reduce the risks and costs associated with 
mobility and  heighten expected gains, which in turn promotes further migration and network 
augmentation. 35 Network theory asserts that once initiated, this cyclical progression will continue 
until the web of transnational networks become so pervasive that all those who wish to migrate can 
do so. Moreover, once the strength of networks reaches a ‘critical threshold’, migration becomes 
self-perpetuating – growing independent of those causal factors that initiated it. Over time, 
migration flows therefore become less selective and reflective of underlying economic or socio-
political conditions, and more broadly representative of the home community. 36  
Network theory suggests that international migratory patterns are dynamic, fluid and evolving 
systems that function not only in response, but also as a causal factor in the motivations to human 
                                                           
31
 (Massey, 1990), p. 9. 
32
 (Vertovec, June 30-July 1, 2001). 
33
 Migrant networks are “sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and nonmigrants in origin and 
destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin.” (Massey et al., 1993), p. 448.  
34
 (Tilly, 1990), p. 84. Networks can be understood in terms of ‘strength’ (or their frequency, duration and intensity), and 
‘durability’ or ‘embeddedness’ (a function of time and potential). See (Vertovec, June 30-July 1, 2001), p. 7. 
35
 (Faist, 2000), p. 96.  Portes defines ‘social capital’ as the “capacity of individuals to command scarce resources by virtue 
of their membership in networks or broader social structures”. As such, rather than inherent to the migrant or the 
resources themselves, social capital is a product of “an individual’s ability to mobilize them on demand”. (Portes, 1995), p. 
12. (Emphasis in original). 
36
 When it has attained this ‘critical mass’, “migration becomes self-perpetuating because migration itself creates the social 
structure to sustain it.” (Massey, 1990), p. 8. For an excellent study of the escalation of Mexican migration to the US in the 
1970s, see (Massey & España, 1987). 
mir 2013 | 17 | andrew slater 
 
mobility. 37 Widespread acknowledgement of this inherent mobility, and the interconnectedness of 
societies across space and time led to the rise of a new era of migration theory – referred to as 
‘transnationalism’. 
The Fulcrum of Migration Theory – ‘Transnationalism’ 
Transnationalism first emerged as the notion of a ‘trans-national America’ – in response to what 
Gleason later referred to as the ‘fusion and confusion’ of the melting-pot ideologies and practices of 
the early 20th century US. 38 In his seminal essay, Bourne describes the apparent failure of attempts 
to assimilate the ‘alien’ into the Anglo-Saxon American tradition: 
“We found that the tendency, reprehensible and paradoxical as it might be, has been for the 
national clusters of immigrants, as they became more and more firmly established and more 
and more prosperous, to cultivate more and more assiduously the literatures and cultural 
traditions of their homelands. Assimilation, in other words, instead of washing out the 
memories of Europe, made them more and more intensely real.” 39  
Yet while transnationalism may have to some extent always existed, it has only recently acquired 
“the critical mass and complexity necessary to speak of an emergent social field.” 40 Over the next 
half-century, transnationalism as a concept was shaped and reshaped, and against an increasingly 
complex global landscape of migration, settlement, citizenship and identity emerged as a theoretical 
understanding of what has been referred to as “communities without propinquity”. 41  
The work of anthropologists including Liisa Malkki and Nina Glick Schiller in the early 1990s has been 
particularly instrumental in shaping the concept – with the latter describing transnationalism as the 
processes by which migrants were “forging and sustaining multi-stranded social relations that linked 
                                                           
37
 As Massey et al. notes, “the conditions that initiate international movement may be quite different from those that 
perpetuate it across time and space”. (Massey et al., 1993), p. 448. . See also (Van Hear, 1998), pp. 2-6. 
38
 (Kivisto & Faist, 2010), p. 127. 
39
 (Bourne, 1916), available at http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/rbannis1/AIH19th/Bourne.html (accessed 24 December 
2012).  
40
 (Portes et al., 1999), p. 217. See also (Faist, 2000), pp. 211-212.; and (Portes et al., 1999), pp. 223-224. 
41
 Webber, Melvin M. (1963). ‘Order in Diversity: Community without Propinquity’, in Lowdon Wingo (ed.), Cities and 
Space: The Future Uses of Urban Land. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 23–54., cited in (Faist, 2000), p. 197. See also 
(Kivisto & Faist, 2010), p. 129. 
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their societies of origin and settlement”, thereby establishing “social fields that cross geographic, 
cultural, and political borders”.42  
While physically existing within the bounds of the nation-state, the transmigrant actively  creates a 
new fluid ‘social space’ which embodies multiple locations, and is founded upon a web of social, 
economic and political relationships or networks. Transnational communities therefore “sit astride 
political borders” and are “‘neither here nor there’ but in both places simultaneously”. 43 As such, 
Glick Schiller argued that current theoretical frameworks were inadequate, noting how transnational 
scholars had begun to “rethink the paradigms within which they study migration and the 
incorporation of immigrants, discarding previous categorizations of return, circulatory, or permanent 
immigration.” 44 
The ‘Inertia’ Fallacy 
Transnationalism in many ways erodes both the theoretical and physical barriers to migration,  
including the prevailing belief that humans inherently do not like to move – what Everett Lee 
referred to as the “the natural inertia which always exists”. 45 Indeed, humans move and continue to 
move, as a result of not only coercion, labour or wage differentials or inequalities, but because 
increasingly, they can. 46 
In addition, it has long been assumed that migrants will settle in the host community and undergo 
the inevitable, albeit gradual process of integration and assimilation. However, assimilation has in 
many ways now come to be regarded as ‘a worn-out theory’, and while previously “economic 
success and social status depended exclusively on rapid acculturation and entrance into mainstream 
circles of the host society, at present they depend (at least for some) on cultivating strong social 
networks across national borders.” 47 
                                                           
42
 (Schiller, Basch, & Blanc-Szanton, 1992a), p. ix. See also (Schiller, 1997), p. 158. 
43
 (Portes, 1997) , p. 3. 
44
 (Schiller, 1997), p. 158. 
45
 (Lee, 1966), p. 51. 
46
 Transnationalism also runs counter to the enduring presumption that “the right to be mobile is the badge of the global 
elite, while the poor are meant to stay at home”.  Bauman, Z. 1998. Globalization: the Human Consequences. Cambridge: 
Polity., cited in (Castles, 2009). 
47
 (Alba & Nee, 1997), p. 826.; and (Portes et al., 1999), p. 229. 
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The Causes of Transnationalism  
Transnationalism can be the result of the grassroots activities of individuals and migrant 
communities in the homeland and destination, or the activities of powerful ‘structural’ agents such 
as institutions or state governments. This categorisation has been termed respectively, 
transnationalism ‘from below‘ and ‘from above’. 48  
The socio-political and economic pressures placed upon migrants (both at home and abroad) can be 
a powerful catalyst in the creation of ‘alternative’ transnational networks. This grassroots 
transnationalism emerges as migrants sort through the evolving ‘portfolio’ of resources and 
opportunities available to them, in a cumulative, progressive and adaptive process which transforms 
individual migrant ‘pioneers’ into a ‘transnational community’, embodying dense and far-reaching 
networks of relationships across space and time. 49 
In addition, much has been written of transnationalism ‘from above’ – emphasising the role of 
international institutions and states, and burgeoning structural interdependence due to 
globalisation. 50 What must be avoided in any study of transnational migrants however, are 
“atomistic theories that deny the importance of structural constraints on individual decisions, and of 
structural theories that deny agency to individuals and families.” 51  Rather, embracing 
transnationalism as a holistic and dialectic process will allow not only the theoretical extrapolation 
of global migratory systems and structures,  but also “the analysis of the everyday networks and 
patterns of social relationships that emerge in and around those structures.” 52  
 
Th e ‘S imp le’  Transnat i onal  Refu gee 
 
As was shown in the brief overview above, the close of the 20th century saw the emergence of a new 
conceptualisation of migration, as a dynamic and socially-embedded transnational process spanning 
                                                           
48
 See (Guarnizo, 1997) 
49
 (Portes, 1997), p. 17. 
50
 (Portes et al., 1999), p. 223. Notably, while largely hesitant to initiate transnationalism, “governments enter the picture 
as the importance of the phenomenon becomes evident.” (Portes, 1999), pp. 466-467. 
51
 (Massey et al., 1993), p. 455. 
52
 (Portes, 1997), p. 3. 
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the globe. Notably, those individuals who become enmeshed within transnational networks and 
communities “are not simply exploitable objects”, but highly empowered individuals “capable of 
reacting creatively to the new situation in which they find themselves”, which may mean upsetting 
the long-held global status quo. 53 Yet despite the pervasiveness of the concept in contemporary 
migration and international relations literature, transnational theory remains “a highly fragmented, 
emergent field which still lacks both a well-defined theoretical framework and analytical rigour.”  54  
Emergence of the Transnational Refugee  
Transnationalism does however, present a particularly useful theoretical tool for understanding the 
mechanics of forced displacement and the dynamics of refugee communities dispersed across the 
globe, for a number of reasons. 55 When migration is large-scale and motivated by coercive forces, 
“it is likely that immigrants remain morally tied to kin and communities left behind and, hence, are 
more likely to engage in a variety of activities to bridge the gap and sustain a common bond.” 56 
Moreover, the general rule applies that the greater the obstacles to mobility, the greater the role of 
transnational networks – as they reduce costs and increase gains. 57 And while international 
movement presents migrants with a varied degree of difficulty, those undertaking ‘illegal’ migration 
face a plethora of obstacles during displacement, not the least of which the risk of arrest and 
deportation. 58 And finally, if the ‘alien’ community is discriminated against, or afforded an inferior 
                                                           
53
 (Portes, 1997), pp. 7 & 19. The latent potential of transnationalism is particularly salient when it is recognised that not all 
transnational activities are positive and beneficial. Indeed, this Janus-like quality explains how, while a powerful 
mechanism for community integration, support and development, transnationalism can also engender discord and 
perpetuate conflict. This can be the result of migrant affiliations and activities, or the “co-optive activities of established 
elites”. (Portes, 1997), p. 19. See also (Van Hear, 1998), p. 256. 
54
 (Portes et al., 1999), p. 218. 
55
 ‘Forced’ migration refers to “individuals or communities compelled, obliged or induced to move when otherwise they 
would choose to stay put; the force involved may be direct, overt and focused or indirect, covert and diffuse.” (Van Hear, 
1998), p. 10. 
56
 (Portes, 1999), p. 464. On the other-hand, when migration is an individual (or household) decision, and based upon a 
rational calculation of the costs and benefits involved,  any transnational engagement is largely selective, and less 
normative or common-place. 
57
 (Massey et al., 1993), p. 460. 
58
 Conversely, as Van Hear notes, in the current global climate of change and uncertainty “the stronger the transnational 
condition, the greater the vulnerability to forced mass exodus.”  (Van Hear, 1998), p. 264. 
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status and  excluded from the local society, it provides impetus to the creation and maintenance of 
transnational networks and ‘adaptive strategies’. 59  
Yet despite such significant theoretical insights, refugee studies have been slow to embrace 
transnationalism. This is in part because it challenges the conceptual foundations upon which the 
refugee paradigm has rested for more than three quarters of a century, predicated upon the 
irreconcilable separation of homeland and states of asylum. 60  Moreover, as Portes cautions, 
transnationalism can only be said to truly exist when the process “involves a significant proportion of 
persons in the relevant universe” and exhibits “certain stability and resilience over time”. 61  
Therefore, while this paper refers to ‘transnational refugee communities’, it is acknowledged that 
this label is in a sense premature.  
Locating the Transnational Refugee in situ 
Notwithstanding these concerns, it is becoming increasingly accepted within the refugee literature 
that rather than a community ‘in exile’, refugees are “not bound by the geographical borders of 
either the countries of origin or the countries of settlement.” 62 Furthermore, the specific forced 
nature of displacement and asylum, and the distinct relationship the refugee engenders with the 
homeland and the host society, as well as other members of the transnational refugee community, 
gives rise to a particularly robust form of transnationalism both ‘from below’ and ‘above’. As Kunz 
noted almost forty years ago, “it is the reluctance to uproot oneself, and the absence of positive 
original motivations to settle elsewhere, which characterises all refugee decisions”, and underpins 
the transnational character of refugee communities. 63 
This resilient form of transnationalism fosters the development of what has been termed the 
‘refugee diaspora’, and it is to this that this paper now turns – as providing a more dynamic and 
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 (Portes, 1999), p. 465. 
60
 Indeed, most refugee research prior to this theoretical ‘rebirth’ has been described as “tactical, ad hoc, diffuse and 
reactive”. Robinson, V. (1993) `The nature of the crisis and the academic response’, in Robinson, V. (ed.) The International 
Refugee Crisis: British and Canadian Responses. London: Macmillan, 3-13., p. 6., cited in (Wahlbeck, 2002), p. 221. See also 
(Van Hear, 2003); (Crisp, 1999a); and (Horst, 2006b). 
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 Alejandro  (Portes et al., 1999), p. 219. Indeed a ‘transnational refugee’ is in many ways a normative ideal that is yet to 
be fully realised, which this paper will explore more fully in the case study sections. 
62
 (Wahlbeck, 2002), p. 228. The transnational refugee canon has now come to include multiple disciplines (including 
Anthropology, Geography, as well as Migration Studies and International Relations). See for example (Al-Ali et al., 2001);  
(Basch, Schiller, & Szanton Blanc, 2003); (Horst, 2006b);  (Kibreab, 1999) and (Malkki, 1995). 
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 (Kunz, 1973), p. 130. 
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inclusive theoretical framework for analysing the refugee community in situ. Indeed, the ‘refugee 
diaspora’ can “bridge the artificial `before’ and `after’ distinction commonly applied to migration” by 
encapsulating the complex transnational relationships refugee communities have with the 
homeland, other communities dispersed across the globe, as well as host communities and states.  64 
 
‘Complex ’  Transnat i onal  Refu gee  Th eor y:   
the  re fu gee  d ia spora  
 
Diaspora as a Theoretical ‘Chameleon’  
While transnationalism and diasporas have been pivotal concepts in the evolution of modern 
migration theory, definitions have varied significantly over time. 65 Having examined the former, let 
us turn now to the evolution of the ‘diaspora’. The term itself is derived from the Greek speiro 
meaning ‘to sow’, and dia meaning ‘over’, and can be found in the earliest Greek translation of the 
Old Testament in existence, dating from the 3rd century BC. 66 However, the concept has roots even 
further back, traditionally used to refer to the Jewish exile from the Kingdom of Judah following the 
Babylonian conquest in the 6th century BC, and has subsequently become strongly associated with 
Jewish displacement, including those fleeing persecution in Europe in WWII. 67  
This enduring notion of a Jewish ‘diaspora’ (or galut), has imbued the concept with strong 
connotations of forced and temporary displacement, and the term has now come to encompass “a 
motley array of groups such as political refugees, alien residents, guest workers, immigrants, 
expellees, ethnic and racial minorities, and overseas communities.” 68 Notably, the term has also 
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 (Wahlbeck, 2002), p. 232. 
65
 See (Vertovec, June 30-July 1, 2001), p. 25. 
66
 Translating the text from Hebrew, the term was used to describe the defeat and dispersal of those who disobeyed God – 
“Thou shalt be a diaspora in all kingdoms of the earth”.  Deuteronomy 28:25., Oxford English Dictionary., cited in (Shuval, 
2000), p. 42. 
67
 (Shuval, 2000), p. 42. 
68
 (Shuval, 2000), p. 42. See also (Wahlbeck, 2002), p. 229.; and (William Safran, 2005), p. 36. While integral to the 
understanding of the diaspora, it is possible to overemphasise the role coercion plays in its formation, overshadowing the 
more benign or positive manifestations inherent within the term. Indeed, the Greek root of the word – ‘to sow’, while 
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come to be used increasingly by refugee communities themselves, “who feel, maintain, invent or 
revive a connection with a prior home.” 69   
What formally constitutes a diaspora is widely attributed to William Safran, writing in the inaugural 
edition of the eponymously entitled journal ‘Diaspora’. Firstly, he argued that a community must 
have been dispersed from a single origin, to be located within two or more new locations (creating 
multiple transnational communities as discussed previously). Secondly, this exile must be ‘enduring’  
and there must exist a degree of alienation from the host community. Fourthly, there must persist a 
“collective memory, vision, or myth” regarding the homeland, which engenders a sense of solidarity 
and commitment to its preservation, and a desire to return. 70 And finally, the community must 
continue to engage ‘personally or vicariously’ with the homeland, utilising transnational networks 
that link the multiple locations and communities embodied within the diaspora and giving rise to an 
‘ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity’. 71   
The Refugee Diaspora as an Analytical ‘Tool’  
The diaspora provides a malleable lens through which to view transnational communities in a 
number of novel ways. 72 Most notably in the field of International Relations, the diaspora allows an 
understanding of the complex economic, social and political foundations upon which transnational 
communities are built. In this way, the diaspora becomes a dynamic, multi-polar global social entity 
or ‘polis’, spanning both physical space and time. 73 And it is in this conceptual form that the 
diaspora is of particular relevance to the study of refugees, and forms the framework for this paper.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
implying the use of force or an action of dispersal, has associated positive connotations of germination and growth. See  
(Van Hear, 1998), pp. 5-6. 
69
 (Shuval, 2000), p. 42. 
70
 (William  Safran, 1991), pp. 83-84. 
71




Vertovec’s notion of a ‘diaspora as consciousness’ infers “a variety of experience, a state of mind and a 
sense of identity”, embodying both negative (discrimination and exclusion), and positive elements (including identification 
with a historically or globally-located foundation). Vertovec also describes the diaspora as a ‘mode of cultural production’. 
See (Vertovec, 1997).  
73
 (Wahlbeck, 2002), p. 229. This corresponds with what Vertovec described as “diaspora as a social form”.  See (Vertovec, 
1997). 
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This theoretical utility has consequently led to the creation of a number of refugee diaspora 
‘typologies’. 74 Yet while such theoretical fervour is a welcome change for a field that has long been 
stagnating, the scope and diversity of this discourse can be overwhelming and convoluted. 
Acknowledging as Wahlbeck does that within the nascent field of transnational refugee research “an 
emphasis on complexity and variety is not fruitful”,  this paper will now disentangle some of the core 
conclusions drawn to date regarding refugee diaspora creation, function and (d)evolution. 75  
The Refugee Diaspora – a Fluid Tripartite ‘Space’ 
As noted earlier, the transnational migrant has access to a ‘portfolio’ of networks that offer a 
multitude of opportunities, resources and support mechanisms that together shape international 
migration. For those facing conflict and forced displacement, this portfolio is highly significant, giving 
rise to discernable spatial patterns of forced displacement. While some household members will stay 
within the home community, the majority of those displaced will seek refuge in other parts of the 
country as internally displaced persons (IDPs). A smaller cohort will cross an international border, to 
become refugees and asylum seekers. 76 Secondary movement will also occur as refugees initially 
residing in regional states of asylum are provided the opportunity to settle in countries further afield 
through resettlement quotas and other state migration policies (or undertake ‘irregular secondary 
movement’). 77 
Over time as displacement persists and people ‘consolidate themselves’ within new locations and 
communities, “complex relations will develop among these different domains of what we may call 
the ‘refugee diaspora’”. 78 This pattern of displacement and consolidation creates a ‘tripartite space’ 
– see Figure One below.  
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 See for example (Crisp, 1999a); (William  Safran, 1991); (Shuval, 2000); (Van Hear, 1998); (Van Hear, 2009); and 
(Wahlbeck, 2002). 
75
 (Wahlbeck, 2002), p. 230. 
76
 This assertion is supported by UNHCR figures. As at the end of 2011, there were 25.9 million displaced persons in the 
world. Of these, 15.5 million were IDPs and 10.4 million refugees. See ("Global Trends 2011," 2011), p. 2. 
77
 (Van Hear, 2009). p. 181. See also (Van Hear, 2006), p. 12. 
78
 (Van Hear, 2006), pp. 9-10. 
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In defining the refugee diaspora ‘space’, three core domains can therefore be identified: the 
‘homeland’ or country of origin; the country or countries of first asylum,  termed the ‘near diaspora’ 
(often a neighbouring country to the homeland); and those more distant countries of asylum and 
resettlement within the ‘wider diaspora’. 80 
Transnational Networks across the Diaspora Space  
The above schema also reveals the primary set of transnational networks upon which the diaspora 
space is founded. These ‘organic’ social networks are crucial mechanisms for sustaining displaced 
communities, through the exchange of remittances, information about travel options and border 
crossings, expanding employment opportunities and socio-cultural support strategies, and 
facilitating the adaptation to (and integration within) new socio-political environments – providing 
what can be termed ‘transnational assets’. 81  
The Refugee Diaspora in praxis 
While on a general level the transnational networks that span the three domains are bi-polar, every 
relationship is heavily influenced by others within the diaspora space, in what is a deeply 
interconnected and complex ‘web’ of exchanges. As a consequence of this fluctuation, the 
prominence of each domain can alter over time. Moreover, there is an ambiguity inherent in these 
transnational networks and affiliations – while under certain circumstances they can serve as 
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 The ‘Tripartite Space’ is based upon the schema outlined in (Van Hear, 2006), p. 11.; and (Van Hear, 2003), pp. 3-4. 
80
 (Van Hear, 2003), p. 12. Notably, while the study of forced migration has to date focused primarily on those that have 
moved, transnational refugee theory and the refugee diaspora emphasises the role of  those that remain in the homeland. 
See (Van Hear, 1998), p. 45.; and (Shuval, 2000), p. 46.  
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Transnational networks and the flow of ‘transnational assets’ 
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positive support mechanisms, these  “political, economic, and other relations are highly volatile” and 
can perpetuate division, conflict and instability within the diaspora. 82  
Skewed Demographics 
Most notably, spatial distribution within the diaspora reflects the ‘transnational-empowerment’ of 
refugees. It is primarily only those who have access to strong networks that can successfully 
undertake international migration and reach the furthest reaches of the diaspora, while those with 
access to fewer transnational assets will be limited to the near diaspora, or be forced to remain in 
the homeland.  83 Transnationalism may therefore reinforce the inequality and tensions that are 
inherent within the ‘pre-displacement’ homeland community, and shape the demographics of the 
refugee communities that span the near and wider diaspora space. 84 As Van Hear notes, “it tends to 
be those who are already better off who take prime positions in the transnational arena: 
encouragement of transnationalism may therefore reinforce inequalities.” 85  
However, as noted earlier transnational networks expand and strengthen over time, fostering the 
collective accumulation of transnational assets. As a result, communities facing protracted insecurity 
will experience escalating levels of displacement  which over time will also become less selective. As 
a result, the initial movement of ‘transnationally-empowered’ individuals will be supplanted by the 
heightened mobility of those less empowered segments of the community.  86 
What this reveals in our exploration of refugee diaspora theory is that transnational networks shape 
the spatial demographics as well as the temporal characteristics of refugee communities, and the 
wider diaspora space. Let us examine these latter temporal changes in more detail. 
Mixed Migration and the Hybrid Refugee Diaspora 
Within migration theory there has long prevailed an analytical distinction between ‘refugees’ and 
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 (Van Hear, 2006), p. 11. 
83
 The capacity to migrate has been described as a product of “class or socioeconomic standing, access to resources, and 
associated networks.”  (Van Hear, 2009), p. 181. See also (Massey, 1990), p. 8. 
84
 Work by the UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit for example, has shown that Africa’s refugee camps (as 
prominent sites of asylum within the near diaspora) are characterised by a high proportion of people with special needs, 
including young people, women and the elderly. See (Zetter, 2011); and (Nowrojee, 2000). 
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 (Van Hear, 2006), p. 13. Moreover, increasingly restrictionist immigration and asylum policies of states (particularly in 
the more developed global North) have exaggerated this inherent disparity, with access to the wider refugee diaspora 
becoming progressively more difficult. See (Guild, 2006).; and (Hollifield, 2000), pp. 140-141. 
86
 See (Van Hear, 1998), p. 259. ; and (Massey, 1990), p. 8. 
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‘migrants’, cast as a political-economic, or involuntary-voluntary polarity. 87 While the notion of a 
‘refugee diaspora’ as a discrete phenomenon would therefore be welcomed by many in the 
international community, an understanding of transnationalism recognises that “almost all migrants 
in reality move for mixed motivations, including social reasons”. 88 Indeed, the demarcation of 
migrant categories has long been blurred by shifting roles that occur “sometimes as a matter of 
strategy, sometimes by chance or circumstance.” 89 As the UN noted more than two decades ago, 
people “are prompted to leave their own country by a mixture of fears, hopes and aspirations which 
can be very difficult, if not impossible, to unravel.” 90  
The temporal transformation of the diaspora exposes the dynamics of this ‘mixed-migration’ 
dilemma clearly. A diaspora may be the product of the evolutionary process of ‘cumulative 
causation’ as noted above, or alternatively, the result of more acute events (or sets of factors) which 
instigate a ‘migration crisis’. 91 Refugee displacement may therefore instigate an entirely new 
diaspora, or permeate and alter the structure of one already in existence. Most commonly however, 
a refugee diaspora will be shaped by a combination of both cumulative and acute factors, which in 
aggregate “add to, reinforce or consolidate diaspora communities already existing”.  92  
The temporal evolution of the refugee diaspora can therefore be understood in three phases. The 
earliest migrants will often be professionals who in anticipation of state insecurity pursue alternative 
transnational opportunities. These ‘early refugees’ generally permeate extant economic, political or 
social networks that, while facilitating more ‘legitimate’ transnational movement can be 
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 This prevailing dichotomy “is maintained in the policy world, where the governance of international migration is shaped 
by a widespread view that ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ migration are mutually exclusive  categories.” (Van Hear, 2009), p. 183.  
88
 (Al-Ali et al., 2001), p. 616. See also (Crisp, 1999a), p. 3. 
89
 (Van Hear, 1998), pp. 50-51. As the UNHCR concluded at the close of the millennium, “migration and refugee flows were 
for many years regarded as discrete phenomena, and the task of distinguishing refugees from ordinary migrants did not 
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(UNHCR, 1998), p. 46. 
See also ("Refugee Protection and Durable Solutions in the Context of International Migration," 2007). 
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 Technical Symposium on International Migration and Development, The Hague, 29 June - 3 July 1998, UNFPA, New York, 
1989, p. 70., cited in (Crisp, 1999a), p. 4. 
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 (Van Hear, 1998), p. 22. See also (Massey et al., 1993), p. 451.  
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 (Van Hear, 1998), p. 47. Indeed “a look at history shows that migration crises are rarely single events coming from 
nowhere – even though they are regrettably often perceived as such by organizations charged with dealing with them; 
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resolved.”  (Van Hear, 1998), p. 241. 
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appropriated by these ‘mixed-migrant’ flows. 93 Over time however, a greater number of ‘primary’ 
refugees will be forced to flee, building upon those transnational networks available and also 
creating new pathways as the need for, and legitimacy of asylum grows – embedding what is now 
principally a ‘refugee’ diaspora within the tripartite space. Finally, and as conflict abates, other family 
and household members will join the multiple (mixed) refugee communities now dispersed across 
the diaspora, reflecting a wider segment of the homeland and returning the momentarily ‘pure’ 
refugee diaspora  to its earlier mixed-migratory, and ultimately voluntary character. 94  
The ‘refugee diaspora’ therefore does not develop as a distinct entity, but is instead a ‘hybrid’ that 
blurs the conceptual distinction between those who flee conflict and persecution, and those who 
come before or after. Indeed, the concept of a purely ‘refugee diaspora’ is more often than not, a 
theoretical fallacy. 95  
Rather, contemporary migration is distinguished by ‘extreme diversification’ in movement types, 
including ‘cross-cutting’ categories where individuals shift from one form of migration to another 
over time and migrant communities “straddle the blurred division between ‘economic’ and ‘forced’ 
migrants that informs scholarly and policy debate”. 96  We need not go as far as Crisp suggests when 
he argued that “it is almost certainly more profitable to focus on such communities as a whole, 
rather than on those people who have been recognized as refugees.” 97 However, it is useful to 
recognise that refugee diasporas are a dynamic system that is influenced by, and itself influences the 
broader social, economic and political contexts in which they emerge.  
Moreover, while this heterogeneous ‘incoherence’ could be considered a hindrance to the refugee 
diaspora, as migration patterns shift and transform individuals and communities accumulate what 
Van Hear refers to as ‘complex migration biographies’ and ‘histories’. Refugee (or rather hybrid) 
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 (Van Hear, 2009), p. 182. 
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 (Van Hear, 2009), pp. 182-183.  
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 This hybridisation  is clearly visible in empirical studies. For example, following the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 
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 (Crisp, 1999a), p. 4.  
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diasporas therefore encapsulate communities with particularly complex migration histories and 
robust sets of transnational assets – allowing individuals to respond to the social, political and 
economic fluctuations that are a feature of forced displacement.  98 
Space, Structure and Agency  
While it may appear otherwise, the creation of transnational communities and the wider diaspora 
space within which they exist is not an inevitable result of migration (forced or otherwise). Rather, 
diasporas are the “exemplary communities of the transnational moment”. 99 They represent the 
cumulative synthesis of attachment to a homeland and host state, and a multiplicity of actively-
maintained relations spanning the transnational space. 100 Indeed, as Castells neatly paraphrases, 
space “is the expression of society”. 101  
Social ‘Fields’ and ‘Spaces’ 
It is therefore worthwhile at this point to briefly explore the conceptual development of ‘space’ in 
social theory, to further our understanding of the dynamics of the refugee diaspora. Largely 
attributed to anthropologists Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch and Cristina Blanc-Szanton, the 
influential notion of ‘transnational social fields’ can be defined as “a series of inter-connecting 
relationships all of which in some way influence one another”, with each field “a segment of the 
social system.” 102 Further bolstering this theoretical foundation is the instrumental work of Thomas 
Faist, who sought to leave behind what he regarded as the ‘container concept of space’ in favour of 
a ‘transnational social space’ – which referred not only to physical location but also “larger 
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 (Shuval, 2000), p. 44. 
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 Moreover, “[s]ince our societies are undergoing structural transformation, it is a reasonable hypothesis to suggest that 
new spatial forms and processes are currently emerging”.  Castells, M. (1996) The Rise of the Network Society, Oxford: 
Blackwell., p. 410., cited in (Vertovec, June 30-July 1, 2001), p. 22. 
102
 While a social system comprises a number of ‘overlapping’ social fields, it was however not well-established whether 
this system comprises “the aggregate of social fields or whether it should be thought of as a ‘field of fields’”. Mitchell, J.C. 
(1966) ‘Theoretical orientations in African urban studies,’ in The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies, M. Banton (Ed.), 
London: Tavistock, pp. 37-68., p. 57., cited in (Vertovec, June 30-July 1, 2001), p. 24. See also (Schiller, Basch, & Blanc-
Szanton, 1992b). 
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opportunity structures, the social life and the subjective images, values, and meanings that the 
specific and limited place represents to migrants.” 103  
As a process in which two or more nation-states are ‘penetrated’ and a new singular space 
established, transnational social space seeks to move beyond the mere acknowledgement of 
transnational relationships connecting communities, “towards a recognition of the practices of 
migrants and stayers connecting both worlds and the activities of institutions such as nation-states 
that try to control these spaces.” 104  
Bringing Space Back to Earth – The Influence of Structural ‘Anchors’ 
Such a recognition of the active creation (and obstruction) of social space is central to our analysis of 
the refugee diaspora. Transnational fields and spaces have existed previously, and the dramatic 
increase in modern global migration and communication networks has created myriad social spaces 
that extend “over and beyond, rather than between or in, the nation-states.” 105 Indeed, Beck has 
described ‘globalisation’ as the processes “through which sovereign national states are criss-crossed 
and undermined by transnational actors with varying prospects of power, orientations, identities 
and networks.” 106 Yet while globalisation is largely ‘decentred’ from the territory of the nation-state 
(as encapsulated within the Marxist notion of an ‘annihilation of space by time’, or Harvey’s ‘time-
space compression’), Faist argues that transnational spaces are “anchored in and span two or more 
nation-states, involving actors from the spheres of both state and civil society”. 107  
As such, our earlier delineation of transnationalism ‘from below’ and ‘from above’ must be seen as a 
confluence – rather than as ‘discrete parallel phenomena’. 108 A comprehensive understanding of the 
refugee diaspora ‘space’ therefore recognises the ‘dialectic interplay’ between refugees and 
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communities dispersed across multiple domains, and the ‘power structures’ of the institutions and 
international state system within which the diaspora is anchored. 109 States have not disappeared, 
but instead “we live in a `glocalized’ social reality where both the local and the global exist side by 
side and in relation to each other.” 110   
Agency, Structure and the Duality of Endogenous and Exogenous Factors 
It is clear therefore, that alongside transnational activities and agency, central to the shaping of the 
diaspora space is “the discourse on the nation state and its authority.” 111 Indeed, ‘agency’ refers 
“not to the intentions people have in doing things”, Giddens asserts, “but to their capability of doing 
those things in the first place”. 112 Agency implies a degree of choice, reflecting the structural 
circumstances that may or may not constrain that choice, and also a degree of power – establishing 
the individual as a ‘perpetrator’ in that they could “at any phase in a given sequence of conduct, 
have acted differently.” 113 Moreover, ‘structure’ is marked by “an absence of the subject”, yet it is 
not ‘external’ to the individual – the structural properties of social systems “are both medium and 
outcome of the practices they recursively organise”. 114  
Therefore, rather than two independent phenomena or a dualism of actor and structured social 
system, Giddens’ Structuration Theory reveals a duality – whereby actors are both enabled and 
constrained by, and simultaneously themselves shape the structured system. 115 The refugee 
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transmigrants cannot be understood without “explicit reference and consideration of both local and transnational ties in 
the places of origin and destination.” Faist, The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social 
Spaces., p. 242.  
111
 (Shuval, 2000), p. 45. (Emphasis in original.) 
112
 (Giddens, 1984), p. 9. 
113
 (Giddens, 1984), p. 9. 
114
 (Giddens, 1984), p. 25. 
115
  Structuration Theory proposes that “the rules and resources drawn upon in the production and reproduction of social 
action are at the same time the means of system reproduction (the duality of structure).” (Giddens, 1984), p. 19. Giddens 
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diaspora is such a dynamic ‘entity’ – created by the interaction of endogenous (emanating from 
within the diaspora as refugee agency and activity) and exogenous factors (the structural system in 
which the diaspora exists) operating across the diaspora tripartite space. Together these factors 
shape the diaspora in situ, creating ‘boundaries’ around the domains and communities embedded 
within the diaspora space. 116  
These factors are particularly salient for refugee communities, as they navigate the highly bounded 
nature of their refugee condition. 117 Let us now examine these endogenous and exogenous factors 
in more detail, and how they shape the refugee communities dispersed across the diaspora space.  
 
Th e ‘Makin g  and Unma kin g’  o f  Communit ies :  
the  re fu gee  d ia spora  as  ‘mi ddle  spa ce’  
 
To borrow from Van Hear, what factors ‘make and unmake’ the refugee diaspora? 118 In other words, 
what endogenous and exogenous factors influence the formation and evolution of the diaspora, and 
shape the refugee communities dispersed within it?  
‘Migration orders’ (defined as discernable patterns of movement that operate in a given tempo-
spatial instance) Van Hear asserts, are not static flows that exist in equilibrium, but are shaped by 
the factors that operate within six different levels of analysis or ‘dimensions of migration’. 119 These 
dimensions provide a robust analytical framework in which to situate the refugee diaspora ‘space’ 
and the myriad endogenous and exogenous factors that influence its evolution in situ. 
i. Individual Motivation:  While migration orders (and the refugee diaspora) represents a collective 
pattern of movement, these patterns are created by the decisions and actions of individuals. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
does note however, that this duality does not prevent a structured social system from “stretching away, in time and space, 
beyond the control of any individual actors.” (Giddens, 1984), p. 25. 
116
 As Van Hear acknowledges, there are “significant cleavages within and among different domains of the [refugee] 
diaspora.” (Van Hear, 2003), p. 12. 
117
 See (Crisp, 1999a), p. 9.; (Portes et al., 1999) and (Portes, 1997). 
118
 (Van Hear, 1998), p. xii. 
119
 (Van Hear, 1998), pp. 11-14. These dimensions are based upon those levels of analysis outlined in Massey et al.’s 
overview of migration theories. See (Massey et al., 1993). 
mir 2013 | 33 | andrew slater 
 
Decisions may be based upon economic cost-benefit calculations (as embodied by neo-classical 
economic theories of migration discussed earlier), however other considerations are equally 
important, including socio-cultural motivations, and considerations of human security. 120 
ii. Household Strategies: The role of the family or household is also acknowledged as a powerful 
driver in migration, as reflected in ‘new economics of migration’ and Stark’s ‘portfolio’ of household 
strategies. These portfolios again include socio-cultural considerations, as well as notions of human 
security that are particularly relevant to our analysis of refugee displacement. 121 
iii. Disparities between Locations: A key catalyst in shaping migration is a disparity (whether real or 
imagined) between home and destination. These push and pull factors include Marxist traditions of 
exploitation and class (encapsulated in ‘dependency’  and ‘world systems theory’ as noted earlier), 
and inequalities in economic and socio-political spheres including human rights and relative human 
security. 122 Such perceptions of disparity, which can also be referred to as ‘politics of the diaspora’, 
can both bind and fracture transnational communities, and have significant influence upon the 
formation of a cohesive and fully-functioning diaspora. 123 
iv. Transnational Networks: As explored at length in this paper thus far, scholars now recognise the 
‘profound’ significance of migrant networks in shaping migration patterns. Concepts such as 
‘cumulative causation’, ‘social capital’ and ‘transnationalism’ capture the more socially reflexive and 
holistic nature of migration orders, as a systemic process that derives from myriad interconnected 
factors. 124 
                                                           
120
 (Van Hear, 1998), p. 14. See also (Kunz, 1973). 
121
 (Van Hear, 1998), p. 14. See also (Stark & Bloom, 1985). 
122
  (Van Hear, 1998), p. 241. The rubric of ‘human security’ encapsulates many of the socio-cultural, economic and political 
factors that shape migration orders at the individual, household and community level. The UNDP’s Human Development 
Report 1994 provides the keystone to contemporary human security – defining ‘Freedom from Fear’ and ‘Freedom from 
Want’ as encapsulating economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security. See the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#atop (accessed 
20 January 2013). See also (Wolfers, 1952); ("Human Development Report," 1994), p. 22. (Baldwin, 1997); (Buzan, 1984); 
and the UN General Assembly 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, available at 
http://www.un.org/summit2005/documents.html (accessed 23 January 2013).; and (Roland, 2001) 
123
 (Al-Ali et al., 2001), pp. 630-631. See also (Van Hear, 1998), p. 2. 
124
 See (Van Hear, 1998), p. 15.; (Basch et al., 2003) ; and (Portes, 1997). 
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v. The ‘Migration Regime’:  The migration regime encapsulates the “national and international body 
of law, regulations, institutions and policy dealing with the movement of people.” 125 Indeed, state 
legislation and policies regarding refugee movement, integration and management, and the actions 
of international organisations attempting to provide structure and order to these strategies have 
significant impact on refugee diasporas.  
vi. The ‘Macro-Political Economy’: This final dimension encapsulates the distribution and dynamics 
of power and resources across the globe. This includes the patterns of production, supply and 
consumption, trade and financial relationships, military strength, populations, environmental 
resources (land, water, forests), political agendas, and the development of, and access to transport 
and communications structures. This domain emphasises macro-level regional and international 
relationships, and those processes inherent within ‘globalisation’ noted above. 126  
The Refugee Diaspora as ‘Middle Space’ – a theoretical framework  
These dimensions encompass both endogenous (i.e. the motivations of individuals, households and 
communities located within the three core domains of the diaspora space) and exogenous factors 
(i.e. the structural characteristics of the macro-political economy and the international refugee 
regime that bind the diaspora in situ).  
In aggregate, these dimensions create the boundaries that shape the diaspora space – “within which 
migrants make choices or have decisions thrust upon them [...] the dynamics of which may 
encompass several countries of origin, transit and destination.” 127 While different weighting may be 
placed on each dimension as environmental and empirical parameters fluctuate, such a robust and 
integrated analytical approach to the refugee community “has the advantage of inclusivity, 
coherently linking the spatial and temporal dimensions of migration, its stages and components.” 128  
This theoretical framework therefore locates the diaspora as a truly ‘middle space’ – the nexus of 
refugee communities and the external environments in which they are located.  
 
                                                           
125
 (Van Hear, 1998), p. 16. See also (Rosenau, 1999). 
126
 (Van Hear, 1998), p. 16 & 19. 
127
 (Van Hear, 1998), p. 21.  
128
 (Van Hear, 1998), p. 18.  
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Figure Two: The Refugee Diaspora as ‘Middle Space’  129 
 
vi. Macro-Political Economy 







iii. Politics of the Diaspora 
ii. Household Strategies 
i. Individual Motivations 
 
As Figure Two above reveals, conceptualising the refugee diaspora as a ‘middle space’ reconciles the 
horizontal (or spatial and temporal) development of the diaspora with the vertical (or multi- 
dimensional) environmental context within which it is situated. No longer a solitary and passive 
‘victim’, the refugee is therefore revealed as a powerful transnational actor located within an 
interconnected, fluid and dynamic diasporic space. 130  
Next this paper will explore in depth the dynamics of this middle space, in particular how the myriad 
factors and dimensions outlined above shape the ‘boundaries’ of the diaspora middle space, and 
impact upon the lives of those refugee communities dispersed within it. For while it is useful to 
                                                           
129
 This schema is based upon the diaspora domains and dimensions defined by Van Hear in (Van Hear, 2006), p. 11. and 
(Van Hear, 1998), pp. 14-16. 
130
 The middle space is the therefore the in praxis embodiment of Giddens’ Structuration Theory noted above. See 
(Giddens, 1984). 
Endogenous Factors or Dimensions 






iv. The refugee diaspora – ‘middle space’ 
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disaggregate the diaspora middle space, it must be understood “in terms of multiple and differential 
embeddedness”. 131 That is, each domain within the diaspora space (i.e. the homeland, near and 
wider diaspora) embodies a unique set of factors and “it is the confluence of these that colour the 
nature and development of any social space and, thereby, the community that inhabits it.” 132  
 
Th e Refu gee  ‘Middl e  Spa ce’  Model  
 
Having located the refugee diaspora as a ‘middle space’, it is now possible to construct a theoretical 
refugee model that a) identifies the core activities of the refugee community, and b) explores how 
the particular endogenous and exogenous factors within each domain of the diaspora shape these 
activities – see Table One below.  
Such a robust and yet malleable analytical tool will greatly bolster the empirical study of refugee 
displacement in situ, by allowing the comparative analysis of those factors that both facilitate and 
undermine the evolution of the refugee diaspora. Such findings may inform not only our theoretical 
precepts but also the policies and strategies employed by the international community. Indeed, 
international theories, intentionally or otherwise “do not simply explain or predict, they tell us what 
possibilities exist for human action and intervention; they define not merely our explanatory 
possibilities, but also our ethical and practical horizons.” 133 
                                                           
131
 (Vertovec, June 30-July 1, 2001), p. 25. 
132
 (Vertovec, June 30-July 1, 2001), p. 25.  
133
 (Smith, 1996), p. 13. Indeed, diasporas “formed as a result of conflict have arguably consolidated themselves into an 
element integral to the current world order.” (Van Hear, 2009), p. 185. 
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Table One: The ‘Refugee Middle Space Model’: an analytical tool for in situ community assessment  134 
                                                          
134
 This table draws on and develops those activities and variables identified by (Al-Ali et al., 2001), pp. 619 and 627.; (Van Hear, 1998), pp. 14-16.; and (Shuval, 2000), pp. 50-53. 
 
 
Refugee Community Activities    Exogenous and Endogenous Factors 
Economic 
• Employment, Business & Labour Activities 
• Remittance Exchange 
vi. The Macro-Political Economy  
 
v. The Migration Regime 
 
 
iii. Politics of the Diaspora 
 
ii. Household Strategies 
 
i. Individual Motivation 
 
Political • Political Engagement, Mobilisation & Activism 
Socio-Cultural 
• Physical Movement 
• Information Dissemination 
• Social Cohesion & Community Security 
• Host Community Engagement & Advocacy  
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The Refugee Middle Space Model 
– a synergy of activities and environmental factors 
It can be seen that the refugee community undertakes a number of core activities. There are of 
course numerous other activities that may be identified, however this set of ‘building-blocks’ 
provides a vital foundation upon which a robust, effective and transnationally-embedded refugee 
community may be built. Moreover, while categorised as economic, political and socio-cultural 
endeavours, these are not discrete variables as they interact and transform according to the 
evolution of the diaspora middle space. Furthermore, reflecting the duality of Giddens’ Structuration 
Theory, these activities are directed both ‘inward’ towards the refugee community and diaspora, as 
well as ‘outward’ to embrace host communities and states. 135  
The refugee model also incorporates the multi-dimensional exogenous and endogenous factors 
outlined above, which influence the realisation of the community activities within each domain, and 
thereby shape the evolution of the refugee diaspora as a dynamic ‘middle space’. By applying the 
above model to specific domains and communities within the diaspora, we can therefore explore the 
convergence of activities and factors as a context-specific process, and ultimately unravel the 
strengths and weaknesses of international refugee protection in praxis. Let us now briefly examine 
the model activities, factors and assumptions – each will be examined in greater detail in the 
following case study sections.   
Economic Activities 
Employment, Business & Labour Activities: 
Vital not only to daily subsistence, but also for providing adequate shelter, accessing healthcare and 
education services, local community and transnational engagement and the ongoing socio-cultural 
cohesion and development of the refugee community is secure employment, a regular income and 
the ability to undertake economic and business initiatives. 136  
However, employment and business activities are shaped by a number of factors that are unique to 
the refugee community – including language ability, education, employment capacity (undermined 
                                                           
135
 This duality will be examined further in our subsequent empirical studies. See (Al-Ali et al., 2001), pp. 619-620.; and 
(Van Hear, 2009), p. 184. 
136
 (Crisp, 1999a), pp. 7-8. Interestingly, the economic enterprises which provide employment for both refugees and other 
migrants are themselves often transnational – embedded within wider migrant networks that see the exchange of goods, 
labour and capital between multiple domains. See also (Al-Ali et al., 2001), p. 627. 
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by physical and mental trauma resulting from conflict and displacement), inherent discrimination 
and exclusion, and the particular market characteristics of the host community and state. Within the 
near diaspora, these factors can be particularly debilitating, with the vast majority of states of first 
asylum those less-developed countries of the global ‘south’, which suffer from failing infrastructures, 
economic stagnation, widespread poverty, and few vocational training and welfare services. 137  
Remittance Exchange 
The transfer of remittances are an integral component of what Van Hear terms a “transnational 
relief and social welfare system” – through which significant resources are channelled from more 
prosperous domains within the diaspora to provide a ‘safety net’ for those less affluent and more 
vulnerable refugees and communities.  138 Within the refugee diaspora these exchanges are not 
merely financial transfers, but engender vital socio-cultural networks and relations. 
Remittances include financial transfers, investments and donations which are used for basic food, 
healthcare, education and housing needs. Refugee remittances may also be used to pay for 
households’ (illicit) passage within or between countries. 139 While generally between individual and 
households, the transfer of goods and finances can also occur through ‘collectives’ or organisations, 
including churches, mosques, community groups and hometown associations. These ‘collective 
remittances’ provide funds that can be channelled into larger projects – such as hospital, schools and 
other community development initiatives – the significance of which “may extend beyond their 
immediate economic and material effects, since they can help repair a social fabric shredded by 
years of conflict.”. 140  
                                                           
137
 Indeed, as the economic, social and environmental costs of refugee populations in these generally ‘weaker and more 
vulnerable’ host communities grows, so too does the “tendency to think of refugees as a burden”. ("Framework for 
Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern," 2003), p. 9. See also (Kelley, 2007). 
138
 (Van Hear, 2009), p. 184. Remittances remain a primary activity for communities dispersed within the diaspora. For 
example, in a study of Bosnian refugees living in the UK and the Netherlands, 80% sent remittances to relatives still living at 
home. (Al-Ali et al., 2001), p. 620. 
139
 Garnering the financial resources necessary for movement appears to be an increasingly vital function for transnational 
networks. As the borders of those states of the global ‘north’ become increasingly securitised, and more stringent control 
mechanisms seek to restrict international mobility, a comprehensive human trafficking industry has evolved, with an 
associated increase in costs (and risks) for irregular migrants. See (Crisp, 1999a), p. 6.; and (Salt, 2000). 
140
 (Van Hear, 2009), p. 184. Indeed, notwithstanding the potential of these transfers, their impact is in many ways more 
symbolic than practical. Moreover, collective remittances often reflect the wider norms of host societies and the 
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Acknowledging the other side of the remittances ‘coin’ however, collective remittances can also be 
used to fuel political causes and insurgent groups, and thereby perpetuate or heighten conflict – 
whether for the greater ‘good’ or ‘bad’. 141 In addition, information and access to efficient banking 
services and remittance systems are all essential to financial acumen and the realisation of refugee 
community activities. 142  
Political Activities 
Political Engagement, Mobilisation & Activism 
Perhaps the most important factor influencing the refugee community – underpinning almost all the 
economic and socio-political activities and functions it may perform – is the legal status accorded it 
by the host state. However, refugee engagement and mobilisation is highly reflective of the ‘political 
landscape’ of both the host state and the homeland, and the highly politicised nature of forced 
displacement and asylum. 143 
Despite these obstacles, many refugees continue to remain active in the political developments in 
the homeland. 144 This ‘political transnationalism’ can have significant impact on refugee 
communities ‘in exile’ as well as those left behind in the homeland. Indeed, nation-states “have been 
created from abroad and dictatorial regimes overthrown by the efforts of exiled citizens.” 145 While 
remaining politically engaged with the homeland bolsters “an identity and a sense of order and 
purpose in the fragmented lives of the refugees”, affiliations often echo the dissension that 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
international community, for example mirroring the objectives of the humanitarian and human rights advocacy groups that 
operate during conflict and displacement. 
141
 See (Van Hear, 2009), p. 184. 
142
 (Al-Ali et al., 2001), p. 628. 
143
 Rather than “a footloose, transient population”, the effective functioning of transnational communities “is predicated 
on reasonably secure attachment to the place of exile”. (Van Hear, 2006), p. 12. See also (Al-Ali et al., 2001), pp. 629-630. 
144
 See (Wahlbeck, 2002), p. 227. 
145
 (Portes, 1999), p. 475. While homeland governments may view the refugee in exile with suspicion if not outright 
hostility, many are now coming to view the diaspora as a valuable asset to national development, and are ‘courting’ the 
diaspora. See for example The New African “Why the AU is Courting the Diaspora” (26 July 2012), available at 
http://www.newafricanmagazine.com/special-reports/other-reports/10-years-of-the-au/why-the-au-is-courting-the-
diaspora  (accessed 12 February 2013).  
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permeates the homeland. This can lead to significant conflict within the refugee community, and 
greatly undermine social cohesion. 146   
In addition, the refugee community can also bring about change in the political structures of the host 
country. Indeed, if the refugee community is politically significant, both the host and the homeland 
may manipulate the diaspora in terms of its own political agenda. 147  
Socio-Cultural Activities 
Physical Movement 
Freedom of movement, both within the host state and across the wider diaspora, is also of 
paramount importance to the refugee community, and the relationships and activities that bind 
them. 148 Such movement fosters a sense of unity and cohesion, and is often in response to socio-
cultural obligations (relating to family, clan or community), and economic or bureaucratic activities 
such as relating to market activities and property. 149  
However, state policies can severely restrict refugee mobility, and concomitant local community 
discrimination can make any such movement extremely risky. As such, refuge communities across 
the diaspora are powerful mechanisms for supporting movement, by providing vital information and 
support structures both en route and at the final destination. 150 Moreover, ongoing movement 
strengthens refugee ‘migration biographies’, and bolsters the transnational assets that are made 
available. 151 In addition, the disparity between those seeking to cross state borders, and the ability 
                                                           
146
 (Wahlbeck, 2002), p. 226. See also (Al-Ali et al., 2001), p. 622. Indeed, within refugee communities “political divisions 
and allegiances often play a far more important role than ethnic identities”, and have been found to be a common obstacle 
in creating viable, inclusive refugee organisations. Conversely, these divisions can provide a strong impetus for smaller 
groups and associations to emerge. See (Wahlbeck, 2002), pp. 227 & 234. 
147
 See (Shuval, 2000), p. 47.  
148
 It is noteworthy that while policy-makers often regard visits to the homeland as a positive step towards repatriation, 
they are often a pivotal motivation in decisions to remain ‘in exile’. While reunions with kin and friends are generally 
welcomed, resentment and changing socio-cultural environments  both in the homeland and exiled communities, can 
undermine any thoughts of permanent return. For a dramatic example of these mixed fortunes, see (Al-Ali et al., 2001), p. 
623. 
149
 See (Wahlbeck, 2002), p. 225.  
150
 As Crisp notes, refugees with access to such information “are evidently better placed to negotiate entry” than those 
who do not. (Crisp, 1999a), p. 6. 
151
 This is particularly pertinent when the community, and the movement itself is by definition ‘illegal’ or irregular, and 
circumvents official pathways. See (Crisp, 1999a), p. 7. 
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to do so legally has created a “lucrative economic niche for entrepreneurs and institutions dedicated 
to promoting international movement for profit” – resulting in a burgeoning ‘black market in 
migration’. 152  
Information Dissemination 
In addition, access to information is vital in facilitating the above community activities. Indeed, the 
particular uncertain and insecure nature of the refugee community places heightened emphasis on 
the dissemination of information, concerning what are constantly shifting opportunities and risks.153  
Access is however, not the only consideration in the utility of information within the community. The 
quality of the information provided is also of consequence to refugee decision-making and activities 
– with the less accurate the information transmitted, the greater its impact. Yet “as a rule migrants 
pretend to be better off than they actually are [...] information is often transmitted through informal 
channels, and at each new link in the transmission process, the success story tends to be further 
magnified”. 154 
Social Cohesion and Community Security 
The ‘cohesion’ and resilience of the refugee community has a direct impact upon what transnational 
activities can be undertaken, and how successful they are. 155 Consequently, a key function of the 
refugee community is the exchange of shared ideas, values and norms (what has been termed 
cultural ‘artefacts’ or ‘social remittances’), and the fostering of a ‘collective consciousness’. 156  
                                                           
152
 (Massey et al., 1993), p. 450. While prone to abuse by these human traffickers, their activities are often supported by, 
and interwoven with the refugee networks and communities themselves – revealing the difficulty in drawing a line 
between network-facilitated refugee migration, and the more insidious and predatory process of trafficking.  See (Crisp, 
1999a); (Ghosh, 1998), p. 70. (Van Hear, 1998), pp. 258-259.; ("Refugee Protection and Human Trafficking: Selected Legal 
Reference Materials," 2008); (Salt, 2000); and (Adepoju, 2005b). 
153
 (Al-Ali et al., 2001), p. 630. 
154
 (Ghosh, 1998), p. 67. 
155
 As Van Hear notes, “people at home and in exile may operate in a single social field, or at least in linked social fields.” 
(Van Hear, 2003), p. 2. 
156
 See (Levitt, 1998). Such a collective consciousness provides migrants with what Bourne eloquently described as a 
‘spiritual country’. These ‘centripetal’ forces he argued, “make for the intelligence and the social values which mean an 
enhancement of life”, and counter those opposing influences ‘at the fringe’ which “make for detached fragments of 
peoples.” (Bourne, 1916), available at http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/rbannis1/AIH19th/Bourne.html (accessed 24 
December 2012). 
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Multiple factors can strengthen community cohesion, including a shared sense of security, 
‘belonging’ and support, and the facilitation of cultural norms and social structures that heighten a 
sense of collective identification and engagement. 157 However, uncertain legal status,  
marginalisation, and the insecurity that comes from restricted economic, socio-cultural and political 
opportunities can significantly undermine these cultural structures, in particular eroding 
generational hierarchies, leadership and gendered relationships. 158  
Refugee ‘identity’ can therefore be understood as the product of continued engagement, synthesis 
and transformation encapsulating the near and wider diaspora, as well as homeland and host 
communities. 159 Indeed, the ‘language of the diaspora’ is increasingly being used by displaced 
individuals and communities, whereby defining oneself (and being defined by others) as a “people 
with historic roots” places you outside of the time-space boundaries of the nation state, and 
“provides a sense of power and legitimacy to claims of oppression or disadvantage.” 160  
This can explain the essentialist nature of ‘collective consciousness’ – as differences are suppressed 
by a reified notion of homeland and nationhood. This is acknowledged by Gans’ theory of ’symbolic 
ethnicity’, whereby (particularly second and third generation) migrant communities foster “a 
nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant generation, or that of the old country”, and 
therefore seek out “ways of expressing their identity [...] that do not conflict with other ways of 
life”.161 
                                                           
157
 Community advocacy and socio-cultural activities are an important means for fostering the language, religion, norms, 
values and ideology (the ‘narratives’) of the homeland. See (William Safran, 2005), p. 36.  Moreover, the internet is joining 
telephone and radio as a key mechanism for the exchange of information and social remittances across the diaspora – 
providing a ‘virtual’ environment that allows for time-space compression, and the shaping of  transnational identities and 
consciousness. See (Al-Ali et al., 2001), p. 624.; and (Wahlbeck, 2002), pp. 225-226. 
158
 A pervasive sense of disillusionment amongst younger generations has led many elderly refugees to admonish “a lack of 
`national consciousness’ amongst youngsters”. (Al-Ali et al., 2001), p. 631. However, it is equally clear that much of the 
socio-political activism that occurs within the refugee diaspora is undertaken by younger refugees.  
159
 Indeed, over  time this collective diasporic identity can become a ‘centre for cultural creation’ – while maintaining a 
(real or mythical) ideological link with the homeland. (William Safran, 2005), p. 36. See also (Wahlbeck, 2002), p. 228.  
Shuval for example, describes an ‘eschatological stance’ towards repatriation, conceptualising it as an undefined utopian 
goal that will occur at some point in the indeterminate future. See (Shuval, 2000), p. 47.   
160
 Clifford 1994. “Diasporas”. Cultural Anthropology 9(3): 302-338., cited in (Shuval, 2000), p. 48.  
161
 (Gans, 1979), pp. 8-9. See also (Kivisto & Faist, 2010), p. 110.; and (Portes, 1999), p. 472. 
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Local Community Engagement & Refugee Advocacy 
It follows that the level of engagement and integration with the host community is one of the 
primary indicators of refugee community strength, and is integral to the successful realisation of the 
majority of the activities outlined above. 162 
While discrimination and marginalisation greatly undermines the activities of the refugee 
community, host communities can also facilitate access to local economic opportunities, social 
support services, and strengthen legal rights and freedoms. 163 However, the degree of local 
engagement is not only the consequence of host actions. The prior existence of local community 
affiliations – based upon histories of trade, migration or social and ethnic networks are crucial 
determinants of community integration. Refugee initiatives such as the establishment of advocacy 
groups and nascent trade or social initiatives also act as important vehicles for refugee-host amity.164  
The Refugee Middle Space Model as an Empirical Tool 
As has been shown, while refugee communities undertake a number of vital activities and functions, 
there is a significant distinction that must be made between the potential and ability of refugees to 
participate in these activities. There are an array of factors (both endogenous and exogenous) that 
influence whether communities have the capacity and ability to successfully engage in the multiple 
activities that are vital to the lives of those displaced.  
These factors are specific to the particular domain in which the community is located, and can be 
categorised within the migration dimensions discussed previously, namely Individual Motivations;  
Household Strategies; ‘Politics of the Diaspora’;  the Migration ‘Regime’ and the ‘Macro-Political 
Economy’. 165 By reconciling the core activities of the refugee community with the specific contextual 
factors  that mould the domains of the diaspora, we can garner a clear understanding of the lives of 
the refugee in situ.  
Middle Space as a Weberian ‘Ideal Type’  
The diaspora is a dynamic, fluid and changing synthesis of internal and external reality. Therefore 
what is considered a significant factor or function in one instance may not be relevant in another. In 
order to function as an analytical tool, the conceptual refugee model outlined above must therefore 
                                                           
162
 (Van Hear, 1998), p. 60. 
163
 See (Massey et al., 1993), p. 450. 
164
 (Al-Ali et al., 2001), p. 624. 
165
 (Van Hear, 2009), pp. 184-185. 
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be treated as an ‘ideal type’. As Weber notes, by gathering together into one homogeneous, stable 
concept “the most multifarious nuances of form and content, clarity and meaning”, we are “applying 
a purely analytical construct created by ourselves.” 166 Indeed, such a fusion of ‘countless concrete 
relationships’ is “a synthesis which we could not succeed in attaining with consistency without the 
application of ideal-type concepts.” 167  
The creation of an ideal-type is therefore ‘ideal’ in the sense that it does not exist empirically in this 
`pure’ form. 168 The value of such an abstraction “lies in its usefulness in describing and explaining 
reality in terms of clearly understandable concepts” – which select and emphasise certain 
characteristics and variables. 169 This allows the comparison of individual cases that gauge how much 
reality embodies or diverges from this theoretical contrivance.  
In order to be theoretically constructive, the refugee middle space as an ideal type is however, open 
to critical analysis and development, as further empirical and theoretical evidence reveals 
characteristics not recognised by the initial proposition. By providing a foundation however, this 
paper seeks to fuel the development of a refugee model that clearly articulates the interconnected 
reality of forced displacement across the globe. 170  
In summation, this section has revealed how transnational theory and the concept of the diaspora 
has had a profound impact upon refugee studies. In order to disentangle and develop this 
burgeoning theoretical canon, a refugee model was proposed that provides a useful analytical tool 
with which to explore the dynamics of the diaspora in situ, and the influence of the contextual 
environment upon those refugee communities dispersed across the tripartite middle space. For as 
Vertovec cautions, “[a]ny concepts brought into a field of study should remain ‘operationalizable’ by 
way of gathering and analysing empirical and ethnographic data.” 171  
                                                           
166
 (Weber, 1949), p. 96. 
167
 (Weber, 1949), p. 96. 
168
 The ideal and reality may vary greatly – and as such, the former concept does not propose a hypothesis but rather 
“offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses. It is not a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means 
of expression to such a description.” (Weber, 1949), p. 90. (Emphasis in original.) See also (Aronovitch, 2012). 
169
 (Wahlbeck, 2002), p. 230. 
170
 Indeed, diaspora theory “is still very underdeveloped and, in terms of theory generation, there is much work to be 
done.” (Wahlbeck, 2002), pp. 231-232. 
171
 (Vertovec, June 30-July 1, 2001), p. 28. 
mir 2013 | 46 | andrew slater 
 
Let us now apply this refugee middle space model to two empirical case studies, in order to explore 
the complex dynamics of those refugee communities which have thus far been the subject of our 
theoretical conjecture. Specifically, this paper will explore the refugee community as it is exists 
within the African near diaspora – firstly as ‘bounded’ within the rubric of the refugee camp, and 
then secondly those refugee communities located in the more fluid or ‘moebius’ space of the 
ECOWAS regional body. 172 
 
                                                           
172
 The middle space model can however, be applied to any domain(s) within the diaspora in order to garner a clearer 
understanding of the refugee diaspora as it evolves and functions across the tripartite space. Indeed, future research may 
benefit from using the model to explore the multiple domains within one particular diaspora (for example analysing the 
Somali communities within the homeland, near and wider diaspora), or as undertaken by this paper, contrast different 
instances of one domain to identify those factors that facilitate or obstruct the embedded functions of refugee 
communities. 
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sect ion  two:   
–  a  s tudy  of  ‘bounded’  re fu gee  space  –  
 
 
Refugees, Displacement and the Primacy of the ‘Near’ Diaspora 
In order to elucidate the dynamics of the ‘standard’ refugee community, it is pertinent to undertake 
a case study drawn from the near diaspora, and in particular within developing states of the global 
‘south’. This is due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the two guiding tenets for refugee displacement 
and protection hinge upon the principles of non-refoulement and geographic proximity to the origins 
of displacement. 173 As a consequence, “most refugees having fled to neighbouring countries, remain 
in the same region.” 174 Moreover, as the nature of contemporary conflict shifts from a 
predominance of inter-national to intra-national or civil conflict, it is those states in the global south 
that generate the largest number of refugees, and assume the greatest responsibility for their 
protection. 175  
According to UNHCR estimates as of the end of 2011, developing countries hosted approximately 8.4 
million refugees, or around 80% of the global refugee population of 10.4 million. The Asia and the 
Pacific region remains the greatest host (35% of refugees), followed by Sub-Saharan Africa (25%), 
the Middle East and North Africa (17%), Europe (15%) and the Americas (8%). 176 In terms of 
                                                           
173
 Non-refoulement refers to Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which prohibits states 
from repatriating someone to their home country, if a threat to safety remains. This will be discussed in greater detail in 
the ‘Macro-Political Economy’ discussion below. See (Harrell-Bond, 1995); and ("Convention and Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees," 2010)., Article 33. 
174
 ("Global Trends 2011," 2011), p. 11.  
175
 According to UNHCR figures, by the end of 2011 the ‘major refugee-generating regions’ were themselves hosting 
between 75 and 93% of the world’s total refugee population. Indeed, in Africa some 80% of refugees remain within their 
region of asylum. See ("Global Trends 2011," 2011), p. 11. For an examination of the shifting nature of contemporary 
conflict, see ("Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and The Shrinking Costs of War," December 2010), 
Chpt. One. 
176
 ("Global Trends 2011," 2011), p. 11.  
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individual refugee host states, Pakistan hosted the greatest number of refugees (over 1.7 million), 
followed by Iran and Syria (with over 885,000 and 755,000 refugees respectively), Germany and 
Kenya (each housing more than half a million). 177 
Kenya and  the ‘Standard’ Refugee Camp  
Faced with ongoing displacement, and overwhelming numbers  of refugees, there have evolved 
many forms of refugee settlements – from informal ‘self-settlement’ and integration, ‘organised-
settlements’ to highly segregated ‘refugee camps’. 178 This latter ‘encampment model’ developed 
during the latter half of the 20th century as rampant instability and displacement spread across large 
swathes of Africa and Asia. In response, the international community emphasised short-term and 
targeted support en masse in formally-established camps. 179 However, "as refugees do not choose 
to live in camps but are forced to reside there, camps become means of ‘warehousing’ refugees, 
marginalising and often segregating them from the host population.” 180 Indeed, the debate 
surrounding the advantages and disadvantages of self-settlement and formal encampment has been 
called the “most sustained single controversy in African Refugee Studies”. 181  
Notwithstanding widespread criticisms, camps remain the most egregious exemplar of conspicuous 
refugee support, and the keystone in the international refugee response framework. 182 Of the 7.7 
million refugees whose type of accommodation was known at the end of 2011, while more than half  
were reported as living in ‘individual accommodation’ (i.e. self-settled in primarily urban areas), 
                                                           
177
 ("Global Trends 2011," 2011), pp. 11 & 14.  
178
 See (Schmidt, 2003); and (Jacobsen, 2001), p. 6. For an excellent overview of ‘self-sustainable’ African refugee 
settlements, see ("Older Refugee Settlements in Africa: Final Report," 1985). 
179
 See (Harrell-Bond, 1995). Some theorists have argued that  the preponderance for containment arises from a desire to 
perpetuate the (profitable) ‘relief model' of refugee assistance. Others argue that while the international community has 
geo-political and economic interests vested in certain regions and seek therefore to defer the “destabilising consequences 
of mass population displacements”, they often lack these incentives in other areas – including Africa.  See (Crisp, 2002), pp. 
1-2.; and Eldis “Is the UNHCR doing its job? Combining refugee relief with local development in Africa” (12 June 2003)., 
available at http://www.eldis.org/id21ext/s10csg1g1.html (accessed 12 February 2013). 
180
 (Verdirame, 2011), p. 270. 
181
 Kibreab, G., The State of the Art Review of Refugee Studies in Africa, Uppsala Papers in Economic History, Research 
Report No. 26, 1991., cited in (Schmidt, 2003), p. 1. 
182
 See (Schmidt, 2003), p. 7.; (Crisp, 1999c); and Black, R. and K. Koser (eds). 1999. The end of the refugee cycle? Refugee 
repatriation and reconstruction. Oxford: Berghahn., cited in (Van Hear, 2003), p. 2. 
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refugee camps and other ‘planned’ settlements equated for an estimated 44%. Moreover, the 
majority of these camps (60%) were located in Africa. 183   
As such, it can confidently be concluded that life in a Kenyan refugee camp is the archetypal reality 
for a significant proportion of refugees in the region, and across the globe. 184 Indeed, as was noted 
more than half a century ago, “although the physical conditions of camps may vary widely, from hell 
to hotels, the effects tend to be uniform”, including:   
“segregation from the host population, the need to share facilities, a lack of privacy, plus 
overcrowding and a limited, restricted area within which the whole compass of daily life is to 
be conducted. This gives the refugees a sense of dependency, and the clear signal that they 
have a special and limited status, and are being controlled.” 185 
The Kenyan refugee camp will therefore serve as the first case study which, through the lens of the 
refugee middle space model, will examine the dynamics of the refugee community as a ‘bounded’ 
space within the refugee diaspora.  
 
FACTOR 1:  Macro-Pol i t ica l  Economy 
 
North Africa, Regional Fluidity and Prevailing Instability 
Africa is widely regarded as “a continent of people on the move”. 186 In particular, migration in East 
Africa and the Horn of Africa has for generations been characterised by extensive and robust circular 
movement and socio-cultural affiliations, as traditionally nomadic pastoralist communities follow 
seasonal grazing patterns, and fluctuating environmental, political and economic circumstances 
across the region. However, colonial rule and the imposition of contract labour substantially altered 
                                                           
183
 ("Global Trends 2011," 2011), p. 35. More than 170 refugee camps are currently in operation on the continent. See 
(Jamal, 2003), p. 4.  
184
 (Konzolo, 2010), pp. 6-7.; and ("Global Trends 2011," 2011), p. 23. 
185
 Murphy, H. B. M., ‘The Extent of the Problem,’ in Murphy, H. B. M. (ed.), Flight and Resettlement. Paris: UNESCO, 1955., 
cited in (Schmidt, 2003) As refugees in Mishamo, Tanzania have argued, “it is a camp because we cannot leave when we 
want to”. (Malkki, 1995), p.139. 
186
 (Bakewell & de Haas, 2007), p. 95. 
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community livelihoods and networks, and mutated this historic ‘free ranging’ mobility. 187 Indeed, as 
a consequence of the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the late 1880s, many communities “found themselves 
thrown together in their particular regions with other ethnic groups with whom they had little, if 
any, prior relationships”. 188 
The political boundaries that demarcate Kenya and its neighbours within the Horn of Africa, and the 
‘fiction of an inherent national unity’ therefore belie the underlying complexities of the interrelated 
communities and ethnic groups which span the region. 189 Kenya and Somalia for example, share a 
common ethnicity, language and religion – in particular those communities that occupy the border 
region between the two states. Moreover, there is a long history of trade and movement between 
the two countries, and this has served as a solid foundation upon which myriad transnational 
networks have been built. 190 For an overview of the ethnic landscape in the region, see Figure Three 
overleaf.  
These transnational affiliations have however, also given rise to a history of tension between the 
two nation-states. From 1963 to 1967 Kenya fought a war against ethnic Somali-Kenyan 
secessionists who sought to incorporate the north-east of the country within a ‘Greater Somalia’. 
The ‘Shifta War’ (meaning ‘bandit’ in Somali) was “a war imbedded in the social and historical 
context of a people resistant to any authority outside their clan groups”. 191 As such, areas to the far 
north and east of the country remain ‘weakly governed’ and insecure, “characterized by banditry, 
cattle rustling and insurgency, as well as violent clashes between the Kenyan army and local armed 
groups.” 192 
 
                                                           
187
 (Bakewell & de Haas, 2007), p. 101.  
188
 (Keller, 1997), p. 301. 
189
 Kenya alone encapsulates more than 40 ethnic groups. The widely echoed African maxim – “we must die as tribes so 
that we can be born as a nation” – has a particularly salience in this multi-ethnic context. See (Keller, 1997), p. 301. 
190
 (Pavanello, Elhawary, & Pantuliano, 2010), p. 13.  
191
 (Ringquist, 2011), p. 100. 
192
 (Crisp, 1999b), p. 19. 
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Figure Three: African Ethno-linguistic Groups  193 
 
Protracted Regional Instability  
Such instability is not limited to Kenya. The substrata of transnational ‘fluidity’ and the creation (and 
re-creation) of an array of nascent yet ‘fragile’ states following decolonisation has over the last half 
century seen the region “scarred by long and pervasive conflicts”. 194 Adding fuel to this volatile mix, 
the Cold-War concerns of the global powers saw Soviet and US interests collide in the posturing of 
proxy wars fought across Africa and the Middle East. 195  This has culminated in intense and 
                                                           
193
 Detail of ‘Africa Ethnolinguistic Groups’ map, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. (1996), available at Library 
of Congress Geography and Map Division http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?gmd:2:./temp/~ammem_JfOn:: 
(accessed 10 February 2013).  
194
 (Bakewell & de Haas, 2007), p. 102. Central to the process of decolonisation was the UN ‘Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, adopted in December 1960. See 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/dicc/dicc.html (accessed 22 January 2013). 
195
 The Ethiopian army for example increased from 54,000 in 1977 to an estimated 600,000 in 1991, with a defence budget 
that more than quadrupled to reach $472 million over the same period.  See (Keller, 1997), p. 304. 
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protracted intra- and inter-state conflict that has plagued inter alia Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.  
State governments and communities in the region can therefore be said to have ‘legitimate’ security 
concerns. 196 For Kenya such concerns are particularly well-founded – as insecurity continues to ‘spill 
over’ into the country. 197 Extensive transnational rebel activity, a ‘flood’ of arms trafficking, local 
recruitment and training by militia groups, and the harassment of local communities seriously 
undermine efforts to establish stability both within the country and across the region. 198  
Transnationalism can thus be understood as both a cause, and consequence of regional insecurity, 
as both local communities and insurgents are driven back and forth across state borders – “in 
‘search of cool ground’ as violence has waxed and waned”. 199  
The Somali Civil War 
One of the major catalysts in regional insecurity pertinent to our case study is the Somali civil war. In 
1991, following the demise of the twenty-year Siad Barre dictatorship, the State of Somalia 
collapsed. By the end of the decade, the lack of a central government, protracted and widespread 
conflict, and recurrent drought, disease and famine had led to the death of over half a million 
Somalis, with a further 3 million (or almost half the population) displaced internally or living as 
refugees in neighbouring countries including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen. 200 By late 2004 
the country was coming to be regarded with ‘cautious optimism’ by the international community, as 
the Somali peace process made significant inroads towards establishing an interim national 
                                                           
196
 (Nowrojee, 2000), available at http://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/name-security-erosion-refugee-rights-east-africa 
(accessed 14 January 2013). 
197
 As Buzan and de Waever explain, “since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, 
security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters” – in what they termed ‘regional security 
complexes’. (Buzan & Wæver, 2003), p. 4. For an overview of the widespread insecurity in the region, see ("The miniAtlas 
of Human Security," 2008) .   
198
 Indeed, some of the earliest attacks on the country’s refugee camps in the 1990s followed the UN’s ‘Operation Restore 
Hope’ in Somalia, which dislodged a number of bandit and militia groups across the border into Kenya. See (Crisp, 1999b), 
pp. 19-20. 
199
 (Bakewell & de Haas, 2007), p. 102. 
200
 See ("Framework Document for the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) for Somali Refugees," September 2005), p. 3.; 
and ("Background Document: Initiatives that could benefit from the Convention Plus FORUM/ 2003/ 03," June 2003), p. 17. 
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governing body. 201 However, the December 2004 tsunami and a severe drought the following year 
saw instability and conflict intensify, with an estimated 1.7 million Somalis in need of humanitarian 
assistance in 2005 – placing even greater strain upon regional security, and a faltering international 
response. 202 
More recently, security concerns have again peaked in the region. Following a devastating drought in 
2011, Somalia again fell into civil disarray, with an estimated 160,000 refugees pouring across the 
border into Kenya. 203 Moreover, Nairobi’s decision to send troops into southern Somalia in pursuit 
of heightened al-Shabaab militant activity saw a dramatic escalation of border insecurity, as tensions 
between insurgents, the Kenyan army, and local communities erupted into violent hostilities. 204   
Kenyan National Insecurity  
Stirring these undercurrents of regional instability, Kenya is itself a volatile regional lynchpin. 205  The 
upcoming 2013 elections pose a significant test of the incipient multi-party democratic system 
established two decades ago, and the cautious stability of what has been termed the ‘anchor state’ 
of East Africa. 206 Such fears are well-founded, with the previous elections in 2007 seeing 1,133 dead 
and almost 600,000 displaced as disputed poll results provided an outlet for rampant socio-cultural 
                                                           
201
 The Somalia National Peace (‘Djibouti’) Conference in 2000 resulted in the ‘Arta Declaration’ and the formation of a 
Transitional National Government (TNG). Three years later, the TNG evolved further into the more comprehensive 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), aided by efforts from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 
the African Union, Arab League and UN.  See the African Union Mission in Somalia, available at http://amisom-
au.org/about-somalia/somali-peace-process/ (accessed 10 October 2012). 
202
 ("Global Report 2005,"), pp. 194-195. 
203
 ("The Human Costs of the Funding Shortfalls for the Dadaab Refugee Camps," July 2012), p. 1. 
204
 See for example Al Jazeera “Deadly grenade attack in Kenya’s Dadaab camp”(5 January 2013), available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/01/20131571854963314.html  (accessed 13 January 2013).; and Voice of 
America “Refugees Fear Insecurity in Kenya, Return to Somalia”, (10 January 2013), available at 
http://www.voanews.com/content/refugees_fear_insecurity_in_kenya_return_to_somalia/1581256.html (accessed 13 
January 2012).  
205
 Kenya is pivotal in assuaging tensions between Sudan and South Sudan, and has long played an active role in the 
ongoing peace process in Somalia, including hosting the Mbaguthi Peace Process and President Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed’s 
government-in-exile in 2004. See (Loescher & Milner, 2005), p. 169. 
206
 See Relief Web “Electoral Violence in Kenya” (9 January 2013), available at http://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/electoral-
violence-kenya ; and BBC News “Viewpoint: Can Kenya avoid election bloodshed?” (16 October 2012), available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19948429 (accessed 10 January 2013). 
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and ethnic tensions, and dissatisfied political factions within the country – almost culminating in the 
collapse of the state. 207 
Two months of intense negotiations facilitated by (former) UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the 
US saw a ‘National Accord’ secured, along with an agreed host of local and state reforms including 
the drafting of a new constitution. However, with many reforms unrealised (in particular the 
enaction of  the ‘Integrity and Leadership Bill’), and the deep ethnic, social and political divisions that 
plague the country still unresolved, the upcoming elections may again expose a significant threat to 
both national and regional stability. 208  
The Macro-Political Economy and ‘Bounded’ Refugee Space 
As can be seen, Kenya is located at the heart of a historically ‘fluid’ and highly volatile region – 
whereby an interwoven fabric of socio-cultural and ethnic affiliation has given rise to both resilient 
transnational networks and migratory support structures, and unbridled conflict, insecurity and 
displacement. The influx of significant numbers of refugees into the country, and the subsequent 
establishment of large refugee communities are therefore not isolated phenomena, but are the 
result of, and continue to be heavily circumscribed by the specific macro-political characteristics of 
the region.  
The Creation of Kakuma and Dadaab 
Following independence in 1963, Kenya largely allowed refugees to settle freely in the country. The 
only refugee ‘camp’ was the small Thika ‘reception area’ outside of Nairobi that provided temporary 
support for those awaiting formal refugee status determination (RSD). However, in 1991 
approximately 17,000 Sudanese ‘Lost Boys’ entered the country, having fled the violence that 
                                                           
207
 Two of the presidency candidates, former Finance Minister Uhuru Kenyatta and minister William Ruto are awaiting trial 
at the International Criminal Court in the Hague, charged with crimes against humanity. See BBC News “Kenyatta and Ruto 
to face ICC trial over Kenya violence” (23 January 2012), available at  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16675268 ; 
and Think Africa Press “The ICC, Kenyatta and Mungiki” (25 October 2011), available at 
http://thinkafricapress.com/kenya/icc-kenyatta-mungiki (accessed 10 January 2013). 
208
 National security concerns, and in particular the threats emanating from Somalia including al-Shabaab, border 
secessionists and “by extension the entire Somali community in Kenya (including refugees)” is likely to become a campaign 
issue.  See ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the 
migration corridor," June 2012), p. 39. 
mir 2013 | 55 | andrew slater 
 
engulfed the southern regions of (then) Sudan. 209 To ensure adequate support for this sizeable 
refugee community, the Kenyan government was forced to establish Kakuma refugee camp. 
Continued regional instability generated further displacement, with refugees from Burundi, Ethiopia, 
Somalia, and the DRC stretching Kakuma’s capacity and leading to the creation of Kakuma II and 
Kakuma III. According to UNHCR statistics the refugee population within the Kakuma ‘complex’ has 
now again exceeded capacity, topping 100,000 in July 2012. 210  
Kakuma is dwarfed however, by ‘the biggest refugee camp in the world’.211 Incorporating three core 
camps – Ifo, Dagahaley and Hagadera – the Dadaab refugee complex was originally built to house 
Somali refugees fleeing civil war in 1991. With an original capacity of 90,000 refugees, numbers have 
continued to grow at such a rate that ‘extension’ camps (Ifo 2 East, Ifo 2 West, and Kambioos) have 
been created to house the overflowing population – see Figure Four below.  According to UNHCR 
figures as of November 2012, Dadaab housed 454,098 refugees, of which 436,043 (or 96%) are 
Somali. 212  
                                                           
209
 Ranging from 10 to 17 years of age, the boys had initially walked to camps in Ethiopia, but following the collapse of the 
Mengistu regime (which had supported the efforts of the Sudan People's Liberation Front), were forced to flee once again 
into Kenya. See (Aukot, 2003), p. 74. 
210
 See UNHCR “Kakuma camp in Kenya surpasses its 100,000 capacity” (6 August 2012), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/501fdb419.html (accessed 12 January 2013).; and UNHCR “Registered Somali Refugee Population” 
available at http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/region.php?id=12&country=110 (accessed 10 January 2013). See also 
(Verdirame, 1999), p. 40.; and the 2012 UNHCR Country Operations Profile – Kenya, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483a16.htmll (accessed 6 January 2013). 
211
 See Al Jazeera, “Dadaab, the world's biggest refugee camp” (11 July 2011), available at  
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/07/201171182844876473.html (accessed 10 January 2013).  
212
 ("Camp Population Statistics by Country of Origin, Sex and Age Group," 25 November 2012), available at 
http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/region.php?id=3&country=110 (accessed 10 January 2013). As of July 2012, there 
were an additional 20-30,000 refugees sheltered on the outskirts of Hagadera camp – unable to access services and 
protection in the overwhelmed official camp. See ("The Human Costs of the Funding Shortfalls for the Dadaab Refugee 
Camps," July 2012), p. 3. The UNHCR also estimates that there are upwards of 46,000 refugees living in Nairobi (2010 
figures). However, unofficial figures place the figure at closer to 100,000. See (Pavanello et al., 2010). 




Figure Four: UNHCR presence in Kenya (as of July 2012) 
213
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 Map adapted from the UNHCR ‘Kenya Atlas Map – July 2012’, Geographic Information Systems and Mapping Unit, 
Europa Technologies Ltd., available at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483a16.html (accessed 23 January 2013).  
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One of the most definitive characteristics of both Kakuma and Dadaab is their geographical location. 
Both camps are located in semi-arid border regions that are highly marginalised – excluded from 
core state infrastructure and largely neglected by the Kenyan authorities, and underpinned by 
widespread insecurity and conflict. 214  
Kakuma is located in Turkana District of Rift Valley Province – one of the poorest, most remote and 
inhospitable regions of the country. The intensely harsh climate (often reaching upwards of 40 
degrees Celsius) and persistent shortage of water means there is little possibility for agricultural 
activities or subsistence farming. 215 The local host community (or Turkana) are nomadic pastoralists, 
and are among the 43% of the Kenyan population described as living in ‘absolute poverty’.216 Dadaab 
lies in a similarly isolated area of North Eastern Province, where the majority of the region’s local 
inhabitants are ethnic Somali-Kenyan pastoralists who struggle to survive in the extremely harsh 
climate. The province is also plagued by conflict – the border region was disputed in the Shifta War 
noted above, and “has a history of strife and insecurity.” 217 
Host Community Engagement and Advocacy 
Having explored the primary characteristics of the Macro-Political Economy, let us now turn to the 
impact it has upon specific refugee community activities.  
Localised Competition and Insecurity  
As a direct consequence of camp location, local community relations are highly volatile, with 
competition over the limited natural resources available a common cause of refugee-host tensions. 
                                                           
214
 Indeed, it has been suggested that one of the reasons the government was, and remains reluctant to establish refugee 
camps, is the lack of ‘suitable’ land. According to the UNHCR, site selection should include consideration of proximity to 
towns and infrastructure, land use, soil condition and water availability, climatic conditions, and vegetation.  However, with 
only 20% of the country arable, the needs of the Kenyan populace are very firmly set against those of the more than half a 
million refugees that have entered the country. See (Verdirame, 1999), p. 40.; and ("Handbook for Emergencies - 3rd 
Edition," 2007), pp. 204-225. 
215
 For a visual perspective on the region and host population, see The Guardian (14 October 2011), “Rankin: It's time to fix 
the world's broken food system” photo essay available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/gallery/2011/oct/14/kenya-rankin-famine-in-
pictures#/?picture=380426292&index=2 and http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/14/rankin-broken-
food-system-kenya-drought-famine (accessed 14 January 2013). 
216
 According to aid workers, during the late 1990s the level of malnutrition amongst the Turkana was greater than 
amongst the refugee population in Kakuma. See (Aukot, 2003), p. 74.; and (Crisp, 1999b), p. 19. 
217
 (Horst, 2002), p. 2. 
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As nomadic pastoralists, the Turkana for example are heavily reliant on the local environment for 
livestock (and community) survival. However, Kakuma refugees often travel upwards of 5km outside 
of camp boundaries in search of firewood and building materials, aggravating local deforestation, 
environmental degradation and community hostilities. Refugees have responded to growing 
hostilities by forming ‘well-armed’ gangs, and Turkana have themselves retaliated by sourcing 
weapons from militia groups operating along the border with Sudan and Uganda. 218  
Closely aligned with tensions over scant resources, one of the greatest sources of conflict between 
Turkana and the refugee community arises from the ownership of livestock. Competition over cattle 
and grazing rights amongst local tribes is fierce, and cattle rustling, violence and banditry are 
commonplace. 219 However, as raising livestock is largely prohibited (and unfeasible), refugees are 
forced to purchase animals for slaughter from markets located on the periphery of the camp. This 
practice greatly fuels local tensions and disputes, with the theft of newly-purchased animals a 
regular occurrence. 220 
Moreover, despite the ability of local communities to freely access many camp services, including 
boreholes, healthcare and education services (in an effort by authorities to bridge host-refugee 
community tensions), in the words of a local NGO worker, “the locals feel that the refugees are 
getting all the goodies.” 221 This has resulted in the common practice of scapegoating the refugee, 
whereby the camp is portrayed as the source of all socio-political and economic ills, including theft, 
violence, alcohol and drug abuse, and the erosion of (conservative) local customs, law and order. 222 
Echoing a UNHCR official working in Kenya who noted “you cannot create island of security in a sea 
of insecurity [sic]”, it is therefore clear that the establishment of refugee camps comprising over half 
a million people in such marginalised and volatile areas of the country has resulted in a ‘geographical 
                                                           
218
 Local communities claim that land in Kakuma, Kalobeyei, Letea, and Lopur has been ‘destroyed’ as a result of the 
refugee population. See (Aukot, 2003), pp. 76-78.  
219
 Local Turkana have for generations conflicted with numerous neighbouring tribes, including the Pokot and Karamojong 
over cattle and resources. See (Aukot, 2003), p. 74 & 76.; (de Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000), pp. 213-214.; and (Verdirame, 
1999), pp. 40-41. 
220
 As one refugee elder explained, “the Turkana say, these are not your animals. You are not supposed to keep them. You 
are refugees and you are on the move. They are our animals and we will take them.” See (Crisp, 1999b), p. 12.  
221
 (Crisp, 1999b), p. 19. See also ("In search of Protection and Livelihoods: Socio-economic and Environmental Impacts of 
Dadaab Refugee Camps on Host Communities," 2010), p. 9. 
222
 See (Aukot, 2003), p. 76. 
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concentration’ to local insecurity. 223 As Crisp rather glibly states, there are “simply more items to 
steal, more people to rob and more women to rape in and around the camps than in other parts of 
the two provinces.” 224  
Regional Transnational Networks 
A second and associated set of factors in shaping local engagement are the extant economic, socio-
cultural and ethnic networks that span the region. Indeed, for refugee communities living in what 
has been shown to be isolated and insecure regions of the country, these transnational relationships 
become even more salient. Ethnic affiliation in particular is of paramount importance in the region, 
and has a profound impact on community engagement. 225 
The Sudanese refugee community in Kenya has access to few transnational networks – with 
extensive ethnic and cultural differences, and a limited history of trade and social interaction 
between the two nation-states. 226 The Sudanese in Kakuma are therefore largely marginalised by 
the local Turkana (or any of the approximately ten other ethnic groups that inhabit the area), and 
with few transnational assets to draw upon, enjoy limited engagement with life outside of the camp. 
Indeed, as noted by the UNHCR, there is “a persistent climate of suspicion” between Sudanese 
refugees and the local Turkana community. 227  
In contrast, as noted above the extensive ethnic affiliations that exist between Somalia and Kenya 
(including the substantial Somali-Kenyan minority which spans the border region), bolstered by a 
vigorous history of movement and trade, serves as a solid transnational foundation upon which 
consequent migration – forced or otherwise – can be built. 228 For example, the longstanding cross-
                                                           
223
 (Crisp, 1999b), p. 19. Both Kakuma (with a pre-refugee population of 8,000) and Dadaab (with a population of 5,000) 
had a human density of less than 0.5 inhabitants per hectare before 1991 (in contrast to other less isolated rural districts 
such as Kisii that has a density of almost 5). Just over two decades later, the two areas boast a population of just over 
100,000 and just under 500,000 respectively.  See (de Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000), pp. 207-209. 
224
 (Crisp, 1999b), p. 20.  
225
 Over 47 ethnicities are found in Kenya alone – fostering the intense community resilience, and divisions that continue to 
shape the nation-state. See (Aukot, 2003), p. 77.  
226
 (Banki, 2004), p. 13. 
227
 (Crisp, 1999b), p. 12. 
228
 ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration 
corridor," June 2012), pp. 81-82. Rather than building upon ‘a tabula rasa’, following the 1973 Gulf Oil Crisis as well as  the 
outbreak of civil war two decades later, the web of extant Somali networks were important in “shaping who was able to 
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border cattle trade between Somalia and markets in northern Kenya provides a vital link between 
communities dispersed across the region, and has fostered the growth of expansive Somali business 
networks selling “everything from shoes to clothes and perfume.”  229  
As a consequence, for the 96% of refugees in Dadaab who are Somali, “the distinction between 
‘refugees’ and the ‘local population’ is in many ways a fuzzy one”. 230 This has allowed the ‘merging’ 
of both communities, and engendered significant economic and social integration. Moreover, such 
permeability is not one-directional. Studies of the area surrounding Dadaab in 2012 for example, 
revealed that more than 40,500 members of the local community (or 27%) within 50 km of the 
camps held refugee ration cards. 231  
Ethiopian refugees have even greater access to  regional transnational networks and assets, and are 
therefore the most successful at integrating within the local community and undertaking economic 
and socio-cultural activities. Indeed, registration with the UNHCR is generally not a means of 
accessing support and protection, but rather a strategy for resettlement. According to internal 
UNHCR statistics, of the approximately 14,000 ‘persons of concern’ from Ethiopia in Kenya in 2001, 
almost 9,000 underwent RSD and were assigned to a refugee camp  – yet failed to show up. 232 
The prior existence of transnational affiliations is therefore a primary factor in successful local 
engagement, providing a crucial foundation for inter alia establishing economic ventures, socio-
cultural integration and protection from discrimination by local authorities. However, extant 
transnational relations can also significantly destabilise both local and refugee communities. As 
instability in Somalia continues to drive insecurity across the border, the ‘fuzzy’ divide between 
‘local’ and ‘refugee’ undermines the security of both communities, with the widely-held belief that 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
go, as well as how and where the later and much larger numbers of refugees went”. (Horst, 2002), p. 6. See also (Bakewell 
& de Haas, 2007), p. 112. 
229
 See (Pavanello et al., 2010), p. 23.  
230
 (Crisp, 1999b), p. 12. 
231
 ("In search of Protection and Livelihoods: Socio-economic and Environmental Impacts of Dadaab Refugee Camps on 
Host Communities," 2010), p. 8. Surrounding communities from Yumbis, Alnijukur, Anole and Kulan have settled on the 
periphery of Dadaab in small hamlets or manyata, while others have moved into the camps themselves – Dagahaley and 
Hagadera in particular are an amalgam of local and refugee populations. See (de Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000), p. 209. 
232
 See (Banki, 2004), p. 14. 
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communities in and around Dadaab are “harbouring terrorist elements who pose a threat to Kenya’s 
national security.” 233 
Political Engagement, Activism and Mobilisation 
Against this ambiguous macro-political backdrop, refugee camps provide “a locality for growing 
social conflict, economic decline, and political abuse.” 234 Refugee political activism is widely 
prohibited – it is generally the view of local authorities that refugees “shall not even question the 
attitude of government agents towards them.” 235 However, with more than half a million refugees 
in the country (equating to a refugee-Kenyan ratio of approximately 1:100), it is in the political 
interests of some to ‘capitalise’ on anti-refugee sentiment, and for others to ‘court’ and support the 
refugee population. 236 Indeed, such is the potential of the refugee ‘political base’ that national IDs 
have previously been issued by politicians seeking to bolster votes in certain areas of the country. 237 
And in the lead-up to the state elections in early 2013, there is a serious risk that refugees could 
again find themselves “thrown into the mix of party political one-upmanship”. 238  
National Security and Political Affiliations 
Closely aligned with this refugee politicisation, concerns regarding national security heavily shape 
the activities of refugee communities housed in the country. Both Kakuma and Dadaab are 
considered to be at a ‘safe’ distance from state borders, (the former being located some 125km from 
the Sudanese border, and the latter around 100km from Somalia). 239 Yet life in the camps is directly 
                                                           
233
 ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration 
corridor," June 2012), pp. 82.  
234
 (Aukot, 2003), p. 74.  
235
 (Aukot, 2003), p. 79. Indeed, scholars suggest that the Kenyan government has continued to refuse refugees long-term 
settlement rights due to fears of secessionists in the border regions of the state. (Crisp, 1999b), p. 17. 
236
 The US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, “World Refugee Survey 2009”, p. 31., available at 
http://www.refugees.org/resources/refugee-warehousing/archived-world-refugee-surveys/2009-world-refugee-
survey.html (accessed 12 January 2013). 
237
 ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration 
corridor," June 2012), p. 80. 
238
 ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration 
corridor," June 2012), p. 82. 
239
 The OAU Refugee Convention states that “for reasons of security, countries of asylum shall, as far as possible, settle 
refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin.” ("Convention Governing the Specific Aspects 
of Refugee Problems in Africa," 1969), Article 2: 6.While the notion of a ‘reasonable distance’ has never been formally 
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affected by the socio-political events which take place in the refugees’ countries of origin. 240 
Recently, growing reports that al-Shabaab is active within Dadaab and recruiting new combatants, 
has greatly fuelled national security fears. 241 Indeed, while xenophobic attitudes pre-date the major 
waves of refugees in the early 1990s, they have escalated in the past decade, “fed by media 
portrayals of Somalis as pirates, terrorists and arm smugglers.” 242 
The Kenyan government also reflects this burgeoning transnational prejudice, with the Ministry of 
State for Immigration and Registration of Persons (MIRP) recently warning that “Islamic radicals may 
use the [Somali] refugee flow to smuggle weapons and people into Kenya to engage in terrorist 
attacks.” 243 While such security concerns may be valid, the guise of ‘national security’ has justified 
“random round-ups, confinement to camps, harassment, and the daily infringement of refugees' 
rights”. 244  
Exemplifying this national security- refugee protection nexus, the Kenyan government officially 
closed the border with Somalia in 2007 following an escalation of fighting in Mogadishu, and 
growing security concerns regarding the activities of the Islamic Courts Union militia (which would 
later splinter into al-Shabaab and other militant groups active in the region). However, refugees (and 
other migrants) continue to enter the country – their movement merely forced ‘underground’. 245 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
defined, 50 kilometres has generally been accepted as the acceptable distance for a camp to be distanced from a state 
border.  
240
 (Crisp, 1999b), p. 23. See also (Verdirame, 1999), p. 62. As Nowrojee notes, insecurity caused by ‘extremists’ within 
refugee communities has led to “a growing hostility and unwillingness to keep refugees in East Africa”. (Nowrojee, 2000), 
p. 1. 
241
 (Pavanello et al., 2010), p. 14. Such security fears are not only held by host communities. Interviews conducted by the 
Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK) in Nairobi found the fear of child recruitment by al-Shabaab  to be one of the main 
reasons refugees left Dadaab. ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee 
camps and along the migration corridor," June 2012), p. 63.  
242
 (Pavanello et al., 2010), p. 27.  
243
 ("Strategic Plan 2008-2012," 2009), p. 14. Such sentiments are echoed  by a number of security theorists, including 
Myron Weiner who argues that increasing international migration poses a direct threat to global stability and security, 
particularly in ‘fragile states’. Huntington goes even further to postulate that in the post-cold war era, failure to control 
borders is the “single biggest threat to the national security in the United States”. See (Hollifield, 2000), pp. 140-141. 
244
 (Nowrojee, 2000), p. 2. See also (Hulme, 2010), p. 198. 
245
 Reports suggest that Somali refugees are forced to pay bribes of upwards of KES7,500 to cross the border and secure 
transport to Dadaab. See ("World Refugee Survey 2009 - Kenya," 2009), available at 
mir 2013 | 63 | andrew slater 
 
Rather than mitigating state concerns, the cessation of border screenings has therefore resulted in 
increased security risks, with criminal and militant activity intensifying across the border region and 
within Dadaab. 246  
Moreover, the associated closure of the refugee transit centre in Liboi, (located 15km from the 
border and 80km from Dadaab), has removed an important ‘safe house’ and reception facility for 
newly-arrived refugees, undermining essential support services and contributing significantly to the 
abuse of refugees by local authorities and criminal groups. 247 Efforts by the Kenyan authorities to 
address state security concerns therefore “has had a markedly negative effect on the asylum space, 
and made the already difficult circumstances that Somali asylum-seekers find in Kenya almost 
intolerable”. 248  
Of note however, the politicisation and securitisation of the refugee community is not only a 
reactive response to refugee socio-political affiliations and activities (whether real or otherwise). The 
refugee is also a powerful tool in wider regional security and political agendas. A campaign by the 
Kenyan Defence Force in 2009 for example, sought to recruit refugees in the camps to the forces of 
the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Following widespread international criticism the 
campaign, which constituted “a grave breach of refugee rights” and international law, was halted. 249  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,USCRI,,BDI,,4a40d2aa76,0.html and the UN Information Centre in Nairobi (3 
September 2007), available at http://www.unicnairobi.org/Kenya_somali.asp (accessed 6 January 2013). 
246
 See (Konzolo, 2010). 
247
 The closure of Liboi has been described as “an egregious protection failure”, contributing directly to refugee mortality 
rates during the critical first days following arrival in the camps. Moreover, 27% of refugees who encountered police as 
they travelled to Dadaab during 2011 report being subject to arrest, threats or extortion.  See ("Asylum Under Threat: 
Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration corridor," June 2012), p. 88.; 
and ("“Welcome to Kenya”: Police Abuse of Somali Refugees," 2010). 
248
 ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration 
corridor," June 2012), p. 38. 
249
 New recruits were transported to a paramilitary base near Mombasa for training, and reports suggest the entire 
operation was conducted with UN backing. ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab 
refugee camps and along the migration corridor," June 2012), pp. 63-64. See also (Pavanello et al., 2010), p. 14.;  and 
Human Rights Watch “Kenya recruits Somali refugees to fight Islamists back home in Somalia” (November 2009), available 
at http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/11/16/kenya-recruits-somali-refugees-fight-islamists-back-home-somalia (accessed 2 
February 2013). 
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Keeping ‘Feet on the Ground’ 
– Recognising the Macro-Political Economy 
As has been revealed, the Macro-Political Economy plays a significant role in shaping the refugee 
community in Kenya. Characterised by a strong history of circular movement and trade, and deeply 
embedded socio-cultural, political and ethnic affiliations that span multiple nation-states, the region 
provides a dynamic and fertile, yet highly volatile transnational foundation upon which the refugee 
community rests.  
However, the outcome for refugees from this transnational foundation is ambiguous – an inherent 
trait that will be revisited time-and-time-again throughout both case studies. Indeed, macro-political 
factors can both facilitate community activities (as evidenced by the transnational community 
cohesion, engagement and support of Somali refugees in Dadaab), or undermine and ostracise the 
displaced community (as revealed in localised Sudanese-Turkana hostilities, and the wider state-
level vilification and politicisation of the Somali community as a vehicle for terrorism and insecurity). 
Indeed, as the UNHCR remarked, regarding the insecurity in Kakuma, “everything is linked to the 
country of origin”.  250 
It is therefore vital that a holistic understanding of the refugee community does not remain 
abstracted from the transnational realities on the ground – in particular how regional macro-political 
characteristics not only underpin refugee displacement, but also shape subsequent community 
development, activities and support strategies. As was argued by the International Rescue 
Committee in defence of its purported abuse of local community relationships – international 
organisations must remain “above local politics”. While this may to some degree ring true, as the 
Turkana elders noted in response, “anybody above local politics on our soil should operate in the 
air”.  251  
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 See (Crisp, 1999b), p. 24. 
251
 (Aukot, 2003), p. 77. 
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FACTOR 2:  The  Migr at ion  ‘Regime’  
 
The International Refugee ‘Regime’ 
252
 
As the UNHCR’s founding document, the 1951 ‘United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees’ (hereafter the 1951 Refugee Convention) consolidated previous nascent international 
instruments, provided a formal definition of the ‘refugee’ and outlined the responsibilities of states 
and the international community. 253 Founded upon Article 14 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the universally-recognised definition of a ‘refugee’ is a person who:  
"owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country". 254 
As of January 2013, a total of 145 states are party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which along with 
its 1967 Protocol remain “the centrepiece of international refugee protection” to this day. 255 Kenya 
acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention in May 1966, but has not ratified it.  
                                                           
252
 ‘Regimes’ are defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”. (Krasner, 1982), p. 186. For the purposes of 
this research, the term ‘International Refugee Regime’ encapsulates those refugee protection norms, policies and 
procedures embodied by the UNHCR, state governments, international humanitarian agencies and implementing partners, 
including international and regional non-governmental organisations.  
253
 See the ("Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees," 2010). 
254
 See Article 1 of the ("Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees," 2010). Article 14 of the UDHR states 
that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”. See the UNDHR available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (accessed 20 January 2013). 
255
 ("Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees," 2010), Introductory Note, pp. 2-3. See also  the United 
Nations Treaty Collection – Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?&src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=V~2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en 
(accessed 6 January 2013). While the 1951 Refugee Convention was restricted to those refugees displaced by events in 
Europe before 1 January 1951 (see Article 1: b), and limited to a mandate of three years, the UNHCR expanded its remit 
with the 1967 Protocol – which removed any geographical and time restrictions. See ("Convention and Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees," 2010), p. 46. 
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Development of an Integrated African Refugee Policy 
While the 1951 Refugee Convention provides a robust foundation, one of the cornerstones to an 
African-centric refugee response framework was the ‘Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa’, adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1969. 256 The 
OAU Convention is described as a ‘regional complement’ to the 1951 Convention, broadening the 
refugee definition and providing legal protection to a wider array of asylum seekers in response to 
the “growing refugee problem in the continent” – both individually and en masse  through prima 
facie recognition. 257  
All 41 African states that were independent at the time signed the OAU Convention (although a 
number have not acceded to its 1951 counterpart). Refugee policy in Africa therefore is a synthesis 
of three international instruments – the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol and the 1969 
OAU Convention – as a response “to the individual as well as the mass character of the refugee 
problem in Africa.” 258 
Kenyan Refugee Policy 
As noted above, after gaining independence in 1963 Kenya was recognised for its ‘generous’ refugee 
policies, allowing refugees from inter alia Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, the DRC, Burundi and 
                                                           
256
 See the  ("Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa," 1969). 
257
 ("Persons covered by the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and by the 
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (Submitted by the African Group and the Latin American Group)," 1992), I. C: 8. See 
also I. A: 6 and I. B: 4 & 5. 
For an overview of the prima facie determination of mass-influx refugee groups – as is characteristic of African refugee 
status determination (RSD), see (Albert, 2010); and ("Protection of Refugees in Mass Influx Situations: Overall Protection 
Framework," 2001). 
258
 ("Persons covered by the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and by the 
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (Submitted by the African Group and the Latin American Group)," 1992), I. A: 1. In 
addition, Kenya has acceded to a number of international humanitarian instruments that are relevant to refugee policy, 
including the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (not ratified); 1966 International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;  the 1981 African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights and 1998 Protocol relating to 
the Creation of an African Court for Human Rights;  the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court; the 1999 African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Rights of Women in Africa. Kenya is also a member of the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). See (Konzolo, 2010), pp. 9-10. 
mir 2013 | 67 | andrew slater 
 
Rwanda to seek asylum in the country with relative ease. 259 The Kenyan Government was solely  
responsible for formal RSD, with the UNHCR acting only in an advisory or ‘observer’ role. 260 Those 
seeking asylum were met by the National Refugee Secretariat’s designated ‘Eligibility Committee’ 
under the of the Ministry of Home Affairs and National Heritage in Nairobi, supported by the Thika 
‘Reception Area’ located a short distance north of the capital. 261 
As the Committee was largely assessing individual claims for asylum, the 1951 Refugee Convention 
provided the primary framework for state RSD. However, the process was hampered by a number of 
inherent factors, including a dearth of cohesive national refugee legislation and policy, limited access 
to asylum information and resources, and an inability to enforce RSD outcomes (those denied 
asylum often chose not to return home, instead simply merging with the host population). 262 
Despite these shortcomings, the ad hoc Kenyan refugee response provided a fairly generous – if 
somewhat laissez faire – welcome to those seeking refuge in the country.  
During the 1970s and 1980s the refugee population in Kenya remained relatively small (not 
exceeding 15,000), and the majority of refugees were readily absorbed into the country’s socio-
economic landscape. 263 However, rampant regional conflict in the early 1990s – including the 
overthrow of Ethiopia’s Mengistu Haile Mariam (which saw some 13,000 refugees seeking asylum in 
the country by mid-1991, reaching 46,500 a year later), the outbreak of war in Somalia noted above 
(culminating in an estimated 3,000 border-crossings per day by early 1992), and the significant influx 
of refugees from Sudan (including almost 20,000 Lost Boys) – saw the country’s refugee response 
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 Indeed, the local integration of refugees from Mozambique, Rwanda and Uganda was “an accepted fact”. (Banki, 2004), 
p. 12. 
260
 As the OAU Convention asserts, “[i]t is a collective undertaking by the Member States of the OAU to receive and protect 
refugees in accordance with their respective national legislations.” ("Persons covered by the OAU Convention Governing 
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and by the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (Submitted by the African 
Group and the Latin American Group)," 1992), I. A: 1. 
261
 Indeed, until the profound shift in refugee response in the early 1990s, the involvement of foreign aid agencies in the 
country was “negligible compared to other countries.” (Verdirame, 1999), p. 6. 
262
 (Verdirame, 1999), p. 5. For example, the Undersecretary of the National Refugee Secretariat had a staff of only three 
persons yet was responsible for more than 250,000 refugees when it was absorbed by the Ministry for Immigration, 
Registration of Persons in 2005. See  ("Analysis of Refugee Protection Capacity Kenya," 2005), p. 8.; and (Kelley, 2007), p. 
407. 
263
 (Crisp, 1999b), p. 17. 
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framework falter under immense pressure, leading to the ultimate collapse of state RSD and support 
mechanisms. 264  
Kenya, the UNHCR and the Development of an Implicit ‘Encampment Policy’ 
By December 1992, the refugee population in Kenya was upwards of 287,000 – an increase of 
2,000% over two years. 265 In order to obtain the international humanitarian assistance necessary to 
support this substantial refugee population, the Kenyan government was forced to acquiesce to the 
precepts of the international refugee regime. 266 After 1991 the country moved quickly to adopt the 
‘refugee containment model’, which saw refugees housed within formally-designated camps where 
a ‘standard relief package’ of aid and protection could be provided en masse – “until a durable 
solution is found”.  267  The UNHCR consequently established a number of camps on land provided by 
the government, including Dadaab, Kakuma, Mandera (in the north-east) and Utange (on the east 
coast 5km from Mombasa).  
By the end of 1992, Nairobi’s stance towards refugees had therefore taken a dramatic about-turn, 
from a generous, to increasingly overwhelmed and hostile host. Under pressure from local 
authorities and communities, the smaller urban camps were closed and refugees assembled in the 
                                                           
264
 See the Refugee Consortium of Kenya, available at http://www.rckkenya.org/index.php/facts-and-faqs/refugees-
asylum-seekers-returnees.html  (accessed 9 February 2013). The Thika Reception Centre, which was built as a temporary 
‘holding camp’ for between 300-500 refugees pending RSD, had by 1993 reached 5,000 inhabitants and was rife with 
disease, hunger and conflict. See (Martin, 23 January 1993). Inflation rates are also reported to have sky-rocketed in the 
early 1990s, reaching a 45% increase (year-on-year) in 1993. See the IndexMundi Kenya Inflation Rate (consumer prices) 
available at http://www.indexmundi.com/kenya/inflation_rate_%28consumer_prices%29.html (accessed 8 January 2012). 
265
 The World Bank places the number of refugees in the country even higher – at just over 402,000 in 1992. See the World 
Bank “Refugee population by country or territory of asylum”, available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG?page=4 (accessed 5 February 2013).  
266
 At the close of 1990, the UNHCR’s budget for Kenya was US$2.7million. By December 1992, it had increased to 
US$45.3million. The state continues to rely heavily on international humanitarian assistance. According to the Ministry for 
Immigration and Registration of Persons (MIRP), the 2008-2012 development budget of KES1.2billion ‘falls short’ of what is 
needed to manage the Ministry’s remit (which includes refugee affairs), and “additional resources will have to be mobilized 
through mutual collaboration with our development partners, NGOs and UN bodies like the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees”. See ("Strategic Plan 2008-2012," 2009), p. vii. ; and the Refugee Consortium of Kenya, 
available at http://www.rckkenya.org/index.php/facts-and-faqs/refugees-asylum-seekers-returnees.html  (accessed 9 
February 2013). 
267
 (Verdirame, 1999), p. 6. See also (Damme, 1999), p. 37. As noted earlier, while refugee settlement can occur 
‘spontaneously’, once the UNHCR and humanitarian aid agencies become involved, they “swiftly introduce the ‘registration 
= food aid logic’ followed by the establishment of refugee camps.” (Verdirame, 2011), p. 270. 
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two main refugee ‘complexes’ at Dadaab and Kakuma, in what became an implicitly-recognised state 
‘encampment policy’. 268  
The 2006 Refugee Act and 2010 Kenyan Constitution 
Despite this profound change in refugee response, state legislation and policy frameworks remained 
severely lacking. 269 It was only with the adoption of the 2006 Refugee Act (following ten years of 
drafting and extensive advocacy by the UNHCR and other humanitarian groups), that the formal 
realisation of any coherent state refugee policy occurred. The Act formally implemented the three 
founding instruments of the African refugee regime, namely the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 
Protocol, and the 1969 OAU Convention. The Act also established a Department for Refugee Affairs 
(DRA) within the Ministry of State for Immigration and Registration of Persons (MIRP) under the 
guidance of a Commissioner for Refugee Affairs, which is responsible “for all administrative matters 
concerning refugees in Kenya, and shall, in that capacity, co-ordinate activities and programmes 
relating to refugees.” 270   
Kenya and an Ambiguous Refugee Status 
The Refugee Act therefore provides a sound basis for state refugee process, and despite some lack 
of legal clarity, formally entrenches the UNHCR ‘encampment policy’. According to the Act, refugees 
will be moved to designated ‘transit centres’ or camps where (notwithstanding certain exceptions) 
they are expected to remain until either repatriation or resettlement in a third country – in order to 
“facilitate their protection and assistance needs and to safeguard national security”. 271  
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 (Crisp, 1999b), p. 18. See also (Pavanello et al., 2010), p. 13.; and Kakuma News Reflector – A Refugee Free Press, “Who 
believes in the rights of immigrants?” (February 2009), available at http://kanere.org/2009/02/28/who-believes-in-the-
rights-of-immigrants-do-refugees-in-kenya-have-the-right-to-a-free-press/ (accessed 6 January 2013. 
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 See (Konzolo, 2010), p. 2.; and ("The Laws of Kenya: Chapter 172 - The Immigration Act," Rev. 2009), Schedule Class M. 
Notably, Kenya was until August 2010 governed by its founding 1963 Constitution which, drawing heavily upon English 
common law, made no reference to refugees. The 2010 Constitution, while still not directly addressing refugees does 
however allude to their strengthened status within the general provisions regarding citizenship, and within the ‘The Bill of 
Rights’ . See ("The Constitution of Kenya: 2010,"), Chapter 3 & 4.; and (Konzolo, 2010), pp. 15-16. 
270
 ("The Kenya Refugee Act 2006," 2006), Article 6: 2. See also (Pavanello et al., 2010), p. 15. 
271
 (Pavanello et al., 2010), p. 15.  According to the 2006 Refugee Act, the Minister may designate areas of Kenya to be “(a) 
transit centres for the purposes of temporarily accommodating persons who have applied for recognition as refugees or 
members of the refugee’s family while their applications for refugee status are being processed; or (b) refugee camps.” 
("The Kenya Refugee Act 2006," 2006), Article 16: 2. See also ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali 
refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration corridor," June 2012), p. 73. For an excellent overview of the 
specific legalities that underpin RSD in Kenya, see (Konzolo, 2010). 
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However, despite the nascent promise of these foundations, “many of the institutions and 
procedures contemplated by the new Act are yet to be established”. 272 Indeed, while the DRA has 
since 2006 adopted a greater role in refugee processing, it remains severely limited in capacity. 273  
This lack of institutional capability and cohesion has led to a ‘confusion’ over UNHCR and DRA 
responsibilities, which has undermined refugee rights and legal status. For example, in addition to 
the ‘Asylum Seeker Certificate’ and ‘Refugee Identification Pass’ issued by the DRA, a refugee may be 
provided one of a number of additional documents that blurs refugee status, including ‘Alien Cards’ 
(issued by the MIRP), ‘UNHCR Mandate Refugee Certificates’ and RSD ‘Appointment Letters’ (issued 
by the UNHCR), ‘Convention Travel Documents’ (issued by both the DRA and UNHCR) and ‘Class M 
Work Permits’ (issued by the Immigration Department). 274 Moreover, the sheer volume of asylum 
applications has placed immense strain on refugee registration and RSD, leading to significant delays 
of between 6 and 24 months – during which time refugees are officially in the country ‘illegally’ and 
are therefore offered no (or very little) formal protection. 275  
Kenyan Refugee Camps – Quis custodiet ipsos custodies 
276
  
While RSD remains the responsibility of the UNHCR and DRA, a plethora of agencies are contracted 
as implementing partners to deliver grassroots services and support within the camps (including 
food and water, sanitation, healthcare, and education), administered by the UNHCR through a 
number of regional sub-offices. The Lutheran World Federation (LWF) for example was placed in 
charge of establishing Kakuma camp, while Care International has served as the principal provider of 
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November 2010), p. 3.  
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12.; and “Denmark in Kenya: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark”, available at http://kenya.um.dk/en/danida-en/ 
(accessed 6 January 2013).   
274
 (Pavanello et al., 2010), p. 17. See also ("The Kenya Refugee Act 2006," 2006), Articles 7 (j) & 17. 
275
 Criticism has not only been directed at Kenyan refugee agencies. Over 60 countries have handed RSD over to the 
UNHCR, despite repeated failure to meet its own guidelines and minimum standards. See Barbara Harrell-Bond and Mike 
Kagan, The Road Home for Africa’s Refugees, Protecting the Rights of Refugees in Africa: Beginning with the UN 
Gatekeeper, Pambazuka News 182, 11 November 2004., cited in (Konzolo, 2010), p. 10.  See also (Verdirame, 1999), p. 10.  
276
 Quis custodiet ipsos custodies can be translated as “who guards the guards?”, and is attributed to Juvenal – Satires 
(Satire VI, lines 347–8). 
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services in Dadaab since 1992. 277 In addition, the Kenya Government is mandated with ensuring 
refugee protection, through local authorities, police and security staff contracted to patrol the camp 
and local communities. 278 
As has been revealed in this brief overview, the refugee regime in Kenya encapsulates a primary 
administrative body of the UNHCR, DRA and other state authorities, and an array of ‘well-endowed’ 
implementation partners, which work together in “coordinating, monitoring and providing 
protection and assistance to refugees.”  279 This extremely powerful ‘Leviathan’ has transformed the 
country from a generous host state with “few formal obstacles to local integration and to the 
enjoyment of such basic rights as the right to work, to education, and to freedom of movement”, to 
a ‘transit country’ in which refugees are permitted to remain only if they are located within the 
‘bounded space’ and rubric of the refugee camp. 280   
Moreover, it is abundantly clear this migration regime is highly dysfunctional, and lacks the coherent 
response framework necessary to adequately respond to the demands of over half a million 
refugees. As a consequence, both refugees and authorities are forced to navigate what are highly 
ambiguous ‘spaces’ bound by uncertain state legislation, policies and procedures. Let us now 
examine how this has impacted upon the activities and evolution of the refugee community. 
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Political Engagement, Activism and Mobilisation 
Within the bounded space of the Kenyan refugee camp, “any reformulation of power and status is 
relational”, involving the refugee community and the migration regime defined above – i.e. the state 
and ‘humanitarian international’. 281 Yet despite a lack of ‘express authority’ this humanitarian 
international (and specifically the UNHCR) exercises “wide-ranging administrative and at times even 
judicial powers on a de facto basis in refugee camps”.  282 While in and of itself not a concern, as 
highlighted above any disproportionate allocation of authority can seriously undermine the legal and 
socio-political foundations of the other actors within the triptych – in particular the refugee 
community. 
Refugee Registration and Status 
Registration provides the critical foundation upon which refugee communities are built – embodied 
within both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 2006 Refugee Act, and integral to formal refugee 
recognition, protection and support. 283 According to the UNHCR, it is not “a one-off exercise. 
Individual and continuous registration is the UNHCR standard for registration.” 284  
However, refugee registration in the country has almost completely collapsed. The UNHCR and DRA 
operating in Nairobi and within the camps are capable of registering only a fraction of those 
refugees that enter the country each year. 285 According to UNHCR figures as of September 2010, of 
the 288,348 refugees in Dadaab, only 44,321 (or just over 15%) had been formally registered. 
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Similarly, of the 77,358 refugees in Kakuma only 8,499 (or 8.5%) had been registered, and only 6,585 
had begun the RSD process. 286  Indeed, the process of counting and registering refugees in Dadaab 
has been described as “fraught with tension and violence which often results in serious violations of 
refugee rights.” 287 
Furthermore, state concerns regarding security in and around the camps have significantly 
undermined refugee registration. In October 2011, escalating hostilities on both sides of the border 
(fuelled in part by the Kenyan Defence Force pursuit of al-Shabaab militants into Somalia), resulted 
in the cessation of all ‘non-lifesaving activities’ – including refugee processing – in Dadaab. More 
recently, the Kenyan Government has announced plans to cease all urban registrations due to 
security fears in Nairobi, particularly in the Somali-dominated area of Eastleigh. 288  
As a consequence of the inherent lack of institutional capacity, and the fluctuating transnational 
socio-political agendas embodied within the refugee regime, the large majority of refugees in the 
camps have no formally-recognised legal status and therefore occupy a highly tenuous position in 
the country – exposing the refugee community to socio-political manipulation and abuse from both 
within and outside the state. 289   
Refugee Self-Governance and Customary ‘Bench Courts’  
Such abuse is evident in the ‘perversion’ of camp governance structures. While the UNHCR “is both 
mandated and tasked with a responsibility to protect, regardless of the changing environment and 
evolving complexities”, as noted above the disproportionate allocation of authority leaves the 
refugee community prone to ongoing protection violations. 290 For example, following widespread 
refugee unrest in Kakuma in 1994, all food distribution was halted for 21 days in an egregious 
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exercise of what is termed ‘collective punishment’. This was repeated two years later, with food 
distribution halted for 14 days and the cessation of all paid incentives to refugee staff. 291 
This alarming attrition of governance structures is also evident in the refugee community – as a 
transnational-mutation (or ‘transmutation’) of traditional hierarchies and authority. In an attempt to 
bolster camp governance, a strategic priority for camp administrators has been ‘community self-
management’, perceived as a means to “empower the refugees and to boost their involvement in 
camp life”. 292  Refugee customary ‘courts’ have therefore been established in both Dadaab and 
Kakuma, founded upon “traditional courts and conflict-resolution mechanisms” and with powers of 
arrest, trial and punishment widely assumed by community leaders. 293 However, these ‘bench 
courts’ wield “immense (and sometimes arbitrary) power”, and echoing their more institutionalised 
counterparts, are highly susceptible to transmutation and abuse. 294 As a number of senior camp 
staff have argued, refugee self-management is a precarious means of securing camp stability 
“because it poses the possibility of reviving traditional power among refugees and reinscribing 
elders' enclaves of autocratic authority.” 295  
Such apprehension is founded – in addition to arbitrary and draconian punishments and 
“discrimination against the most vulnerable”, the bench courts in Kakuma have in the past been 
heavily influenced by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). 296 Particularly in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, SPLA commanders regularly visited the camps, and played a significant role in the 
actions of community leaders and the activities of the refugee community. 297  Moreover, these 
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transnational seats of power were not only permitted de facto  jurisdiction over criminal matters by 
the local authorities, but “actively encouraged and funded” by the UNHCR. 298 The camp therefore 
became a powerful tool for transnational refugee politicisation – with the SPLA “effectively in charge 
of the Dinka sector of the camp.” 299  
It is clear from this analysis that due to the inherently discordant refugee regime, and the excluded 
nature of the refugee camp, a fertile ‘parallel’ political space is created in which the arbitrary 
legitimisation and transmutation of state, ‘humanitarian international’ or refugee governance 
structures risks fomenting the socio-political agendas of each party. Indeed, the structures created 
often operate “in dramatic conflict with both national and international norms”, and can severely 
undermine refugee community stability and security. 300   
Physical Movement 
Perhaps one of the most egregious examples of the refugee regime directly impacting upon the 
activities of the refugee community however, are the restrictions imposed on movement. Indeed, it 
is widely acknowledged that the more movement is restricted, “the more the refugee settlement is 
generally seen to take on the character of the camp”. 301  In stark contrast to the provisions of the 
1951 Refugee Convention, the 2006 Refugee Act permits the Minister to designate areas as ‘transit 
centres’ and ‘refugee camps. 302  Any refugees, including children and infants, found outside these 
areas without authorisation face (officially) arrest, fines and imprisonment, and are (unofficially) 
prone to physical abuse and extortion at the hands of local authorities. 303 It must be noted however 
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that, in a further twist of Kenyan refugee policy, a refugee registered in Nairobi is permitted to settle 
in the capital, and to a certain degree, travel ‘freely’. 304 
A ‘Movement Pass’ may be allocated to those refugees seeking to travel outside the camps for 
reasons of health, education, resettlement processing in Nairobi, and general ‘humanitarian 
requests’ including family illness and funerals. However, in practice very few passes are issued, as 
the process hinges on the arbitrary decisions of local authorities operating under vague criteria. 305 
Indeed, the DRA issued a total of 6,286 movement passes in 2009, less than 3% of the total refugee 
population of Dadaab (at the time). 306 In October 2009, Kenya set in place a further hurdle to 
refugee mobility, establishing a ‘security vetting committee’ to carry out additional screening of all 
movement applications, under the guise of national security. 307 During the first six months of 
operation, approval rates almost halved (from a monthly average of 524 to 284), including a 
profound drop in medical passes, from an average of 164 down to 35. Moreover, the heightened 
securitisation of refugee mobility has engendered increased discrimination and abuse by local 
authorities, with police arresting and turning back even those refugees travelling with valid 
movement passes. 308  
Despite these restrictions, the refugee community has succeeded in achieving a considerable degree 
of mobility. A study of Dadaab residents in 2012 revealed that 39% of long-term residents had left 
the camp at least once, and it was widely acknowledged that counter to official reports, a movement 
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pass “was easy to get, if you were willing to pay for it.” 309 It is clear therefore that, assisted by local 
officials, a steady stream of refugees continues to cross the boundaries of the ‘designated’ areas and 
head for destinations across Kenya as well as further afield. Refugees often use underground routes 
that are built upon both historic and emerging transnational networks, including increasingly 
institutionalised smugglers who traverse the main migration routes and have established elaborate 
systems of bribes to circumvent formal checkpoint procedures. 310 This growth in illicit refugee 
movement has however, had the associated and unwanted consequence of increasing the 
harassment of refugees undertaking legitimate movement, greatly aggravated by the inherent 
ambiguity in refugee policy and documentation noted above. 311  
Employment and Business Activities 
Refugees’ right to work is also guaranteed by numerous international instruments, including the 
1951 Refugee Convention, the 1986 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), and the 
1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 312  Yet despite these 
provisions, limited income-generating activities are officially permitted within the camps. 313  
According to the 2006 Refugee Act, “every refugee and member of his family in Kenya shall, in 
respect of wage-earning employment, be subject to the same restrictions as are imposed on persons 
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who are not citizens of Kenya.” 314 Refugees are therefore required to obtain ‘Class M Work Permits’, 
which according to the Immigration Department are issued gratis to those with recognition letters 
from the UNCHR and DRA. 315 As such, it is the Immigration Act that prescribes the right to work, 
with the allocation of permits reliant upon the discretion of an immigration officer. Reports differ as 
to the ease with which refugees can avail themselves of these permits, however in general they are 
highly restricted and have been issued in only a few rare instances. 316 Kenya also does not permit 
refugees to acquire land, bank accounts, vehicles and other material assets, nor (as noted above) 
does it readily permit movement outside of the camps in order to conduct business activities. 317  As 
such, any economic activity is heavily constrained and undertaken “with limited protection or legal 
rights”. 318  
Yet despite these restrictions, a surprising range of economic opportunities are available to refugees 
in the camps. Employment with implementation agencies is possible, however refugee workers are 
not permitted to earn salaries, and are instead provided with ‘incentives’ which are generally much 
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lower than the incomes provided other staff.  319 Moreover, camp employers are often perceived as 
discriminating against local communities, and “intense competition for jobs, contracts and access to 
the various resources of the refugee assistance programme” leads to widespread inter- and intra-
communal conflict. 320  
An alternative strategy comes in the form of small business activities within the camps and local 
markets. 321 These market activities include the informal exchange and sale of small goods and 
foodstuffs in order to procure items that are lacking in the camps – such as shoes, clothes, meat, 
milk, kerosene and matches. 322 More formal activities are also prevalent, with large markets 
operating within both Dadaab and Kakuma that serve the needs of refugees and local communities 
alike. Notably, due to the restrictions noted above the extent of these market activities clearly 
reflect the significance of refugee transnational networks. 323  
As noted previously the Sudanese in Kakuma do not have access to robust transnational networks. 
The Sudanese market therefore remains small, encapsulating only a handful of ‘businessmen’ selling 
dried fish, tobacco, vegetables and a few ‘basic goods’. By way of contrast, the transnationally-
empowered Ethiopian market has been described as ‘dynamic’ – including “more than 120 stalls, 
with video clubs, hardware stores, a post office which relays Kenyan mail, and so-called 'hotels' 
which are coffee shops where locally brewed tej beer is served.” 324 Within Dadaab, a solid 
foundation of Somali transnational networks and local affiliations has seen a bustling market 
economy develop, with around 5,000 businesses drawing on trade links with Somalia (particularly 
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for khat – a mildly psychoactive leaf that is chewed by many in the region – and high value goods 
such as sugar, powdered milk, fruit drinks and more upmarket consumer goods), as well as links with 
local Kenyan wholesalers.  325 
In addition to network access, market activities are heavily shaped by the broader characteristics of 
the host community. As was noted above, both Kakuma and Dadaab are located in highly 
marginalised and sparsely populated areas, that are largely excluded from state infrastructure. 326  
While this means that the local economy is intrinsically not well suited to refugee self-sufficiency or 
integration, the camps have served as a locus for economic growth and expansion.  327 Indeed, the 
Dadaab complex has become “very much a feature of the North Eastern Province” and represents its 
most ‘significant city’. 328  With the annual turnover of camp businesses estimated at more than KES2 
billion (US$25 million), economic engagement and integration has benefitted immensely refugee 
and local communities alike. The annual income garnered from livestock and milk sales to the camp 
is alone estimated at KES218 million, while more than 500 jobs have been created as a direct result 
of camp economic activities, and wages for unskilled labour are between 50-75% higher than in 
other comparable areas of the country.  329 
Yet such striking economic activity has also given rise to inter-communal tensions. Goods sold in the 
camps are often very cheap in comparison to local prices, and Kenyan traders find it difficult to 
compete with their refugee competitors. The price of essential commodities including maize, rice, 
wheat, sugar and cooking oil for example are at least 20% lower in the camps than in similar rural 
                                                           
325
 (de Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000), p. 213. See also ("In search of Protection and Livelihoods: Socio-economic and 
Environmental Impacts of Dadaab Refugee Camps on Host Communities," 2010), p. 9. 
326
 The Turkana for example participate “only marginally in the market economy.” (de Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000), p. 213. 
327
 (Schmidt, 2003), p. 22. See also ("World Refugee Survey 2009 - Kenya," 2009), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,USCRI,,BDI,,4a40d2aa76,0.html (accessed 6 January 2013). For an interesting 
glimpse of local-refugee community economic interaction in Nairobi, see the BBC News “’Little Mogadishu’: Paradise for 
shoppers or pirates? (10 December 2012), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11962254 (accessed 11 
January 2013). 
328
 ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration 
corridor," June 2012), p. 82. 
329
 ("In search of Protection and Livelihoods: Socio-economic and Environmental Impacts of Dadaab Refugee Camps on 
Host Communities," 2010), p. 9. See also The Guardian “Kenya can turn the Dadaab refugee camps into an asset” (18 April 
2012), available at  http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/apr/18/kenya-turn-dadaab-
into-asset (accessed 11 January 2013). 
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areas of the country. 330 Refugee traders are also not subject to taxation, have access to cheap (and 
illegal) imports from neighbouring countries, and do not pay for rent or other ‘overheads’. 331  
The Refugee Migration Regime – Unravelling ‘Bounded’ Space 
As has been revealed in this section, the Migration Regime presents a number of complex difficulties 
for the refugee community. At its most basic, the Kenyan refugee camp differs from other local and 
migrant communities in its mode of governance. 332 Overwhelming pressure from refugee 
displacement and the overarching primacy of the ‘international refugee regime’ saw the subjugation 
of state authority, and the creation of a ‘parallel’ refugee space that is both located within, and yet 
excluded from the nation-state. Indeed, bound by the refugee regime’s prevailing ‘containment and 
relief’ model, “the lack of integration of refugees in the host country is not merely a consequence of 
their encampment, but the very essence and purpose of camps.” 333  
This exclusion has permitted the regime’s abject failure to legally recognise refugees within the 
state, and perpetuated illegitimate camp governance structures that have greatly derailed socio-
political mobility, and the cohesion of the refugee community itself. Moreover, restrictions on 
refugee movement and economic activities have further isolated the refugee ‘space’ from the state 
– leaving the refugee community in a highly tenuous and ‘bounded’ position within the country.  
Yet it is also evident that the refugee community has not remained a passive agent within this state-
regime-refugee triptych. Drawing upon substantial transnational networks, refugees are highly 
empowered actors in Kenya, and enjoy a remarkable degree of movement, and an array of economic 
and business activities (particularly in Dadaab). What is more, these activities do not only benefit the 
refugee community itself, but have a profound impact upon local communities. As such, far from the 
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 See ("In search of Protection and Livelihoods: Socio-economic and Environmental Impacts of Dadaab Refugee Camps on 
Host Communities," 2010), p. 9. 
331
 Local communities have on numerous occasions demanded the taxation of the refugee community. Authorities 
estimate taxes in Dadaab could raise as much as KES8 million, and Kakuma around KES2million. Refugees however, argue 
that the payment of bribes to local authorities are a suitable substitution for any tax. See (de Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000), 
p. 215.;  and (Crisp, 1999b), p. 19 
332
 Refugee camp ‘modes of governance’ can be defined as “the mechanisms of decision-making within or over the refugee 
community.” (Schmidt, 2003), p. 5. 
333
 (Verdirame, 2011), p. 270. As Edwards notes, “as non-citizens who are on the perimeters of the citizen-state protection 
system, refugees have been reliant largely on specific legal regimes, supported by humanitarian goodwill, for their 
protection.” (Edwards, 2009), p. 765. 
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symptomatic ‘exclusion’ that in many ways underpins our understanding of the refugee camp , the 
state exhibits a high degree of permeability, as refugees draw upon those transnational strategies 
that are available to perforate the restrictions inherent within the refugee regime’s bounded space 
model.  
FACTOR 3:  Pol i t ics  o f  the  Diasp ora  
 
As was highlighted in the previous section, while guaranteeing the basic survival and protection of 
refugees is a primary function of the refugee regime, with agencies operating under a UNHCR 
implementation model according to certain ‘minimum standards’, the camp falls desperately short 
of realising the wider notion of community security that was embodied within the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. 334 It is widely acknowledged that long-term residence within camps leads to 
‘dependency syndrome’, with refugee communities characterised by “a sense of despair and low 
self-worth” and becoming “permanent cases for international welfare”. 335  
In response, those bound by the camp space undertake both negative and positive coping 
mechanisms, drawing heavily upon the transnational assets and networks that are available in an 
effort to counter the restrictions of containment. 336 Let us now examine in-depth how the dynamics 
of those refugee communities dispersed across the diaspora themselves shape and transform these 
strategies, and the ‘bounded’ space of the Kenyan refugee camp.  
The Refugee Community: A ‘Common’ Identity 
As Horst notes in her exploration of refugee communities in Dadaab, while it is incorrect to assume a 
homogeneity or single refugee ‘identity’ (i.e. a unified refugee community with shared traits, 
experiences and characteristics), it is also not useful to describe the “very personal and unique 
                                                           
334
 See (Jamal, 2003), p. 5., ("Minimum standards and essential needs in a protracted refugee situation: A review of the 
UNHCR programme in Kakuma, Kenya,"); and ("Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees," 2010), p. 3. 
335
 (Harrell-Bond, 1995), p. 8.; and (Crisp, 2002), p. 13.  See also (Bakewell, 2003); and (Kelley, 2007).  For an excellent 
analysis of ‘self-sufficient’ refugee camps in Africa during the 1980s, see ("Older Refugee Settlements in Africa: Final 
Report," 1985). 
336
 Negative and positive coping mechanisms refer to the multitude of strategies refugees employ in order to realise basic 
needs, sustain livelihoods and establish (or reaffirm) social support structures as a result of refugee camp restrictions and 
the erosion of traditional support mechanisms. See (Schmidt, 2003), p. 17.  
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characteristics” of individual refugees, for whom any comparison or conclusion would be 
impossible.337 However, the Somali refugee community (which is by far the largest in Kenya, 
constituting approximately 82% of all refugees including those in urban areas), are commonly 
represented as ‘one people’ –  with a single language (af-soomali), one traditional livelihood 
(nomadic pastoralism) and one religion (Islam). 338 Moreover, the traditional Somali tol or ‘clan’ 
structure has a profound influence on society, acting as both a powerful binding mechanism and a 
divisive force in the community. 339 Indeed, Horst notes that “[a]s the foundation of social 
cooperation, kinship is a feature of all transactions between and amongst individuals.” 340 While 
there are principally six clan ‘families’ – the Darod, Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye, Digil and Rahanweyn – within 
the camps around 80% of refugees belong to the Darod clan. 341  This means that despite the 
possibility for dissention, there is in fact a very strong sense of unity and cohesion within the Somali 
refugee community in the camps.  
As such, while reference will be made to ‘individual motivations’ and ‘household strategies’ (as 
outlined by the refugee middle space model), as well as other refugee communities, this section will 
focus primarily upon the ‘unified’ Somali refugee community as the principal endogenous unit of 
analysis. Indeed, as Zetter notes, “Somali displacement is, in some respects, an archetype of 
protracted displacement”. 342 
                                                           
337
 (Horst, 2006b), p. 45. 
338
 (Horst, 2006b), p. 45. As of the end of 2012, there were more than 630,000 refugees in Kenya. The Somali refugee 
population stands at around 515,500 – constituting 96% of refugees in Dadaab and more than 50% in Kakuma. See the 
UNHCR Information Sharing Portal, available at http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/country.php?id=110 ; the 2013 
UNHCR Country Operations Profile – Kenya available at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483a16.html (accessed 23 
January 2013).; and ("Camp Population Statistics by Country of Origin, Sex and Age Group," 25 November 2012). 
339
 Horst describes the ‘evocative’ power of kinship as the “axiomatic ‘natural’ basis for all forms of social cooperation and 
as the ultimate guarantee of personal and collective security”. Such is the extent of this ‘socio-cultural obligation’ that clan 
affiliations form the basis for potent transnational networks within the Somali diaspora. (Horst, 2006b), p. 63. 
340
 (Horst, 2006b), p. 63. 
341
 The reason for this is two-fold. Firstly, during civil war the significance of clan affiliations grows in importance as a 
mechanism for social cohesion and support (and division). And secondly, as noted previously displacement largely follows 
pre-existing patterns of transnational networks, and the Darod (and Ogaden sub-clans) have a particularly well-established 
and prolific web of networks across the region.  See (Horst, 2006b), pp 46-47. 
342
 (Zetter, 2011), p. 6. 
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Social Cohesion and Community Security 
In what Vortovec describes as ‘diaspora as consciousness’, those dispersed across the diaspora 
foster a sense of collective identity and belonging by “selectively preserving and recovering 
traditions so that they create or maintain identification within far reaching historic, cultural and 
political processes”. 343 This created identity or ‘collective consciousness' is vital to community 
cohesion and its effective functioning during displacement – in simple terms making “the best of a 
bad situation”. 344  
Community Education 
Education is paramount to building collective consciousness, as a mechanism for providing young 
persons with not only basic knowledge and skills, but also for perpetuating shared values and norms, 
and fostering the mental, physical and psycho-social tools necessary for coping with the trauma of 
displacement. 345  
Following the establishment of Dadaab in 1991, the Somali refugee population played an active role 
in education – with services provided according to a Somali curriculum and prevailing community 
ideology. However, formal community engagement ended in 1994 when the UNHCR took over 
responsibility for education within the camps. 346 Moreover, education was not perceived as a 
‘humanitarian priority’, and despite recent moves towards community capacity-building, services 
remain dramatically inadequate. Camp statistics reveal 40% (or almost 182,000) of Dadaab’s 
residents are between 5 and 17 years old, yet there are only 24 primary and 6 secondary schools 
                                                           
343
 (Shuval, 2000) See (Vertovec, 1997). Malkki describes identity as “always mobile and processual, partly self-
construction, partly categorization by others, partly a condition, a status, a label, a weapon, a shield, a fund of memories 
[...] It is a creolized aggregate composed through bricolage.” (Malkki, 1992), p. 37. 
344
 Clifford, J. (1994) `Diasporas’ , Cultural Anthropology, 9(3): 302-338., p. 312., cited in (Wahlbeck, 2002), p. 234. 
345
 The importance of refugee education cannot be understated. Children constitute approximately 44% of the global 
population of refugees and those in ‘refugee-like situations’.  ("UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2010: Trends in Displacement, 
Protection and Solutions," 2011), p. 9. 
346
 This shift, it was argued, sought to ensure that refugees achieve a ‘minimum standard’ of education, with refugee 
children permitted to sit the Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) and the Kenya Certificate of Secondary 
Education (KCSE) examinations since 1998. Yet certificates from refugee schools are generally not recognised by the 
Kenyan Ministry of Education. See ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee 
camps and along the migration corridor," June 2012), p. 68.; and (Pavanello et al., 2010), p. 25. 
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funded through the UNHCR (and 11 primary and 3 secondary schools funded privately), as well as a 
handful of vocational training programmes. 347  
Enrolment rates also remain alarmingly low – according to 2011 data, enrolment in pre-primary 
education was at 19.8%, primary enrolment 34.4%, while secondary education enrolment was a 
striking 7.4%. Only 1% of those aged between 15-24 were enrolled in an alternative education 
programme. Girls in particular are significantly under-represented in the education system – 
reflecting the influence of cultural traditions which stress the importance of (early) marriage, family 
and household duties for girls. 348  
Moreover, for those young persons who do acquire some level of education, as noted above there 
are limited livelihood opportunities, and loss of agency heightens the appeal of crime as a negative 
coping mechanism. 349  Indeed, there pervades a sense of ‘intense frustration’ amongst refugee 
youth, who in general see themselves as “not being heard or involved in decision-making in the 
camps”. 350 As a consequence, a large proportion of youth “remain idle and become prone to 
antisocial behaviour, including substance abuse” which, combined with a lack of leadership amongst 
community elders undermines the traditional social hierarchies, structures and activities that 
underpin refugee communities. 351  
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 ("Camp Population Statistics by Country of Origin, Sex and Age Group," 25 November 2012). Reports show that schools 
are vastly overcrowded and under-resourced, with upwards of 100 students per classroom and only 20% of teachers 
having any formal training. Schools are also generally located on the camp periphery, exposing children to heightened risk 
of abuse and exploitation. See ("The Human Costs of the Funding Shortfalls for the Dadaab Refugee Camps," July 2012), p. 
2.; and ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the 
migration corridor," June 2012), p. 69. 
348
 See ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the 
migration corridor," June 2012), p. 68.; and Borderless Higher Education for Refugees (BHER), available at 
http://crs.yorku.ca/bher-dadaab-about (accessed 22 January 2013). 
349
 (Crisp, 1999b), p. 28.  Of those employed, 86%  earn less than KES5,000 per month – often below Kenya’s minimum 
wage. See UNHCR. (2011). Youth Survey of 2011. Dadaab., cited in ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of 
Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration corridor," June 2012), p. 71. 
350
 ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration 
corridor," June 2012), p. 71. 
351
  ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration 
corridor," June 2012), p. 71.
 
 See also (Crisp, 1999b), p. 26.; (Milner & Loescher, 2011); and (Pavanello et al., 2010), p. 14. 
For an excellent analysis of the transmutation of Hutu and Tutsi refugee communities in refugee camps in Western 
Tanzania, see (Malkki, 1995). 
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In an attempt to counter this generational socio-cultural decline, the Somali community has made it 
clear that the “inclusion of Somali language, religious education, and cultural studies” in camp 
education services “are of vital concern.” 352 In addition, for those households who are able to access 
education services outside the camps, there is a preference for madrassa schools (which teach an 
Islamic-based curriculum). 353 However, while such culturally-affirming education practices ensures 
younger generations remain embedded within (and supported by) the transnational collective 
consciousness, it also means that sections of the refugee community are actively isolated from the 
mainstream camp and Kenyan education systems. This aggravated social exclusion plays “an 
enormously important role in determining the extent to which integration into local society takes 
place.” 354 
Personal  Security 
Closely associated with this socio-cultural devolution, is the intrinsic insecurity of the bounded 
space. While it is difficult to accurately gauge the level of insecurity within Kenya’s camps, refugee 
communities (particularly in Dadaab) face ‘acute protection challenges’, with violence, shooting, 
rapes, murders, as well as physical and mental abuse, theft and crime “a feature of everyday life”. 355  
However, as evident in the degradation of social cohesion revealed above, insecurity must be 
understood as a synthesis of both structural and social factors – including not only the intensive 
‘warehousing’ of heterogeneous communities and failing camp services discussed in the preceding 
section, but also the transmutation of traditional community structures and socio-cultural systems 
across the diaspora space. 356 
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 ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration 
corridor," June 2012), p. 70. While arguing that it is not ‘feasible’ to incorporate specific cultural elements within the 
general education programmes in the camps, the UNHCR is supportive of community education services conducted outside 
of school hours. 
353
 These alternatives are however, very costly. A public secondary school in Nairobi can cost upwards of KES3,000 per 
month, and private schools seven times this amount. See (Pavanello et al., 2010), p. 25. 
354
 ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration 
corridor," June 2012), p. 81. 
355
 ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration 
corridor," June 2012), p. 40. See also (Crisp, 1999b), pp. 3-4.; ("The Human Costs of the Funding Shortfalls for the Dadaab 
Refugee Camps," July 2012); and ("“Welcome to Kenya”: Police Abuse of Somali Refugees," 2010). 
356
 (Operational Protection in Camps and Settlements, 2006), p. 27.   
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Indeed, notwithstanding substantial inter-communal conflict, insecurity within the camps is largely 
the result of intra-communal tensions. 357  Violence is highly reflective of homeland clan affiliations 
and tensions that underpin the transnational foundations of the diaspora – heightened by 
displacement and the pressured conditions of the camp. This is evident in Kakuma in the late 1990s 
– when violence between the Sudanese Dinka and Nuer clans, and between the Dinka Barhal Gazal 
and the Dinka Bor was widespread. 358 Intra-communal violence can also occur along ethnic 
divisions, as exemplified by the violence that erupted between the majority Somali and the minority 
Somali Bantu (who have historically been regarded as ‘subservient’) in Dadaab in the late 1990s. 359 
Violence is however, not only limited to the camps. The surrounding district provides an enticing 
location for roving ‘bandits’ who engage in rampant theft, violence and extortion – drawn by the 
concentrated population and activities of refugees, local communities and implementing agencies. 
360 Reports indicate that bandits operating around Dadaab comprise a mix of local Kenyans, Somali 
refugees and to a lesser extent Somali militia engaged in cross-border raids. 361 Yet unlike violence 
within the camps, socio-cultural and ethnic affiliations play only a minor role in shaping their 
criminal activities. The extreme and non-specific nature of violence suggests that bandits prefer 
simply to maintain a sense of insecurity amongst the local and refugee communities, and thereby 
create a level of impunity and control. 362   
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 In Kakuma for example, refugees from over ten different countries occupy an overcrowded and hostile space, and 
violence between Sudanese, Ethiopian and Somali communities has been commonplace since its creation in the 1990s. See 
(Aukot, 2003), p. 76.; and (Crisp, 1999b), p. 30. 
358
 Similar clan tensions are evident in Dadaab within the Somali community. However, as noted earlier the 
disproportionate prevalence of the Darod clan negates to some degree intra-communal hostility – which is instead 
primarily the consequence of transnational political affiliations. See (Crisp, 1999b), pp. 9-10. 
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 (Crisp, 1999b), pp. 9-10. A history of violence and suspicion between the Hutu and Tsutsi, and the Oromo and Ethiopians 
are further examples of the ethnic tension inherent within refugee communities in the camps. See (Aukot, 2003), p. 76. 
360
 A ‘bandit’ has been defined as “a conveniently generic term that is used to describe roving groups of men who are also 
responsible for theft, cattle rustling and other criminal activities.”  (Crisp, 1999b), p. 7. Interestingly, the Somali word for 
‘bandit’ – shifta – is historically associated with a Robin Hood-like figure who resisted colonial authority, and garnered 
‘prestige and plunder’ for the people. See (Ringquist, 2011), p. 100.  
361
 Bandits are also heavily involved in criminal activity on the transport routes around the camp – their increasing audacity 
evident in the recent kidnapping of four international workers from the Norwegian Refugee Council. See (Crisp, 1999b); 
and al Jazeera “Aid workers abducted at Kenya's Dadaab camp” (29 June 2012), available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/06/2012629112537457510.html (accessed 22 January 2013). 
362
 (Crisp, 1999b), pp. 8-9. 
mir 2013 | 88 | andrew slater 
 
Attempts to bolster the formal security presence has been shown to have little impact, hampered in 
part by a failure to address the inherent socio-cultural nature of insecurity, and a lack of engagement 
by the international refugee regime itself. 363 Indeed, the activities of local authorities to ‘keep the 
peace’ are most often ad hoc ‘settlements’ that seek to extort money from refugees, and muddy the 
already murky waters surrounding refugee security. This is particularly relevant for new arrivals – 
who are unfamiliar with the local socio-political landscape, and are in general “disorientated by their 
recent displacement experience.”  364 
Moreover, refugees are often unwilling to prosecute criminal elements, due to prevailing clan 
affiliations and the customary practices of the community. The concept of mashalah or ‘blood 
money’ for example, is “a central feature of Somali culture, allowing individuals to buy exemption 
from criminal acts.” 365 Retribution and intimidation against community members or clan groups 
who do seek prosecution is also commonplace. 366 The refugee community has been somewhat 
active in addressing security concerns, for example establishing ‘Community Peace and Safety 
Teams’ (CBSTs) in Dadaab in order to tackle escalating border insecurity. However, mirroring the 
inherent ambiguity and transmutation of transnational affiliations, those community leaders 
perceived as ‘assisting’ CBSTs have been threatened and in some cases killed by al-Shabaab 
sympathizers. 367 
Gender-based Violence (GBV) 
Against this backdrop of intra-communal conflict and socio-cultural decay, women and children 
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 Indeed, the main UNHCR office in Nairobi was staffed by only one International Protection Officer (IPO) until February 
1998. See (Crisp, 1999b), p. 13.; and UNHCR “UNHCR strengthens its presence in Dadaab refugee complex” (25 May 2012), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/4fbf62689.html (accessed 10 January 2013).  
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 (Pavanello et al., 2010), p. 17. Indeed, such is the practice of refugee abuse and extortion that patterns of arrests can be 
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sexual abuse.  
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 (Crisp, 1999b), p. 21. Such is the degree of impunity in and around these liminal spaces that the UNHCR has 
recommended “a high degree of accountability on the part of the elders and the perpetrators” be introduced. (Crisp, 
1999b), p. 20. 
366
 In addition, some reports suggest that those refugees who are jailed often “learn more criminality in prison” – 
sometimes forming criminal gangs or joining local bandits upon release and thereby increasing insecurity in the camps. 
(Crisp, 1999b), p. 21. 
367
 Center for strategic & International Studies “The Dadaab Refugee Complex: A Powder Keg and It’s Giving Off Sparks” (1 
March 2012), available at http://csis.org/publication/dadaab-refugee-complex-powder-keg-and-its-giving-sparks (accessed 
24 January 2013). 
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“have particular and pronounced protection needs in the camps”, with sexual abuse and gender-
based violence (GBV) “a daily reality for refugees”. 368 Although a number of ad hoc projects have 
sought to address this gendered- insecurity, camp services remain largely inadequate and 
ineffective. 369 Indeed, while reports of sexual violence increased 36% between February and May 
2012, funding for GBV programmes decreased by 50% over the same period. 370  
Many instances of GBV are a result of traditional practices, for example female genital mutilation is 
widely practiced amongst the Somali refugee community, and Sudanese girls have been abducted 
from Kakuma for forced marriage in the homeland. 371 However, one of the most widely reported 
instances of GBV within the camps is rape. 372 While some reports suggest that the rape is a ‘weapon 
of warfare’ used in traditional hostilities between rival clans, others suggest that it occurs 
irrespective of clan affiliation or ethnicity, and is more the result of the insecurity inherent within 
and around the camp complex. 373 Reports also indicate that contrary to traditional norms, domestic 
violence is prevalent in the camps – to the extent that it has become accepted as ‘normal’ by the 
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 ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration 
corridor," June 2012), p. 88.; and (Crisp, 1999b), p. 6 
369
 For example, in mid-1997 the Dadaab Firewood Project was implemented to address the incidence of rape as women 
and girls collect firewood in the surrounding area. With a 45% decrease, the project was regarded as ‘highly successful’. 
However, the politicisation of firewood collection and distribution, and the costly nature of the exercise (only 11% of 
household firewood needs were met, and an increase in rape of between 78-113% in other areas and contexts was 
reported), meant that the project was halted. See ("Evaluation of the Dadaab firewood project, Kenya," 2001). 
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 ("The Human Costs of the Funding Shortfalls for the Dadaab Refugee Camps," July 2012), p. 3. This runs contrary to the 
2006 Refugee Act, which states that “the Commissioner shall ensure that specific measures are taken to ensure the safety 
of refugee women and children in designated areas.” ("The Kenya Refugee Act 2006," 2006), Article 23. 
371
 (Crisp, 1999b), p. 6 
372
 Moreover, sexual violence is not restricted to the female population – reports suggest that rape of Sudanese boys and 
young men may be prevalent, particularly as a large proportion of these refugees arrived as unaccompanied minors in the 
early years of Kakuma. (Crisp, 1999b), p. 6. 
373
 See (Fitzgerald, 1998). Reports indicate that attacks are most likely to occur at night, in conjunction with the activities of 
bandits within the camp grounds. In response, in the late 1990s the UNHCR and German humanitarian agency GTZ  assisted 
in the planting of more than 150km of thorn-bushes along the periphery of the Dadaab complex. However, increasing 
camp security has simply shifted the issue, with the vast majority of rape now occurring during daylight hours in the bush 
surrounding the camps, when women and girls are collecting firewood and building materials, or when walking to and from 
school. See (Crisp, 1999b), pp. 15 & 31. 
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majority of Somali refugees. 374 Interviews by the International Rescue Committee in Dadaab support 
these findings, finding ‘intimate partner violence’ (IPV) to be “the most common form of GBV” 
occurring in the camp. 375  
The prevalence of IPV and GBV can therefore be largely attributed to the breakdown of social 
structures and cohesion within the camps. Indeed, one of the principle transformations in refugee 
communities concerns the role of women. As discussed earlier, the refugee camp erodes traditional 
leadership mechanisms – in which men play a central role. Women on the other-hand, not only 
retain many of their traditional social functions, but are increasingly empowered and integrated 
within camp governance and decision-making processes by the UNHCR and other (western) 
humanitarian agencies. 376 As a consequence, “traditional authority structures are less reliable, and 
new power-relations are created and sustained”. 377 
The transmutation of socio-cultural relationships within the camp space is also the result of the 
actions of refugee households themselves. Caregivers often profit from financial payments for young 
brides, or enforce marriage in order to secure a form of ‘security’ for their daughters and to mitigate 
the risk of pregnancies ‘out of wedlock’ (a euphemism for pregnancy due to rape). 378   
While this research supports what is increasingly being acknowledged by refugee theorists – that the 
camp creates a space conducive to the ‘perversion’ of refugee community structure and cohesion,  
and ultimately erodes refugee safety – solutions remain mired in outmoded ontologies and 
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 See (Crisp, 1999b), p. 5. Notwithstanding heightened GBV due to  civil war, and traditional practices including female 
genital mutilation, Somali culture places heavy emphasis on the protection of women and ‘the vulnerable’. See (Konzolo, 
2010), p. 3.; and ("Gender-Based Violence Rapid Assessment Dadaab, Kenya," July 2011), p. 2.; and United Nations Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Somalia “Gender Based Working Group”, available at 
http://www.unocha.org/somalia/coordination/clusters/protection/gbv-working-group (accessed 22 February 2013).  
375
 ("Gender-Based Violence Rapid Assessment Dadaab, Kenya," July 2011), p. 5. UNHCR figures reveal that the incidence of 
GBV in Dadaab are increasing, from 103 report cases in 2007, to 219 in 2008 including 79 cases of rape. See (Pavanello et 
al., 2010), p. 14.; and IRIN “Kenya: Camp resources stretched by influx of Somali refugees” (6 February 2009), available at 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report/82792/KENYA-Camp-resources-stretched-by-influx-of-Somali-refugees (accessed 2 
January 2013).  
376
 (Crisp, 1999b), p. 26.  
377
 (Schmidt, 2003), p. 18.  
378
 ‘Survival sex’ is also a feature of camps, as a readily available negative coping mechanism for young women seeking to 
secure some form of protection in the absence of alternative strategies. See ("Gender-Based Violence Rapid Assessment 
Dadaab, Kenya," July 2011), pp. 5-6. 
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practices. 379 In response, refugee women are establishing their own community groups, including 
security committees, and GBV advocacy and support groups, that exist outside of the dominant 
socio-cultural structures and power dynamics of the camp space, and draw upon their own set of 
gendered relationships and resources, embodying a novel evolution of community structure and 
gendered socio-cultural dynamics. 380  
Information Dissemination 
The exchange of information is a hugely powerful mechanism for community strength and advocacy, 
and can transform migration and migrant communities, including those living within Dadaab and 
Kakuma. 381 As noted earlier, the explosion in global communications technology that has occurred 
in the last century has dramatically reduced the ‘distance’ between transnational refugee 
communities within the diaspora. Of note, an informal network of two-way radio sets, referred to as 
the taar, allows cheap and relatively easy communication between Somali communities dispersed 
across the region. 382 For these hyper-connected communities, readily accessible images of other 
communities, and specifically those in the global ‘North’, create a vision of the refugee diaspora that 
is part reality – part fiction.  
 
                                                           
379
 Notably, in 1986 the International NGO Working Group on Refugee Women and their report “Working with Refugee 
Women: A Practical Guide” provided an important building block in the formation of UNHCR guidelines that address the 
protection needs of refugee women. However, research has revealed that despite the implementation of more 
participatory security and governance methods, women continue to be largely excluded and persecuted. See (Bakewell, 
2003).; (Hyndman, 1997); (Schmidt, 2003), p. 19.; Trōcaire “Refugee Women - A Kenya Case Study” (1999), available at 
http://www.trocaire.org/resources/tdr-article/refugee-women-kenya-case-study (accessed 23 January 2013).; and 
("Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees," 2002). 
380
 (Hyndman, 1997) These groups are often assisted by humanitarian groups working within the camps. See for example 
LWF “A Life Free from Violence: The safe Haven in Dadaab” (30 August 2011), available at 
http://www.lutheranworld.org/lwf/index.php/dadaab-safe-haven.html (accessed 24 January 2013).  
381
 Eluding to the preceding discussion on gendered relations, radio is a particularly potent form of information 
dissemination and community engagement within the camps. See Lifeline Energy “A lifeline to women – Kenya”, available 
at http://lifelineenergy.org/news_index_A_Lifeline_to_women.html (accessed 23 January 2013) 
382
 (Van Hear, 2006), p. 11. In addition to information exchange, the taar actively strengthens the transnational links that 
underpin the refugee diaspora, with much of the operator’s time spent in baafin or ‘tracing’ individuals amongst camps 
and communities. See (Horst, 2006b), pp. 130-133. 
mir 2013 | 92 | andrew slater 
 
As Appadurai notes: 
“[t]he lines between the realistic and the fictional landscapes they see are blurred, so that 
the farther away these audiences are from the direct experiences of metropolitan life, the 
more likely they are to construct imagined worlds that are chimerical, aesthetic, even 
fantastic objects”. 383 
The stories of refugees who have ‘successfully’ resettled in other parts of the diaspora in particular, 
have a huge influence upon bounded refugee communities. 384 Moreover, these stories are highly 
susceptible to embellishment, and are therefore a potent catalyst in the transmutation of the 
‘reality’ of containment – as refugees come to view their lives “through the prisms of the lives of 
others.” 385  
The dissemination of information can therefore strengthen the refugee community, as those 
dispersed across the diaspora cultivate powerful forms of transnational ideology, association and 
activity. Equally it can undermine social cohesion, as disparities (real and imagined) generate 
tensions within the refugee community and across the wider diaspora. As Horst notes, while 
“collective imagination provides hope in quite a hopeless situation”, it will inevitably lead to “all 
manner of frustrations if dreams cannot be realized or their accomplishment does not bring the 
solution hoped for”. 386 
The Problem of the Buufis  
The inherent duality of transnational information exchange is exemplified by the notion of buufis. 
Common amongst the Somali refugee community in Dadaab, the term literally means to ‘blow into 
or inflate’, and is used to describe a longing for resettlement. 387 Moreover, it can be used to refer to 
                                                           
383
 (Appadurai, 1996), p. 35. 
384
 Indeed, imagination is a ‘social practice’, and is “central to all forms of agency”. (Appadurai, 1996), p. 31. 
385
 (Horst, 2006a), p. 152. As Horst notes, if one assumes that refugees have a certain degree of agency in determining their 
lives, “this surely also includes the power and choice to create knowledge about and give meaning to their own situation 
(Horst, 2006a), p. 144. 
386
 (Horst, 2006a), p. 152. 
387
 The extent of the buufis ‘phenomenon’ must be understood in the historical context – as noted above Somali 
communities are built upon strong traditions of mobility. Indeed, older Somali believe that those in the grip of buufis are 
possessed by the saar or ‘spirit’ of travel. In order to heal someone, the community must help the individual realise their 
dreams of migration.  See (Horst, 2006a), pp. 143-144. 
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the ‘madness’ that can occur when this dream is not realised. 388 The prevalence of buufis is, Horst 
asserts, the direct result of the transnational flow of information – which allows refugees within the 
camp to contrast their own lives with those living in other (more desirable) locations across the 
wider diaspora. 
A number of conclusions regarding the refugee community can be garnered from the buufis 
phenomenon. Firstly, the notion of collective ‘consciousness’ – in this case the vision of resettlement 
– is a synthesis of information dissemination and the bounded nature of refugee containment. In the 
words of a young Somali in Dadaab, buufis “is a disease that attacks people who are mentally in 
America and physically in Ifo.” 389 Secondly, the outcome of this confluence is ambiguous – 
characterised by both risk and potential. For example, while there has been a resurgence of 
nationalistic sentiment among younger refugees, this consciousness can fuel tension as evident in 
the politicised conflict spanning the Somali-Kenyan border (and encapsulating Dadaab) noted 
earlier.390 And thirdly, refugee reliance on, and the transmutation of information exchange and 
collective consciousness is cyclical and self-perpetuating, and positively correlated with insecurity in 
the camps. 391 
                                                           
388
 (Horst, 2006a), p. 144. As noted earlier, with severely limited opportunities available, competition for resettlement ‘is 
intense’. The unrealised resettlement dreams of reaching ‘desirable’ countries such as the US, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand therefore serves as a significant catalyst in community discord and conflict. See (Crisp, 1999b), p. 27. Interestingly, 
the term buufis is used to refer to general mental health problems by the Somali community in Minneapolis. (Horst, 
2006a), p. 155. 
389
 (Horst, 2006a), pp. 146-147. 
390
 The information-containment nexus is also evident in the clashes that occurred within the Sudanese community in 
Kakuma which followed the rift between the SPLA’s John Garang and Riak Macher.  See (Crisp, 1999b), pp. 23-24.; and 
(Aukot, 2003), p. 76.  
391
 Faced with widespread insecurity, the role of transnational networks and the flow of information increases in 
significance. However, this fuels the construction of alternative ‘realities’ and an idealised collective consciousness, which 
emphasises the perceived disparities between communities within the diaspora , and the salience of community insecurity. 
This phenomenon is not restricted to Kenya. Malkki has found that refugees confined to camps in Tanzania “created an 
imaginary and idealized image of the ‘Hutu Nation’”, which not only preserved a cohesive refugee identity, but also 
justified and reproduced tensions. See (Schmidt, 2003), p. 18.; (Malkki, 1995); (Horst, 2006a), p. 146.; and IRIN “I never 
regret being in Dadaab” (23 March 2012), available at http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95142/KENYA-SOMALIA-I-never-
regret-being-in-Dadaab (accessed 11 January 2013). 
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Physical  Movement 
As was highlighted in our opening examination of migration in the region, mobility is not only socio-
politically or economically, but also culturally embedded within the Somali refugee community – 
both in terms of physical movement as well as a vibrant linguistic tradition. 392  For refugees in 
Dadaab and Kakuma, movement is therefore not merely a mechanism for survival, but a significant, 
culturally-embedded phenomenon. Such transnational empowerment has a Janus-like role to play in 
the refugee community – not only intensifying the negative impacts of bounded containment 
(including the erosion of traditional socio-cultural structures and support systems), but also 
providing a robust foundation for transnational solutions. 393 Indeed, for refugees such as the Somali 
who have access to the “means or the connections to survive independently”, life outside of the 
camps “is likely to be preferable” – and possible. 394  
Three main patterns of movement can be identified for communities in the camps, dependent upon 
the transmutations of transnational networks across the diaspora space. Firstly, repatriation is an 
option for some refugees, although in the current Macro-Political climate the sustainability of any 
such option is uncertain. 395 Secondly and more likely, movement can occur between communities 
within Kenya itself. Reports indicate that some Dadaab refugees have relocated to Kakuma, while 
increasing numbers of newly-arrived refugees are choosing to make the significantly more difficult 
journey across the country to reach Kakuma, rather than entering the more insecure Dadaab 
complex. Indeed, of the 8,000 new registrations in Kakuma in late 2011 and early 2012, over 5,000 
were from Somalia. 396  
                                                           
392
 Movement across borders has for hundreds of years “played a vital role in Somali lives and livelihoods” – the 
consequence of nomadic pastoralism, Islam (and an emphasis on the pilgrimage or hajj to Mecca, and the search for 
knowledge or rihla), and extensive and long-standing regional trade and labour patterns.
 
(Horst, 2006a), p. 153.  
393
 Dadaab, with a population of almost 500,000 housed within an area 50km
2 
 for over twenty years is in many ways the 
antithesis of a ‘functioning community’. See (Schmidt, 2003), p. 17.; (Crisp, 1999b), p. 25 & 30.; and ("Handbook for 
Emergencies - 3rd Edition," 2007), p. 211. 
394
 ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration 
corridor," June 2012), p. 78. See also (Lindley, 2007), p. 10.; and (Crisp, 1999b), pp. 27-28. 
395
 A 2012 survey of Dadaab revealed that only 14% of respondents would consider returning to Somalia at that time. 
("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration 
corridor," June 2012), p. 86. 
396
 ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration 
corridor," June 2012), p. 76. See also Medecins sans Frontieres “Dadaab refugee camps: Back to square one” (16 February 
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Another alternative is to move from the camps to urban communities.  397 However, this 
urbanisation is not uniform, but reflective of the inherent transnational-empowerment of the 
refugees themselves. “Almost without exception”, urban refugees will have access to a greater array 
of transnational assets, and will therefore settle in urban areas where they are able to access a 
diverse range of livelihood strategies, while the refugee camps have long been considered “the 
destination for those with no other resources”.  398 A substantial amount of movement also flows 
from urban areas to the camps, as households diversify their transnational portfolios  between 
multiple locations, and exchange information and pursue business and administrative activities 
(including card re-validation and resettlement opportunities). 399 
Finally, movement can occur between the camps and the wider diaspora, particularly in Europe and 
North America . 400 There are two methods of reaching the wider diaspora. Firstly, one can join the 
official ‘resettlement’ queue, however these opportunities are profoundly limited. According to 
UNHCR figures, of the 412,193 refugees residing in the country in September 2010, only 1,841 (or a 
staggering 0.4%) were resettled.  401 Alternatively, a far greater number of refugees choose to 
undertake ‘irregular migration’ and utilise increasingly institutionalised illicit migratory routes. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2012),  available at http://somalia.msf.org/2012/02/dadaab-refugee-camps-back-to-square-one/  (accessed 11 January 
2013). 
397
 Indeed, according to 2009 UNHCR figures, only a third of the world’s 10.5 million refugees were living in camps. This has 
prompted the UNHCR to adopt a new ‘Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas’, which advocates for the 
expansion of ‘protection spaces’ within cities. The movement of refugees into urban refugee communities must however, 
be understood in the wider context of urbanisation. Despite being the least urbanised region in the world, over 50% of the 
sub-Saharan population will become urbanised in the next two decades. See the UNHCR “Trying to Get By in the City”, 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4b0e4cba6.html ; the UNHCR “State of the World’s Refugees 2012: In search of 
solidarity”- Chpt. 6: Displacement and Urbanization., available at http://www.unhcr.org/publications/22-chapter-6-
displacement-and-urbanization.html#more-22 (accessed 11 January 2013).; and ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the 
protection of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration corridor," June 2012), p. 76. 
398
 (Banki, 2004), p. 16. 
399
 ‘Circular movement’  between urban areas and the camps is risky however, and without  a valid Movement Pass, 
refugees are hugely reliant on illicit national and transnational migratory routes, often paying significant bribes for the 
privilege – ranging from KES200 to 1,000 per person per roadblock. See (Pavanello et al., 2010), p. 23. 
400
 (Horst, 2002), p. 2. London hosts one of the largest Somali populations outside of Africa. Prior to the outbreak of civil 
war, there existed only a small community of ex-Merchant Navy seamen and their families –there are now more than 
60,000 Somalis in the UK, not including those not recognised in state statistics. See (Lindley, 2009), p. 1318. 
401
 (Konzolo, 2010), p. 4.  
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Indeed, such is the extent of this onward movement that it has “a rather everyday quality” for 
refugee communities in Kenya.  402 
These patterns of movement within the diaspora highlights the agency of refugee communities, and 
the informed choices that are possible based on a ‘portfolio’ of alternatives and strategies, in order 
to maximise livelihood opportunities and reduce risk.  Moreover, the proactive manipulation of 
movement strategies clearly reveals the ongoing fluidity and evolution of the diaspora space. In 
many cases, refugees exist within multiple locations, linked and supported by a complex array of 
transnational networks that shift across time and space according to need and circumstance. 403 
Accordingly, the refugee diaspora extends above and beyond static communities and camps – to 
encompass a highly ‘fluid’ space that in many cases exists completely outside of the ‘official’ refugee 
field. 
Remittance Exchange 
In addition to the transmutation of socio-cultural relationships and physical movement across the 
diaspora space noted thus far, refugee communities are embedded within complex and highly 
significant exchanges of financial assistance – or remittances. 404 Indeed, the ‘new development 
mantra’ of Devesh Kapur, and the considerable attention in recent years from both scholars and 
policy-makers alike can attest to the importance of financial support networks to those communities 
dispersed across the diaspora – particularly within the homeland. 405 However, relatively little is 
                                                           
402
 Originally used to refer only to unlawful methods of entry into a country, ‘irregular migration’ is now a pejorative term 
used to describe any refugee that exits a state of first asylum seeking alternative living conditions.  (Lindley, 2007), pp. 11-
12. For an in-depth analysis of the irregular movement of individuals from the Horn of Africa, see ("In Pursuit of the 
Southern Dream: Victims of Necessity," 2009). 
403
 (Schmidt, 2003), p. 6. 
404
 As Sahlins notes, “if friends make gifts, gifts make friends . . . the material flow underwrites social relations.” Sahlins, M. 
(2004) Stone Age Economics. London: Routlege., pp. 186-187., cited in (Lindley, 2009), p. 1316. See also (Pavanello et al., 
2010), p. 23. 
405
 According to the World Bank, global remittances sent to developing countries exceeded $406 billion in 2012, with 
approximately $31 billion reaching Sub-Saharan Africa. See The World Bank News Release (20 November 2012), available 
at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-
1288990760745/MigrationDevelopmentBrief19.pdf (accessed 25 January 2013). For an excellent overview of the current 
debates surrounding remittances, see (Kapur, 2004); (Haas, 2005); and (Plasterer, 2011). 
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known about the role remittances play in the refugee diaspora, and for those communities within 
camps. 406 
Somali Remittances and the Xawilaad 
During the 1970s and 1980s the main source of remittances (between 60-75%) within the Somali 
diaspora was from migrant workers in the Gulf States, in a ‘franco valuta’ system that provided a 
basis for both regional trade and remittance exchange.  However, following the outbreak of civil war, 
refugees transformed the Somali diaspora, and the extant patterns of remittance exchange. 407 
Crucial in supporting the flow of remittances across the shifting diaspora space, a semi-formal 
transnational money-transfer system known as the xawilaad has been established. 408 In addition to 
providing a ready mechanism for financial exchange between communities, the xawilaad relies 
heavily on effective communication networks, and as a consequence agents have invested heavily in 
telephones, the taar system and computer technology – significantly bolstering the web of 
transnational information networks and transnational consciousness that binds the diaspora 
space.409  
While remittances are often a factor in the motivations of migrants communities, for the refugee 
diaspora remittances are primarily an ad hoc support strategy that is realised post-displacement. Yet 
despite their ‘unforeseen’ nature, the exchange of funds within the refugee diaspora are 
“astonishingly large and frequent”. 410 Due to their informal and illicit nature, exact figures for 
remittances directed to communities in Dadaab and Kakuma are difficult to establish. 411  However, 
                                                           
406
 (Lindley, 2009), p. 1316.    
407
 While previously two-thirds of remittances were used for trade and the remainder to support families, these 
proportions have now been inverted. (Horst, 2002), pp. 9-10. See also (de Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). 
408
 Xawil is a Somali word meaning ‘transfer’ – of money or responsibility. The xawilaad system incorporates three official 
organisations (Al Barakat, Dahabshil and Amal), as well as a plethora of smaller agencies and operators, many of whom 
operate illegally. See (Horst, 2002), p. 7.; (Lindley, 2007), p. 14.; and (Pavanello et al., 2010), p. 22.  
409
 See All Africa “UN Refugee Agency Launches Inaugural Somali Community Event in Kenya” (19 April 2011), available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201104190914.html (accessed 12 January 2013).  
410
 (Horst, 2002), p. 8. 
411
 Most xawilaad agents are reluctant to release figures for fear of jeopardising their unofficial activities. Furthermore, 
refugees are hesitant to provide information regarding the extent of remittances in the camps – fearing that it may lead to 
cuts in food and aid provision, or invoke increased bandit attacks and robbery. See (Horst, 2002), pp. 8-10. 
mir 2013 | 98 | andrew slater 
 
as an indication the annual flow of remittances from the Somali diaspora to the Horn of Africa was 
estimated at $130 million in 2000. 412  
While figures may be uncertain, the potential of remittances to “partially or fully release refugees 
from the aid relationship” is however, clear. 413 Horst estimates that between 10-15% of the refugee 
community in Dadaab receive remittances via the xawilaad. 414 In addition to supporting the 
immediate survival needs of families and communities – including buying food and basic items, 
accessing healthcare services, and building shelter – remittances underpin myriad positive coping 
mechanisms and strategies that reduce refugee dependency and bolster self-sufficiency. This 
includes funding trade and economic activities within the camps and surrounding markets, and 
facilitating mobility which has been shown to provide a crucial foundation to the diaspora space. 415  
As such, “just as migrants are not ‘just labour’, remittances are not ‘just money’”. 416 Indeed, 
remittances are a source of “familial and cultural reaffirmation”, acting as a vital catalyst in the 
creation and maintenance of resilient social networks, and a sense of collective identity and 
cohesion within the bounded communities of the refugee diaspora. 417  
Remittance Transnational ‘Relationships’ 
The deeply-embedded socio-cultural and ethnic affiliations noted earlier explain the strong emphasis 
on remittance sending within the Somali diaspora. 418 As such, while remittances flow primarily from 
more prosperous domains in Europe and North America, Australia and the Middle East, a small 
                                                           
412
 (Horst, 2006b), p. 35. Other estimates place the figure between US$140 million and $800 million per annum. See (Horst, 
2002), p. 9. 
413
 (Lindley, 2007), p. 15. A survey conducted amongst the Somali community in London between 2004 and 2005, revealed 
on average 61% of individuals sent remittances to family in Somalia at least once a month.  See and (Lindley, 2009), p. 
1319. 
414
 (Horst, 2002), p. 13.  
415
 See (Lindley, 2007), p. 10.; (Verdirame, 1999), p. 43.; and (Pavanello et al., 2010), p. 25. 
416
 (Lindley, 2009), p. 1315 
417
 (Lindley, 2009), p. 1327. Refugee households receiving remittances are “less likely to fragment”, and in the uncertain 
and insecure setting of the refugee diaspora, “such solidarity is an important cultural and economic asset.” (Lindley, 2007), 
p. 11. 
418
 The practice of remittance sending, often to numerous recipients and equating to considerable amounts of money has 
been described as a form of ‘generalised reciprocity’.  As a Somali in London noted, “You eat with your brother when he 
has money”. (Lindley, 2009), p. 1324.  
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proportion of those in urban communities within the near diaspora (including Eastleigh) send 
remittances to refugees in the camps, and also to those remaining in the homeland. 419  
However, the strong social obligation to send remittances can give rise to a ‘pressured 
transnationalism’ – indeed, failing to send remittances to those in Kenya and the homeland is 
regarded as ‘unacceptable behaviour’. 420 Disparities (real and perceived) between sender and 
recipient communities can also heighten these transnational tensions. It is widely accepted amongst 
refugees in the camps that those living dibadaha or ‘outside’ in the West are prosperous, to which 
the ambiguous influence of information dissemination and  the prevalence of buufis noted above 
can attest. 421 Remitters can therefore feel exploited, while the ready availability of funds can foster 
a localised ‘dependency’ for recipients, much like the ‘dependency syndrome’ that has been 
associated with humanitarian aid. Indeed, while remittances can support refugee communities 
through the shock of displacement and more acute crises, they do not necessarily foster more 
sustainable livelihoods, or contingency strategies against future events.  422 
This transmutation of remittance networks can therefore seriously undermine community cohesion 
and the ‘unity’ of the refugee diaspora. Perhaps most notably, male-dominated migrant niches are 
increasingly being replaced by women who are forced into vital economic activities to meet the 
transnational needs and resources of refugee communities. Anecdotal reports also suggest a greater 
willingness amongst women to send remittances than men, and to manage finances when 
received.423 This has led to a profound diversification and ‘feminisation’ of economic participation 
within the refugee diaspora, and further transformed (or ‘eroded’ – for want of a better term) the 
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 See (Lindley, 2007), p. 15. 
420
 (Lindley, 2007), p. 12. 
421
 See (Horst, 2002), p. 5.   
422
 As the UK’s Department for International Development asserts, a livelihood is sustainable “when it can cope with and 
recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future”.  See the 
DFID “Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets” Overview 1.1., available at http://www.ennonline.net/resources/667 
(accessed 11 January 2013). 
423
 Some scholars argue that this is due to a relative, rather than absolute change, as women become increasingly more 
visible in transnational networks over time. Others suggest that because women are in a generally ‘weaker’ position in 
refugee and migrant communities, they rely more heavily on, and are more actively engaged with transnational networks 
than males. Studies of Somali communities in London have however, revealed that males remain the primary remittance 
senders (60%) and also send larger amounts (on average £3,645 compared with £2,340). See (Lindley, 2009)., pp. 1322-
1323.; and (Horst, 2002), p. 15. 
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traditional social structures of refugee communities both in the camps and dispersed across the 
diaspora. 424   
Communities within the diaspora can therefore be seen to readily engage with complex remittance 
networks, that evolve over time across the diaspora space. Yet as with many of the activities of the 
refugee community discussed in this section, as a consequence of the ‘bounded’ nature of the camp, 
remittance outcomes are inherently ambiguous. While a vital activity underpinning basic survival 
and the wider activities of those displaced, remittances can fracture communities and heighten 
insecurity – not only in the camps but also within the homeland and wider diaspora. Indeed, being 
‘locked into’ pervasive remittance networks means that many communities across the diaspora are 
simply unable to shape their own lives and livelihoods – bound within the rubric of the transnational 
‘middle space’. 425 
Th e ‘Boun ded’  Real i ty  o f  the  Refu gee  Camp 
 
It is at the community level that refugee theory becomes a ‘lived’ reality. Yet according to the 
prevailing refugee regime ontology, “a refugee camp is not a community, nor is it treated as one by 
humanitarian agencies”. 426 Refugee camps have therefore long been envisioned as ‘states of 
exclusion’, with refugees languishing in a liminal space devoid of local and transnational support, 
integration and agency. 427 This is evident in Dadaab and Kakuma, where geographical isolation, and 
dislocated administration and governance structures create a parallel and ‘bounded’ space that 
largely operates independently of the state system.  
However, as has been revealed in this case study, the refugee community is extremely active in 
circumventing (or ‘permeating’) the boundaries imposed upon it by the exogenous environment, 
and remains very much engaged with the multiple communities that populate the wider diaspora. 
Contrary to prevailing thought, refugees are not “victims of persecution and recipients of aid, but 
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 (Lindley, 2009), pp. 1321-1322. See also (Horst, 2002), p. 14. 
425
 (Lindley, 2009), p. 1328. For example, migrant communities in the ‘West’ are often employed in low-income jobs, and 
the toll of remittances can restrict alternative livelihood strategies and heighten household and community poverty. 
Indeed, according to the 2001 Census, only 7% of Somali families in the UK live in a home they had bought, and only 1% 
were self-employed. See (Lindley, 2009), p. 1326-1327. 
426
 (Hyndman, 1997), p. 21. 
427
 See for example (Agamben, 1995). 
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thinking individuals with survival strategies and coping abilities”. 428 The transnational networks that 
underpin the refugee diaspora provide a particularly resilient portfolio of survival strategies – vital in 
sustaining the refugee community activities during displacement. 
Yet there remains an inherent ambiguity in this dualism – as the synergy of both containment within 
the bounded space, and enduring embeddedness within the wider diaspora gives rise to a 
perversion or ‘transmutation’ of the refugee community. This not only abrogates (to a degree) the 
restrictions inherent within the camp model, but also creates a novel refugee ‘middle space’ which 
increasingly deviates from the collective socio-cultural, political and economic potentiality of the 
diaspora – fuelling insecurity and instability. As such, and reflecting the duality inherent within 
Giddens’ Structuration Theory, “refugee camps produce refugee behaviours”. 429  
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429
 (Hyndman, 1997), p. 19. 
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sect ion  three:   
–  t he  refu gee  communit y  and  ‘moebius ’  s pace  –  
 
 
ECOWAS as Moebius Space 
Having examined the refugee community as it exists within the ‘bounded’ space of the refugee 
camp, let us now turn to an alternative – what I have termed ‘moebius space’. The Economic 
Community of West African States or ECOWAS is one of the myriad regional bodies emerging not 
only in Africa (others include East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development 
Community or SADC), but also across the globe, as governments become increasingly inter-
connected and create new socio-political and economic entities that transcend prevailing notions of 
international borders, statehood and sovereignty.  
This ‘transnationalism from above’ complements that arising from ‘below’, in a synergy that echoes 
the duality that is central not only to theoretical constructs of Giddens’ Structuration, and the 
endogenous and exogenous foundations of the refugee middle space model, but also the lived 
reality of the refugee community revealed in our preceding case study. Indeed, what this next 
section reveals is that ECOWAS member states and the refugee regime itself have come to embrace 
the transnational character of not only regional migrants, but also refugee communities.  
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FACTOR 1:  Macro-Pol i t ica l  Economy 
 
West Africa – a History of Regional Fluidity 
West Africa, like the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa described above, is characterised by a strong 
history of migration and the ‘mixing of populations’. 430 The seasonal, cyclical migration of nomadic-
pastoralists (including the Fulani) across the Sahel, and the extensive trade and religious networks 
that span the Sahara engendered widespread movement, integration and socio-cultural, ethnic, 
economic and political fluidity across West and North Africa – see Figure Five below.431 
 
Figure Five: ECOWAS Ethno-linguistic Groups  432 
                                                           
430
 ("Protecting Refugees and Other Persons on the Move in the ECOWAS Space," 2011), p. 14. See also (Memorandum on 
the Equality of treatment for refugees with other citizens of Member States of ECOWAS in the exercise of Free Movement, 
Right of Residence and  Establishment, 25-27 July 2007), p. 2. 
431
 (Bakewell & de Haas, 2007), p. 10. 
432
 Detail of ‘Africa Ethnolinguistic Groups’ map, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. (1996), available at Library 
of Congress Geography and Map Division http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?gmd:2:./temp/~ammem_JfOn:: 
(accessed 10 February 2013).  
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The arrival of Europeans in the 15th century and the advent of colonialism had a significant impact 
upon these historic transnational networks. The introduction of colonial taxes and modes of 
government, ‘organised labour recruitment’, and the expropriation of traditional land and resources 
severely undermined migration and trade networks, and the socio-cultural and ethnic affiliations 
across the region. 433 Moreover, by the 19th century the development of large-scale cocoa, coffee 
and peanut plantations, proliferation of infrastructure including road and rail, and the establishment 
of large cities including Accra, Lagos, Abidjan and Dakar instigated a dramatic rural-urban shift and 
an increase in sedentary lifestyles.  434 
More recently, following waves of decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s the comparative prosperity 
of regional hubs such as Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire attracted a steady stream of migrants from 
regional neighbours including Nigeria, Togo, Burkina Faso and Guinea. And reflecting the strong 
sense of unity and anti-colonial spirit (referred to as ‘pan-Africanism’) that was spreading across the 
continent, governments were largely welcoming of these regional migrants – allowing them to 
settle, integrate and gain employment en masse. 435  
As we enter the 21st century, patterns of migration remain highly malleable and volatile, “rooted in 
socioeconomic, political and historical-cultural factors.” 436 West Africa has been described as the 
‘most mobile’ region of contemporary Africa, with most countries functioning intermittently as 
states of origin, transit and destination. 437 Intra-regional migration accounts for some 90% of all 
movement in West Africa (equating to approximately 7.5 million migrants in 2006), principally 
flowing from north to south, and from inland to coastal areas – as migrants leave the Sahel (Mali, 
Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad) seeking out the economic opportunities presented by the agriculture, 
mines and cities of the coast (including Senegal, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria). 
                                                           
433
 The slave trade would see approximately 12 million West Africans transported across the Atlantic to the Americas in a 
‘black diaspora’. As Rodney notes, the slave trade was in no way a form of ‘trade’ – it was made possible through “warfare, 
trickery, banditry and kidnapping”, and when acknowledging its affects on the continent,  “it is essential to realize that one 
is measuring the effect of social violence”. See (Rodney, 1981), p. 95.; and Pan-African News Wire (13 March 2007) “The 
Effects of the Atlantic Slave Trade on West African Societies”, available at 
http://panafricannews.blogspot.com.au/2007/03/effects-of-atlantic-slave-trade-on-west.html (accessed 27 January 2013). 
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 (Bakewell & de Haas, 2007), p. 10.  
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 (Bakewell & de Haas, 2007), p. 10. For a good overview of the growth of pan-Africanism including the birth of the 
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 (Adepoju, 2005a) See also (Ba & Ndione, 2006). 
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Most of this migration “is seasonal or circular, reflecting pre-colonial patterns”, however many have 
settled permanently and established sizeable migrants communities that have further entrenched 
these historic transnational networks. 438 
Protracted Conflict and Displacement 
West Africa has, like its eastern counterpart, for many years suffered intense and pervasive 
instability, and migration has served as an indispensible strategy “for diversifying risks in highly 
uncertain economic and political contexts.” 439 In what has been described as a ‘merry-go-round of 
violence’, civil conflict in inter alia Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire over the past three 
decades saw upwards of 250,000 killed and 1.5 million people forcibly displaced. 440 The robust 
transnational networks noted above have proved vital in shaping and supporting displacement, 
however confronted with an ever-decreasing portfolio of strategies as conflict spilled over from 
state to state, many refugees have forged new networks further afield in search of alternative 
destinations and opportunities, spanning Southern Africa (South Africa and Botswana), the Maghreb 
(including Libya), and the EU. 441  
Moreover, despite ‘robust economic growth’ and a general state of calm since 2004, West Africa 
remains plagued by high unemployment, widespread poverty and sporadic outbreaks of violence, 
which continues to fuel mixed-migration across the region. 442 In Cote d’Ivoire for example, anti-
government militias continue to target not only the military but also civilians and displaced 
                                                           
438
 (Bakewell & de Haas, 2007), p. 10.; and ("Protecting Refugees and Other Persons on the Move in the ECOWAS Space," 
2011), p. 14. 
439
 ("Protecting Refugees and Other Persons on the Move in the ECOWAS Space," 2011), p. 15. 
440
 Migration Information Source “West Africa's Refugee Crisis Spills Across Many Borders” (August 2003), available at 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=148 (accessed 27 January 2013).  
441
 Indeed, West Africa pre-1980 saw very limited migration to the industrialised global ‘north’. However, following the 
escalation of regional instability, there occurred a significant increase and diversification in migration towards Europe and 
North America (primarily the US), including both regular and irregular movement. See (Bakewell & de Haas, 2007), p. 12. 
442
 UNHCR “2013 UNHCR regional operations profile - West Africa”, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45a9c6.html (accessed 28 January 2013). Indicative of this regional growth, according to 
the UN-HABITAT and UNEP, five of the fastest growing cities in Africa between 2005 and 2010 were located in West Africa 
– namely Lagos, Abuja, Ouagadougou, Abidjan and Dakar. See ("Protecting Refugees and Other Persons on the Move in the 
ECOWAS Space," 2011), p. 16. 
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communities in border regions. 443 Tuareg uprisings in Mali (exacerbated by an enduring drought and 
food crisis), has also seen more than 200,000 displaced across the Sahel (in particular to Niger and 
Burkina Faso). 444 As of January 2012, UNHCR statistics reveal that some 280,540 refugees are 
displaced across the West African region, mainly from Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Mauritania and 
Senegal. 445  
Guinea – Regional ‘Safe Haven’  
Let us now examine in detail an example of refugee displacement in the region – to garner a 
comparative perspective to our previous case study. Like Kenya, Guinea has long been a “primary 
asylum country for West Africa's refugees”. 446 Indeed, despite being one of the poorest countries in 
the world (with an average life-expectancy of only 46 years), during the 1990s it became host to the 
greatest refugee population on the continent, housing approximately 800,000 refugees in “one of 
the largest humanitarian responses in the world”. 447 Today, following a relaxation of regional 
conflict and large-scale repatriation efforts, some 16,609 refugees remain in the country, the vast 
majority from Liberia (almost 10,000) and Cote d’Ivoire (over 6,000). 448  
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 Despite the promise of the 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement and the planned return of refugees to Cote d’Ivoire, 
civil conflict following the 2010 presidential elections severely impeded repatriation and gave rise to further waves of 
newly-displaced groups. See ("Protecting Refugees and Other Persons on the Move in the ECOWAS Space," 2011), p. 35. 
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 Instability in Mali has been heightened in recent months by the activities of Tuareg separatists and Islamist militants, 
and the intervention of French troops in what has been termed Operation Serval.  See BBC “Can France achieve its goals in 
Mali?” (17 January 2013), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21058512 (accessed 28 January 2013).  
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 UNHCR “2013 UNHCR regional operations profile - West Africa”, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45a9c6.html (accessed 28 January 2013). 
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 Migration Information Source “West Africa's Refugee Crisis Spills Across Many Borders” (August 2003), available at 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=148 (accessed 27 January 2013). 
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 International Rescue Committee “The IRC in Guinea” (1 April 2009), available at http://www.rescue.org/where/guinea 
(accessed 28 January 2013). See also (Andrews, 2003), p. 2. 
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 See UNHCR “2013 UNHCR regional operations profile - West Africa”, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45a9c6.html ; UNHCR Statistical Online Database available at 
www.unhcr.org/statistics/populationdatabase (accessed 28 January 2013).; and ("World Refugee Survey 2008 - Guinea," 
2008). Approximately 70%  of refugees are registered in ‘Lainé’, ‘Kouankan’, ‘Kouankan I’, and ‘Kouankan II’ refugee camps 
situated along the south-eastern border, while the remainder are located in urban areas including the capital Conakry. The 
UNHCR “Guinea: Refugee operations continue – just” (20 February 2007), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/45dad8fd2.html (accessed 28 January 2013). 
mir 2013 | 107 | andrew slater 
 
Liberia and Sierra Leone – Shifting Transnationalism and Refugee Displacement 
Refugees in sub-Saharan Africa, as the world over, are often perceived as “homogeneous flows of 
exhausted and destitute victims of manmade disasters, settling in camps, and dependent on outside 
emergency assistance”. 449 However, as was revealed in our previous case study, refugee 
communities exhibit complex migration histories and significant transnational-empowerment, which 
has a profound influence on settlement patterns, activities and integration. The 500,000 refugees 
that fled civil war in Liberia and Sierra Leone and settled in Guinea between 1990 and 1995 provide a 
vivid accompaniment to support these findings – and reiterate the critical influence the Macro-
Political Economy has upon the refugee community. 
During the early 1990s, two refugee ‘waves’ can be identified – each embodying a different set of 
transnational characteristics. Initially, some 350,000 refugees entered the country between January 
1990 and April 1991, following an attack by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by 
Charles Taylor, and retaliation by the Liberian Armed Forces. Many settled in villages just across the 
border in south-eastern Guinea, in a remote, mountainous region referred to as Guinée forestière 
(the ‘Forest Region’). These ‘early arrivals’ had strong socio-cultural and ethnic ties with the region, 
and were therefore readily absorbed by local communities, or prescribed land for the creation of 
new ‘paired’ villages and settlements. While these two groups often remained discrete (each with its 
own chief and identity), local reception was harmonious and no outside agencies (either state or 
humanitarian) were included in the process. 450 
As violence intensified, a widening segment of the Liberian population was displaced across the 
border – drawing upon what transnational assets they had available. The Mandingo (Guinean 
migrants who had settled in the country during the 1960s and 1970s) for example, followed resilient 
trade and migration routes back to towns including Macenta and Beyla.  
Diminishing Transnationalism and a Misdirected Refugee Approach 
Despite efforts by a Nigerian-led multinational peace-keeping force (ECOMOG) and the creation of 
an interim government, the NPFL soon controlled over 95% of Liberia, and refugees continued to 
move en masse into the Forest Region. Furthermore, in 1991 the Liberian conflict spilled over into 
Sierra Leone, with the entire border region soon engulfed in fighting between the United Liberation 
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 (Damme, 1999), pp. 36-37. 
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Movement (ULIMO), the NPFL-affiliated Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the NPLF and the Sierra 
Leonean army, forcing further waves of refugees across the border. 451  
Unlike earlier, transnationally-empowered refugee communities, these later arrivals were of 
heterogeneous ethnicity and not closely affiliated with Guinea, and having experienced years of civil 
conflict “were exhausted on arrival and had little energy left to develop creative coping 
mechanisms.” 452 As occurred in Kenya, the pressure upon the state from these burgeoning refugee 
communities precipitated an increase in international humanitarian response in the country. 
Considering more urbanised communities (such as the Mandingo noted above) not as refugees but 
‘returnees’ and therefore not requiring of assistance, the UNHCR restricted its support services to 
the Forest Region, where refugees would be formally ‘registered and assisted’. 453 Refugee 
communities were coerced into formally designated camps such as in Kouloumba – in a process 
described as ‘guided self-settlement’.  454 By the end of 1995 an estimated 603, 750 refugees were 
registered in Guinea, 96% of whom were in the Forest Region (or one in every three inhabitants). 455 
However, despite having minimal transnational affiliations and assets, few of these ‘later arrivals’ 
availed themselves of formal camp support – preferring instead to seek out alternative strategies in 
the surrounding communities. As a consequence of this pro-active transnationalism, and a fairly 
relaxed approach to encampment by authorities, it is estimated that less than 20% of refugees in the 
Forest Region resided in camps, with approximately 25% living in ‘paired villages’ and the remainder 
integrated within rural and urban communities. In Gueckedou prefecture for example (with the 
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 In addition to intense conflict, the widespread use of ‘scorched earth’ strategies severely undermined community 
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highest number of both refugees and camps in the country – 45), as of the end of 1995 only a third 
(90,790) of the total 273,388 registered refugees lived in the camps. 456 
Employment and Labour Activities 
As noted above, the vast majority of rural refugees in Guinea were well-received and integrated 
within local communities. 457 Many were farmers, and gained employment as agricultural labourers, 
or in some instances were provided access to local fallow land which could be used on a temporary 
basis. As such, refugees “shared the lives of the Guineans, worked on their farms and participated 
fully in the rural subsistence economy”, and over time developed “a high degree of economic self-
sufficiency”. 458 
A number of those living in the camps also had access to communal land, negotiated with local 
communities by the UNHCR. Moreover, a large majority chose to leave these ‘ghost camps’ in search 
of alternative livelihood opportunities, only returning for food distribution and when other services 
were required. 459 Many, like their rural counterparts were able to secure some level of self-
sufficiency as agricultural labourers – especially during the rainy season. Indeed, despite some local 
hostilities and accusations of deforestation, the refugees in the Forest Region “contributed to local 
agricultural activity”. 460  
However, within urban areas local-refugee relations were more ambiguous, with strong 
transnational affiliations (fostered through regional trade as well as ethnicity) undermined by 
pervasive hostility as rising refugee numbers placed increased pressure upon unstable local 
economies, and fuelled inherent poverty, banditry and pre-existing socio-cultural and ethnic 
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tensions. Insecurity was also fuelled by the transnational flow of guns and militia across the border 
as regional instability continued to shake the socio-political foundations of local communities. 461 
Community Engagement and Advocacy 
In September 2000 this transmutation of socio-political affiliations came to a head. Following 
heightened cross-border attacks by rebel groups and insurgents from Sierra Leone and Liberia, 
President Lasana Conte made a highly-inflammatory speech fuelling community fears of a ‘rebel 
infiltration’ among the refugee population. 462 In response, both authorities and civil groups turned 
on refugee communities, displacing tens of thousands from the camps and urban areas in 
widespread violence and abuse. 463 In response, the UNHCR and Guinean Government relocated 
approximately 44,000 refugees  from settlements in the volatile border area (referred to as “Parrots 
Beak”) to four newly-created camps – Sembakounya, Kountaya, Telikoro, and Boreah. 464 
Yet rather than establishing secure ‘spaces’ for asylum, as occurred in Dadaab and Kakuma the 
arbitrary and heterogeneous aggregation of refugee groups served as a ‘melting pot’ for refugee-
host engagement. Sembakounya for example, is located in an isolated area some 30km away from 
the nearest town Dabola, and despite a ‘sensibilization’ campaign by the UNHCR , presented a test of 
the “historic commonalties of language and ethnicity”. 465 Those refugees who had pre-existing ties 
to the area (primarily from Sierra Leone) were generally well-integrated, however those from Liberia 
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engaged less with the local community and were unable to benefit from the transnational affiliations 
that had ‘served them well’ in other self-settled areas of the Forest region.  
This localised distillation of transnationalism explains why according to some locals, the refugee 
community was responsible for “sickness, banditry, alcohol abuse, and rape of the local women.” 466 
Others however, regarded the presence of refugee as beneficial to community development, 
providing cheap labour on farms, promoting trade and the development of vibrant local markets, 
and strengthening local infrastructure.  
The Inherent Duality of the Macro-Political Economy 
It is clear therefore that refugee displacement in West Africa is heavily shaped by the dynamics of 
the Macro-Political Economy – as rampant regional insecurity and the prevalence of historic 
transnational networks converge and fluctuate over time and space. Moreover, facing significant 
flows of refugees with increasing protection needs and escalating regional security concerns, Guinea 
like Kenya shifted from a generous and laissez-faire stance, to a ‘new relief approach’ – whereby the 
provision of targeted support services was made contingent upon registration and containment in 
designated areas (the Forest Region), and camps such as Sembakounya.  
Whereas previously refugees were able to ‘self-settle’, and therefore make an informed and active 
choice predicated on the transnational characteristics of the region, this formalised approach 
remained detached from the realities on the ground (to borrow from the Turkana, operating ‘in the 
air’), and greatly exacerbated the salience and transmutation of these extant transnational networks 
– both supporting local integration and fuelling discord. However, in stark contrast to Kenya this 
‘spatial segregation’ has been adhered to in a much less vigorous fashion, with camp boundaries 
extremely porous and the majority of inhabitants preferring (and able) to engage with communities 
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FACTOR 2:  The  Migr at ion  Regi me 
 
As discussed previously, the African Refugee Regime is founded upon a tripartite structure, 
encapsulating the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, and bolstered by the OAU 
Convention. 468 However, West African states are bound by an additional regional institution that has 
immense import for refugee policy in the region. On 28 May 1975 sixteen countries formally 
established the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 469 ECOWAS aims to: 
“promote co-operation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic union 
in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its peoples, and to maintain and 
enhance economic stability, foster relations among Member States and contribute to the 
progress and development of the African Continent.” 470 
 
ECOWAS and the Free Movement Protocols 
Central to the creation of ECOWAS is “the total elimination of all obstacles to the free movement of 
people, goods, capital and services”. 471 Subsequently, on 29 May 1979 the ‘Protocol Relating to Free 
Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment’ was adopted, which states that “Community 
citizens have the right to enter, reside and establish in the territory of Member States.” 472 The 1979 
Free Movement Protocol was augmented by four Supplementary Protocols which together 
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established the collective rights of citizens of the ECOWAS ‘Community’ – including freedom of 
movement, residence, access to employment, and the establishment of business and economic 
activities. 473 
The Implementation of the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocols 
Free movement within the Community was envisaged as being implemented in three ‘phases’, each 
lasting five years – first establishing the ‘Right of Entry and Abolition of Visa’, followed by the ‘Right 
of Residency’ and finally the ‘Right of Establishment’. 474  
Phase One has been completed, with all Member States allowing citizens the right of entry without a 
visa for 90 days. 475 However, entry is only permitted for those migrants that possess “a valid travel 
document and an international health certificate”, and despite the adoption of an ‘ECOWAS Travel 
Certificate’ in a number of states, for many in the region such documentation is simply not 
available.476 Moreover, restrictions continue to be placed on the right of entry through the 
application of Article 4 of the 1979 Protocol, which allows Member States to refuse “any Community 
citizen who comes within the category of inadmissible immigrant under its laws.” 477 Indeed, by 
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2006), p. 24. In Liberia for example, those deemed ‘inadmissible’ include “aliens who are feeble-minded, insane, mentally 
defective or epileptic, drug or alcohol addicts; those suffering from tuberculosis or leprosy; paupers, criminals, or 
prostitutes”. See The Alien and Nationality Law of the Republic of Liberia, (Amended 9 May 1974) Article 5: 1., cited in 
(Adepoju et al., 2007), p. 10. 
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affirming the primacy of state sovereignty over regional movement, ECOWAS undermines the 
“regional social cohesion and promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights objectives at 
the heart of the ECOWAS initiative”. 478  
Phase Two will provide equal residency and employment rights to Community citizens, as well as 
ensure access to training, education and socio-cultural participation, through ECOWAS Residence 
Cards or Permits. 479 Phase Three will facilitate business activity across the Community,  and allow 
ECOWAS citizens to establish economic ventures in other member states. However, both Phase Two 
and Three have not been fully realised, due in part to regional economic decline during the 1980s, 
and the instability of the 1990s and early 2000s noted above. 480 Moreover, and echoing our findings 
regarding Kenyan state capacity, national and regional institutions remain under-resourced and 
under-developed, with inadequate access to information regarding complex regional migration 
patterns, and insufficient domestic or regional legislation and policy development.  481   
As a result, there remain serious obstacles to regional movement, and the fragmented realisation of  
rights and responsibilities means that migrants face exploitation, physical abuse (including GBV) and 
detention when crossing intra-regional borders. Yet despite these failings, ECOWAS allows the 
greatest degree of regional free movement in Africa. 482  
                                                           
478
 (Adepoju et al., 2007), p. 8.  See also The Revised Treaty of ECOWAS (1993), Article 4. 
479
 Article 23 of the 1986 Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/7/86 states that “No matter the conditions of their authorisation 
of residence, migrant workers who comply with rules and regulations governing residence, shall enjoy equal treatment 
with nationals of the host Member State”, including access to employment, health, training and education facilities, and 
“participation in social and cultural activities”. 
480
 (Adepoju et al., 2007), pp. 3-4. 
481
 (Ba & Ndione, 2006), p. vii. For example, while the ECOWAS Treaty obliges states to establish national bodies to monitor 
the implementation of ECOWAS Protocols, only Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo have done so.  
See (Adepoju et al., 2007), p. 4.; and (Bakewell & de Haas, 2007), p. 11. 
482
 Many migrants still choose to travel between Member States irregularly, relying on human trafficking and illicit 
migratory routes.  See (Adepoju et al., 2007), pp.3-4.; ("Protecting Refugees and Other Persons on the Move in the 
ECOWAS Space," 2011), pp. 16 & 26-27.; and (Boulton, 2009), p. 33. Moreover, while individual and en masse expulsion of 
migrant communities is explicitly proscribed by the Free Movement Protocols, it has not prevented the expulsion of large 
migrant and ‘alien’ communities. In late 1982 for example, Sierra Leone forcibly expelled members of the Foulah 
community (mostly from Guinea). A few months later the Nigerian Minister for Internal Affairs followed suit, forcing an 
estimated 1.5 million ‘illegal’ migrants to leave the country. See the 1986 Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/7/86 on the 
Second Phase (Right of Residence), Articles 13 & 14.; (Bakewell & de Haas, 2007); and (Okolo, 1984). 
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ECOWAS and Refugee Protection – in theory 
While fundamentally, the ECOWAS Treaty and its Free Movement Protocols are not refugee 
instruments, it is clear they go further than establishing merely an integrated economic community, 
seeking amongst other things, the “maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the 
promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness”. 483 Moreover, notwithstanding the rights 
and responsibilities embodied within the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1969 OAU Refugee 
Convention, the majority of refugees found within the ECOWAS Community are from Member States 
– predominantly  Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia and Ghana. 484 An increasing number of regional and 
international commentators therefore argue that refugees (as with all regional migrants) should be 
included within the Free Movement Protocols. 485  
However, exactly where the line between the application of the 1951 Refugee Convention (and the 
role of the UNHCR and international refugee regime) and the Free Movement Protocols of the 
ECOWAS Community lies is uncertain. Neither the ECOWAS Treaty nor the Protocols limit the 
application of other international instruments – economic or otherwise.  486 Moreover, the 1951 
Convention itself also asserts that “Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to impair any rights 
and benefits granted by a Contracting State to refugees apart from this Convention.” 487 Yet little has 
                                                           
483
 The Revised Treaty of ECOWAS (1993) Article 4 (e). 
484
 See ("Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees," 2010), Articles 26, 31, 32 & 33.; ("Persons covered by 
the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and by the Cartagena Declaration on 
Refugees (Submitted by the African Group and the Latin American Group)," 1992), I. C: 10 & I. C: 15.; and UNHCR “2013 
UNHCR regional operations profile - West Africa”, available at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45a9c6.html (accessed 28 
January 2013).   
485
 See (Adepoju et al., 2007); and ("Protecting Refugees and Other Persons on the Move in the ECOWAS Space," 2011). 
486
 According to the ECOWAS Treaty, “Member States may conclude agreements among themselves and with non-Member 
States, regional organisations or any other international organisation, provided that economic agreements are not 
incompatible with the provisions of this Treaty [...] In the event that agreements concluded before the entry into force of 
this Treaty between Member States or between Member States and non-Member States, regional organisations or any 
other international organisations are incompatible with the provisions of this Treaty, the Member State or Member States 
concerned shall take appropriate measures to eliminate such incompatibility.  Member States shall, where necessary, assist 
each other to this end and adopt a common position. “ See The Revised Treaty of ECOWAS (1993) Article 84. See also 
Article 24 of the 1986 Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/7/86 on the Second Phase (Right of Residence).  
487
 ("Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees," 2010), Article 5. 
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been formally resolved regarding the critical, yet blurred legal space where these two instruments 
overlap, and refugee rights in the Community therefore continue to be incoherently realised.  488 
Strengthening Refugee Protection under the Free Movement Protocols  
Both the UNHCR and Member States have asserted that the ECOWAS free movement, settlement 
and establishment provisions are applicable to refugees. As the ECOWAS Committee on Trade, 
Customs and Immigration noted in July 2007, the regional body was created as “a unified space for 
citizens of all member states to move about, reside and establish themselves in, without 
discrimination”, and as such members “recognise the imperative need to ensure that refugees 
benefit from the protocols on free movement.” 489 The ‘Meeting of Ministers on ECOWAS Common 
approach on Migration’ in Abuja 2007, also argued for the harmonisation of national migration 
management policies for both migrants and refugees – recognising “the difficulty in managing them 
and regularising their status after conflict”. 490 
More recently, in a meeting in August 2012 with the UN Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for 
Sahel, the President of the ECOWAS Commission noted that “[w]e have a responsibility to protect 
citizens of the region who find themselves as refugees, internally displaced or disadvantaged”. 
Describing the regional organisation as “a mechanism for holistically addressing the humanitarian 
challenges in the region”, he reaffirmed the value of continued close cooperation between ECOWAS 
and UN humanitarian agencies. 491 
Accordingly, ECOWAS Members have continued to work with the international refugee regime to 
build regional capacity and ensure the inclusion of forced displacement in the Free Movement 
                                                           
488
 See (Gale, 2008), pp. 538-539. 
489
 The Committee also explicitly acknowledged the ‘Convention Travel Document’ (issued according to Article 28 of the 
1951 Refugee Convention), as a valid travel document for cross border movement and Residence Permit application. See 
(Memorandum on the Equality of treatment for refugees with other citizens of Member States of ECOWAS in the exercise of 
Free Movement, Right of Residence and  Establishment, 25-27 July 2007), pp. 3-4. Moreover, the 1986 Supplementary 
Protocol provides guidelines on the treatment and facilitation of ‘illegal immigrants’ (defined as “any immigrant citizen of 
the Community who does not fulfill the conditions stipulated in the different Protocols”) – including assisting in the 
“acquiring of correct documents, if desired and possible”. See the 1985 Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/7/85 on the Code 
of Conduct for the implementation of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and 
Establishment Article 5. 
490
 ("Meeting of Ministers on ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration - Abuja," June 2007), p. 6. 
491
 “ECOWAS, UN to deepen cooperation in addressing humanitarian challenges” - 
http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=225&lang=en&annee=2012 (accessed 20 August 2012). 
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Protocols. 492 Of note, in 2006 the UNHCR launched its ‘10-Point Plan of Action on Refugee 
Protection and Mixed Migration’. 493 Under the auspices of the Plan, the ‘Regional Conference on 
Refugee Protection and International Migration in West Africa’ convened in Dakar in November 2008  
sought to promote the development of a ‘protection-sensitive’ regional migration strategy. 494 The 
Conference merged three core migration strategies, namely the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocols, 
the UNHCR’s 10-point Plan, and the IOM-backed Migration Dialogue for West Africa (MIDWA), with 
the aim of ensuring the comprehensive implementation of the Free Movement protocols, enhancing 
government capacity, and tackling regional human trafficking. 495  
Further acknowledging regional ‘mixed’ migration and its relevance to a comprehensive 
interpretation of the Free Movement Protocols, in January 2008 the  ECOWAS Common Approach 
on Migration was adopted as a robust framework upon which to build enhanced regional capacity 
and the protection of the rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees.  496  
Political Engagement, Mobilisation and Activism 
Having examined the unique characteristics of the ECOWAS Migration Regime, and the applicability 
of the Free Movement Protocols, let us now explore how this has impacted upon refugee 
communities ‘on the ground’. The implementation of this reinvigorated interpretation is promising, 
and the Free Movement Protocols have now been used on a number of occasions “to provide 
                                                           
492
 Additional projects include the €10 million ECOWAS – Spain Fund for Migration and Development. See ECOWAS – Spain 
Fund Partnerships available at http://ecowasmigrationproject.com/?page_id=8 and the Global Forum on Migration and 
Development available at http://www.gfmd.org/en/pfp/practices/item/187-spain-ecowas-fund-on-migration-and-
development  (accessed 30 January 2013). 
493
 ("Protecting Refugees and Other Persons on the Move in the ECOWAS Space," 2011), pp. 39-40. The ‘comprehensive 
and cooperative approach’ embodied by the 10-Point Plan urges the international community to “establish entry systems 
that are able to identify new arrivals with international protection needs and which provide appropriate and differentiated 
solutions for them, side by side with such other solutions as need to be pursued for other groups involved in mixed 
movements.” ("Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration: A 10-Point Plan of Action," 2007), p. 2. 
494
 The Conference brought together the UNHCR, IOM, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the 
European Union, African Union, and the East African Union, along with more than 200 representatives of ECOWAS Member 
States and an array of international and local NGOs and humanitarian agencies. See ("Protecting Refugees and Other 
Persons on the Move in the ECOWAS Space," 2011), p. 41. 
495
 ("Protecting Refugees and Other Persons on the Move in the ECOWAS Space," 2011), pp. 41-42. 
496
 ("Protecting Refugees and Other Persons on the Move in the ECOWAS Space," 2011), p. 21. See also ("Regional 
Integration for Growth and Poverty Reduction in West Africa: Strategies and Plan of Action," 2006), p. 2. 
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residual refugee populations from ECOWAS states with both greater socioeconomic mobility and 
increased political security.” 497 One clear example can be drawn from Nigeria.  
Following the restoration of stability, in 2007 the governments of Sierra Leone and Liberia, along 
with Nigeria, ECOWAS and the UNHCR signed a multi-lateral agreement acknowledging the Free 
Movement Protocols, and allowing for the ‘local integration’ of Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees 
remaining in Nigeria. 498 Approximately 500 passports and two-year ECOWAS Residence Permits 
were issued by the states of origin and Nigerian authorities respectively, securing the legal 
settlement of those refugee communities who had chosen not to repatriate.  499 To date, Sierra 
Leone has issued more than 5,500 passports to former refugees in Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, and Senegal, and these states have in turn enacted the rights of 
movement and settlement embodied within the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocols.  500 
Bolstered by these successes, the UNCHR is currently seeking solutions for the 168,000 refugees 
from Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Senegal who remain displaced within the region. 501  By 
mobilising the widespread regional support for the ECOWAS body, highlighting the reciprocal nature 
of the Protocols, and supporting both refugee and host communities, ECOWAS and the UNHCR, 
                                                           
497
 (Katy Long & Crisp, 2010), p. 57. 
498
 The agreement both recognises local integration as a durable solution under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the OAU 
Convention, and seeks to facilitate “local integration for Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees residing in Nigeria on the 
basis of Article 2 of the 29 May 1979 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and 
Establishment (the Protocol, A/P.1/5/79)) and supplementary protocols”. However, by availing themselves of the 
protection of their states of origin (through the provision of passports) and the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocols, those 
covered in the agreement would surrender their formal recognition as refugees. See ("Multipartite Agreement for the 
Local Integration of Liberian and Sierra Leonean Refugees in Nigeria," June 2007), pp. 2 & 4. 
499
 In many ways, this solution was a ‘logical conclusion’ to the crisis in the region – the UNHCR durable solutions mandate 
(repatriation and resettlement) had largely ‘run its course’, and the imminent ‘cessation of refugee status’ for those 
remaining in host countries threatened the end of refugee support and protection. See (Adepoju et al., 2007), p. 19.; 
(Boulton, 2009), p. 33.; and ("Protecting Refugees and Other Persons on the Move in the ECOWAS Space," 2011), p. 31.  
500
 See ("Protecting Refugees and Other Persons on the Move in the ECOWAS Space," 2011), p. 43. See also (K Long, 2011), 
pp. 22-23. 
501
 See the UNHCR “2013 UNHCR regional operations profile - West Africa”, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45a9c6.html (accessed 30 January 2013).; and ("Protecting Refugees and Other Persons 
on the Move in the ECOWAS Space," 2011), p. 35. 
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along with other regional humanitarian agencies are therefore continuing to make significant 
progress towards realising the comprehensive application of the Free Movement Protocols. 502 
The ECOWAS-UNHCR Nexus 
Despite its nascent promise, a number of states remain hesitant to accede to a broader 
interpretation of the protocols. For many, providing many thousands of refugees with formal 
ECOWAS citizenship is viewed as a threat to state and regional security, and will precipitate the ipso 
facto withdrawal of international humanitarian support for ‘costly’ displaced communities.  503  
While instability is a legitimate concern across the region, the relative peace of recent years belies 
such fears. 504 Moreover, as revealed in the Kenyan study, while socio- political affiliations do blur 
the line between victim and perpetrator, it is often the encampment model and strategies of the 
refugee regime itself that engenders a fertile breeding-ground for localised insecurity. Indeed, as 
reflected in President Conte’s xenophobic diatribe, Guinea's largest refugee camp, Kouankan 
became ‘partially militarized’ in the early 2000s, with Liberian rebels ‘openly circulating’ in the 
settlement. 505 Furthermore, a fear of losing international humanitarian support for refugee 
communities presupposes that states will have to fill the ‘shortfall’.  As shown above, a large 
proportion of refugees in Guinea were either readily absorbed by local communities, or actively 
sought out alternative livelihood strategies outside of formalised UNHCR support (provided in the 
aptly named ‘ghost’ camps).   
Notwithstanding the potential of the Free Movement Protocols, they remain therefore an ad hoc bi- 
or multi-lateral response to specific refugee crises in the region, with few formally entrenched and 
harmonised regional policies – creating a liminal and highly insecure refugee protection space. This is 
evident in Boreah camp which, along with Sembakounya was constructed following border 
insecurity in 2000-2001. As security returned to the region, both Boreah and the Kissidougou UNHCR 
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 (Boulton, 2009), p. 33. 
503
 (Adepoju et al., 2007), p. 16.  
504
 Indeed, considering the strong transnational affiliations shared by refugee and host communities in the region, such 
fears regarding ‘outsiders’ are largely  misguided. Moreover, the Protocols include exceptions for the exclusion of those 
individuals considered a ‘risk’ to “national security, public order or morality”. See the 1986 Supplementary Protocol 
A/SP.1/7/86 on the Second Phase (Right of Residence), Article 14: 1. 
505
 Migration Information Source “West Africa's Refugee Crisis Spills Across Many Borders” (August 2003), available at 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=148 (accessed 27 January 2013). See also the UN “Report of 
the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the investigation into sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West 
Africa” A/57/465, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/reports/a57_465.htm (accessed 13 January 2013). 
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regional office were formally closed in September 2006, however almost 1,800 refugees remained 
within the ‘defunct’ camp. With limited access to either transnational networks or local support 
services, the community embodies the axiomatic ‘vulnerable’ refugee the UNHCR is mandated to 
protect, yet due to the blurred legal space created by the UNCHR-ECOWAS nexus, the community 
remains excluded from both the refugee and regional space. 506 
A primary hurdle for the comprehensive realisation of the ECOWAS ‘moebius’ space is therefore the 
remnants of the Refugee Regime and its institutionalised ‘care and maintenance’ model of refugee 
protection. What is vital is the clear demarcation of UNHCR-ECOWAS responsibilities vis-à-vis 
refugee protection in the region, alongside the homogenisation of migration legislation and policies, 
and increased institutional capacity. As the convergence of the two regime’s agendas continue to 
engender novel strategies that recognise and facilitate the transnational foundations of all migrant 
communities, such a comprehensive interpretation of the Free Movement Protocols may well 
establish the foundations of a ‘moebius’ space and allow refugees the apparently incongruous yet 
vital ability to “achieve ‘local integration’ through greater regional mobility".  507  
 
FACTOR 3:  Pol i t ics  o f  the  Diasp ora  
 
Sierra Leonean Refugees: a Transnational Community 
Like the Somali refugee community discussed in the preceding case study, the experiences of the 
Sierra Leonean ‘Fulani’ reveals the extent to which the characteristics of the transnational (or 
‘translocal’ due to the proximity of the homeland) community itself shapes the diaspora during 
                                                           
506
 (Gale, 2008), p. 538. The BNCR was replaced by the Commission Nationale pour l’Integration et le Suivi des Refugies 
(CNISR) in August 2007. See (Gale, 2008), p. 539. 
507
("Protecting Refugees and Other Persons on the Move in the ECOWAS Space," 2011), pp. 25-26. See also Jacobsen, 
Karen (October 2003). “Local Integration: The Forgotten Solution” available at 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=166 (accessed 2 February 2013).  
This recognition is evident in the UNHCR’s 2009 ‘Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas’, which seeks 
to maximise the ‘protection space’ – a term used to denote “the extent to which a conducive environment exists for the 
internationally recognized rights of refugees to be respected and their needs to be met.”  ("Policy on Refugee Protection 
and Solutions in Urban Areas," 2009), p. 4. 
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displacement – in this case within the emerging ‘moebius’ space of ECOWAS (see Figure Five on page 
103). 
Reflective of the highly mobile, transnational communities living in the region, the Fulani do not see 
displacement as “clearly bounded in space and time”. 508 Indeed, the Fulani “have been ‘between’ 
states all their lives” – forged by a tradition of mobility, robust socio-cultural and ethnic affiliations, 
and ongoing persecution at the hands of both states and civil groups, “the protection of a state is 
less important in daily life than local connections and livelihood opportunities”. 509  
During forced displacement, the Fulani refugee community therefore embrace an extensive portfolio 
of transnational strategies. Women and children are commonly sent to live with relatives in more 
stable regions, while men remain behind to secure land and property including cattle. Other families 
cross the border and settle in, or adjacent to camps so as to have ready access to humanitarian 
services if needed – often strategically splitting the family between residence in the camps and local 
communities. Many also settle in urban areas, drawing upon prior socio-cultural and economic 
contacts. Within the ‘highly-pressurised’ refugee situation, relationships can therefore be regarded 
as “strategies writ large: not just for food or money, but for cultural survival and the continuation of 
a family group”. 510   
Community Engagement and Advocacy 
Such transnational-empowerment means that a large number of Fulani view nationality as ‘situation 
dependent’, drawing upon a diverse portfolio of strategies and affiliations in multiple locations as 
required. 511 While a powerful transnational asset, this fluid identity can however also engender 
ambiguous and even hostile responses from local communities.  
                                                           
508
 Embodying the epitome of a complex migration biography, “conflict and migration have become durable aspects of the 
social landscape.” (Gale, 2006), p. 71.  
509
 (Gale, 2008), p. 544. For centuries the Fulani have moved along extensive regional migratory routes as cattle herders, 
traders and Islamic teachers, compounded more recently by continued regional instability, for example during the 
repressive Sekou  Touré regime which saw approximately 2 million (mostly Fulani) displaced from Guinea. See (Gale, 2006), 
p. 71. 
510
 (Gale, 2006), p. 75. 
511
 Indeed, many Fulani have multiple identity cards which facilitates regional movement. See (Adepoju et al., 2007), p. 19.; 
and (Gale, 2006), p. 72.  
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For example, during the refugee crisis noted earlier, the boundaries that existed between Fulani 
‘refugee’ and local communities across the Forest Region of Guinea were highly porous and ‘fluid’ 
(or as noted in Dadaab – ‘fuzzy’). And as was revealed in Dadaab, this permeability flowed both 
ways. Yet despite pervasive intermingling, some community members continued to view the Fulani 
as unwelcome ‘outsiders’, disputing their ethnic affiliations and arguing that “if they were truly Fula 
they would not be refugees in the first place”. 512 
This transmutation of socio-cultural distinctions is not however, as some in the local and 
international community would define it, the result of duplicitous and cunning ‘crooks’. 513 While it 
must be acknowledged that the ‘care and maintenance model’ is prone to abuse, refugee 
communities are utilising what strategies are made available to them – both transnational and 
localised – to diversify opportunities and reduce risk. While the camp does provide a vital lifeline for 
those refugees with access to few transnational assets and specific protection needs, others view 
the camp as just one (readily available) option in an portfolio of possibilities. 514 Indeed, as noted 
earlier, for the majority of these transnationally-empowered refugees, the preference is to seek out 
alternatives rather than remain within the ‘bounded’ camp space.  
Social Cohesion and Community Security 
Another key finding regarding refugee communities in Guinea is that while traditional transnational 
relations are highly significant, ‘created’ kin are also important. Indeed, during displacement the 
transnational dynamics of the diaspora evolves in response to the constraints and opportunities 
experienced, shaping the refugee ‘social security system’ in situ –  strengthening old affiliations and 
supporting new ‘advantageous’ economic and socio-cultural activities. Yet as noted throughout this 
paper – such transmutation can also be ‘detrimental’. 515  
Mirroring refugee communities in Kenya, one of the greatest transformations is in gendered 
relations. While male hierarchies are perpetuated through notions of ‘success’ in the refugee and 
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 (Gale, 2006), p. 72. 
513
 See (Horst, 2006b), pp. 12-13.; and (Harrell-Bond, 1995). See also IRIN News “GUINEA: Refugees criss-cross a fluid and 
volatile border” (22 July 2004), available at http://www.irinnews.org/Report/50796/GUINEA-Refugees-criss-cross-a-fluid-
and-volatile-border (accessed 20 January 2013). 
514
 Indeed, refugee settlement “is seldom fixed; it should rather be seen as a fluid process [...] In some cases, refugees use 
the camps as part of a broader household strategy of survival. “ (Jacobsen, 2001), p. 8. 
515
 Terms such as ‘big brother’, ‘uncle’ and ‘family’ are used widely amongst these extended kin groups, blurring the 
distinction between refugee and locals, and ‘old’ and ‘new’ connections. See (Gale, 2006), p. 76. 
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local community (through business and community ‘standing’), women struggle with prevailing 
community and UNHCR perceptions. Mobility is traditionally the domain of men, while Fulani 
women are largely sedentary and responsible for maintaining the household. Moreover, within the 
camps women are often framed as ‘vulnerable’ and ‘war widows’, and forced into an ontology of 
dependence and need. However, displaced women are often the sole head of the family, and are 
active in manipulating a portfolio of opportunities that are both limited by and transcend the 
boundaries of the camp. 516 In Sembakounya, women for example often enter into ‘partnerships’ 
with men in ‘bulgur marriages’, allowing for the mutually-beneficial sharing of the bulgur wheat 
distributed by the WFP. 517 Such livelihood strategies risk community criticism and ‘erode’ traditional 
social structures, yet significantly bolster the support available to women and families, acting 
alongside other social and financial remittances flowing from local communities and other family 
members dispersed further afield in the diaspora.  
Another notable transmutation of camp communities is the absence of children. The ‘fostering’ of 
children by the extended diaspora has long served as both a cause and consequence of 
transnationalism, particularly during displacement. Yet rather than a safe space of asylum, 
approximately 40% of children registered in the camp in 2006 were absent, sent to live with 
grandparents of extended family members in surrounding communities and elsewhere in the region. 
And again reiterating the ‘fuzzy’ divide between ‘refugee’ and ‘local’, a large number of children 
living in the camps were from surrounding communities – seeking access to education and health 
services. 518   
Economic Activities and Physical Movement 
In the case of Sembakounya, the ‘permeable boundaries’ of the camps meant that those with 
transnational affiliations “were most readily able to establish business relationships and start-up 
local and long-distance trade”. 519 The local Fulani community often provided collective remittances 
to assist a refugee family in establishing a small business or to settle in an urban area, while it was 
also not uncommon for the wider diaspora to provide remittances, and those in the camps “would 
                                                           
516
 The vulnerability of women and girls is not here disputed – as revealed earlier GBV is a very real feature of displacement 
and refugee communities. Rather, refugee women are not merely victims but also active, empowered agents in the 
community and diaspora. See (Hyndman, 1997). 
517
 See (Gale, 2006), p. 76. 
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 See (Gale, 2006), p. 77. 
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 (Gale, 2006), p. 73. 
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disappear for weeks at a time to travel to Freetown or Conakry to wait for money to be wired from a 
relative overseas.” 520 However, these remittances do not appear to be as vital to Fulani community 
survival as within the bounded Somali community. Rather, other livelihood strategies including the 
ability to gain agricultural employment, to engage with local market activities (including selling camp 
foodstuffs to local communities), and notably to receive small loans from the local business 
community underpinned the establishment of highly-integrated and prosperous transnational 
economies.  
In addition, while cyclical movement is a common feature of the Fulani refugee community, the 
UNHCR has unwittingly facilitated regional mobility – bolstering transnational networks and the 
breakdown of the (albeit loosely) ‘bounded’ camp space. Prior to the closure of Sembakounya and 
relocation of refugees in 2003, the UNHCR conducted numerous repatriation drives to Sierra Leone. 
Rather than permanent return, many in the refugee community used these efforts as ‘go and see’ 
opportunities, as they provided a safe mode of travel and circumvented local authorities and border 
controls. Refugees purchased counterfeit refugee identity cards on the local black-market (so as not 
to jeopardise their legitimate papers), and travelled on UNHCR convoys back to the homeland. Here 
they were also provided a ‘repatriation package’ by the UN World Food Program (consisting of food 
rations, mats, tarpaulins, lanterns, pots and blankets), which could be resold for substantial profit. 
These visits therefore provided an excellent opportunity to re-engage with transnational networks 
and communities back home, and greatly facilitated business and social remittance exchange. 521  
 
Th e Moebius  Space –  a  Th eoret ica l  Real i t y  
 
Refugee communities in Guinea can therefore be seen to be active transnational agents, ‘creatively’ 
manipulating what strategies are available to overcome risks and maximise gains – fostering 
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pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html (accessed 2 January 2013).  
521
 (Gale, 2006), p. 74.  
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traditional notions of kinship and transnational affiliation, conforming to prevailing notions of 
refugee vulnerability and dependency, and seeking out new opportunities at the local and regional 
level in order to overcome the risks and obstacles inherent in displacement. As in Kenya, rather than 
remaining restricted by the bounded camp, the socio-cultural, economic and political boundaries 
that are created are fluid and transcend the official ‘refugee space’ – reflecting the activities of a 
refugee community embedded and active within what is a hugely powerful and malleable refugee 
diaspora.522 
However, two notable differences exists between the case studies. Refugees within Dadaab and 
Kakuma are bound by a highly restrictive localised context – with the Refugee Regime striving 
against the inherent transnational empowerment of refugees to ensure the containment and 
marginalisation of refugee communities in a space excluded from the state and refugee diaspora. 
Yet refugee communities in Guinea benefit from a highly porous and fluid refugee space, the 
consequence of a laissez-faire approach to settlement by local communities, the state and the 
refugee regime. Moreover, and most notably this refugee space is being enveloped within the 
nascent Free Movement Protocols of the ECOWAS Community. This institutionalised regional 
framework both recognises and facilitates transnationalism through the fundamental principles of 
free movement, economic activity and settlement for both migrants and refugees alike – and 
thereby creates the fertile exogenous environment in which the ‘moebius space’ can emerge.  
                                                           
522
 As Zetter notes, displacement “stimulates new patterns and processes of mobility which are motivated by a variety of 
livelihood, security and social needs and may be supported by social and family networks.” (Zetter, 2011) 
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conclus i on:   
–  t r anscend in g boun dar ies  in  the 21
s t
 century  –  
 
 
The Evolution of the Refugee Diaspora as a ‘Middle Space’ 
This paper set out to do three things. Firstly, it sought to disentangle contemporary transnational 
refugee theory, and reveal how it provides a conceptual reinvigoration of what is increasingly being 
acknowledged as a failing and outmoded global refugee paradigm. 523 Having explored the temporal 
development of transnational networks and communities, and the self-perpetuation of what are 
‘hybrid’ refugee or mixed-migration flows, this paper then broadened its theoretical perspective to 
encapsulate the spatial dynamic of the refugee diaspora. The schema of the tripartite refugee 
diaspora ‘space’ was then defined as encompassing three core domains – the homeland, near and 
wider diaspora. Recognising that rather than a `state of being’, “transnationalism is itself a dynamic 
process”, the evolution of this social space was revealed as a duality between refugee agency and 
the structural environment in which evolves, in what Giddens referred to as structuration. 524 This 
paper then built upon this theoretical foundation, by proposing the refugee diaspora as a fluid 
'middle space' –  created, shaped and ultimately ‘bound’ by a confluence of endogenous and 
exogenous factors.  
Secondly, in order to elucidate this dynamic interplay, a robust analytical tool was proposed which 
identified the core activities, and the primary set of factors that together shape the boundaries of 
the refugee community in situ. This ‘refugee middle space model’ allows an empirical analysis of 
specific communities within the refugee diaspora – and the identification of those environmental 
                                                           
523
 The global incidence of PRS theorists argue, exposes the extent to which the UNHCR “is failing to respond adequately to 
the significant unmet protection needs of refugees and other displaced persons caught in chronic exile”. (Milner & 
Loescher, 2011), p. 1. See also (Zetter, 2011). 
524
 (Al-Ali et al., 2001), p. 633. 
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characteristics that both facilitate and hinder the effective functioning of communities during 
displacement. 525 
Thirdly, utilising the middle space model this paper sought to undertake an in-depth investigation of 
refugee communities located within the African near diaspora, in order to determine how they are 
influenced by the ‘bounded’ space of the international refugee regime’s prevailing ‘containment 
model’. An alternative, more fluid or ‘moebius’ space was then examined, to explore whether it 
offered a more supportive environment for the realisation of a fully-functioning refugee community 
– as a transnationally-empowered actor embedded within the broader refugee diaspora.  
The Refugee Middle Space – key findings 
A Historic State of Exclusion 
Refugees have long been considered “an aberration in a modern world which is neatly partitioned 
into nation states”. 526 As a consequence, the international community has come to embrace the 
camp as a conspicuous mechanism for refugee ‘care and maintenance’ on the pathway to a ‘durable 
solution’.  
It can be argued that camps “strengthen asylum by encouraging hosts to accept the presence of 
refugees”, by providing a concrete form of international burden sharing as ‘traditional African 
hospitality’ gives way to host fatigue. 527 However, post-structuralists such as Hyndman argue that 
refugee camps “remove evidence of human displacement from view and contain ‘the problem’ 
without resolution, as noncommunities of the excluded”. 528 
                                                           
525
 For, as Kunz asserted almost forty years ago, “[b]etween the bird's-eye-view of the general theoreticians and the 
theories based on specific refugee groups there is a need for a comprehensive approach to refugee movements. Such an 
approach, while restricting itself to refugee movements, should be able to embrace the various subtypes as they are 
manifested by both past and present refugee phenomena.” (Kunz, 1973), p. 126. 
526
 (Gale, 2006), p. 69. 
527
 (Jamal, 2003), p. 4. See also ("Persons covered by the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa and by the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (Submitted by the African Group and the Latin American 
Group)," 1992), I. C: 14. 
528
 Hyndman, J. (2000). Managing displacement: refugees and the politics of humanitarianism. Minneapolis: University of 
Minneapolis Press., p. 190., cited in (Van Hear, 2003), p. 3. 
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Indeed, echoing the conclusions drawn earlier regarding the ‘parallel’ refugee space, Agamben 
argues that the camp is not created out of ‘ordinary law’, but “out of a state of exception”. 529 
Comparing naked or ‘bare life’ (zoe), with ‘qualified’ or political life (bios) which is conditional on 
state recognition, within this ‘state of exception’ “the so-called sacred and inalienable rights of man 
prove to be completely unprotected at the very moment it is no longer possible to characterize them 
as rights of the citizens of a state”. 530 Yet paradoxically, while the refugee no longer has any 
recourse to the state, (s)he remains paradoxically and resolutely bound by it – “included through its 
own exclusion”. 531 
Permeating the State 
However, through the lens of the middle space model this paper has clearly revealed that rather 
than excluded, refugee communities within the near diaspora remain strikingly engaged with both 
the state and wider diaspora. Indeed, these transnationally-empowered communities  wield highly-
complex migration histories (reflecting both real and ‘mythical’ mobility) that provide a resilient 
foundation during displacement. 532 Yet these networks are highly volatile, with transnational fluidity 
engendering both socio-cultural and political cohesion as well as discord, that transcends the 
arbitrary demarcations of both refugee camps and nation-states. Indeed, for the refugee 
community, “their homeland and their country of exile, as well as the time before and the time after 
migration, constitute a continuous and coherent lived experience.” 533  
The displaced refugee community in Kenya and Guinea were therefore shown to be not an 
aggregate of passively displaced victims, but rather strategic transnational actors that go to great 
lengths to permeate the boundaries of the camp and foster a vital ‘portfolio’ of networks spanning 
                                                           
529
 (Agamben, 1998), pp. 166-167. 
530
 The fact that there remains no ‘autonomous’ space within the international political system for “the pure man in 
himself” Agamben continues, is evident in the fact that “the status of the refugee is always considered a temporary 
condition that should lead either to naturalization or to repatriation. A permanent status of man in himself is inconceivable 
for the law of the nation-state.” (Agamben, 2008), p. 92. 
531
 (Agamben, 1998), p. 170. Interestingly, in contrast to Arendt’s refugee who is coerced into inclusion within the host 
state and thereby acquires a new political identity or bios,  we have here (d)evolved to the ultimate exclusion of the 
refugee, separated and isolated within the camp and creating a modern-day equivalent of the homo sacer.  
532
 Indeed, while conflict and widespread displacement has fractured entire communities, the refugee diasporas that have 
been created “are in the process of transforming societies worldwide” – with the potential for “either the perpetuation of 
conflict or its resolution and the recovery of shattered societies.” (Van Hear, 2009), p. 180. 
533
 (Wahlbeck, 2002). pp. 234-235. 
mir 2013 | 129 | andrew slater 
 
both the state and diaspora space. 534 However, it is also evident that the ‘transmutation’ of the 
refugee diaspora – as communities struggle to circumvent the restrictions inherent within the 
‘bounded’ rubric of the refugee camp – heightens the salience of transnational affiliation and 
dissonance, and severely undermines the UNHCR mandate of refugee protection and support. 535 
In stark contrast, the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocols are establishing a fluid ‘moebius’ space 
that transcends the boundaries of both the camp and the state – to embrace and foster the 
transnational character of all communities in the region, whether ‘forcibly displaced’ or otherwise. 
However, while engendering a dramatic transformation of refugee protection in the region, it was 
also revealed that the nascent UNHCR-ECOWAS nexus remains mired in the prevailing mixed-
migration debate, and an incoherent demarcation of regional responsibilities and process. As a 
consequence, there prevails a perverted liminal space into which many refugees are now falling, as 
the outmoded UNHCR ‘bounded’ ontology crumbles and the burgeoning moebius space expands to 
incorporate all transnational refugee communities in the region. 
Embracing the Moebius space  
ECOWAS, and the conception of a moebius space which it embodies allows a more reflexive regional 
approach to refugee protection, by acknowledging and facilitating the crucial transnational 
foundations of the near diaspora – as both a ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ dynamic process. 
Rather than the imposition of an arbitrarily-defined refugee space through the solitary actions of the 
structural environment (i.e. state and refuge regime), the moebius space emphasises the duality that 
is inherent within the diaspora and embraces both the endogenous motivations and strategies of the 
refugee community itself as well as the exogenous structural demands of the international 
community. The moebius space is therefore a synthesis of the agency of refugee communities and 
the choices that are made possible by a portfolio of transnational strategies, as well as the 
institutionalised rights embodied within the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocols that are the 
                                                           
534
 Indeed, transnational communities have been described as “thrusting, energetic entrepreneurs or cultural innovators, 
breathing life into the societies that accommodate them.” (Van Hear, 1998), p. 253. 
535
 It must be acknowledged that despite intense pressure from regional displacement, the Migration Regime within 
Guinea continues to extend a laissez faire approach to refugee settlement, and has allowed a semi-permeable refugee 
space in which refugee camps are sites of self-selective refugee protection. However, as in Kenya the encampment 
approach has fuelled the transmutation of transnationalism in the camps, and heightened intra- and inter-communal 
affiliations and tensions. 
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structural backbone of the burgeoning regionalism in West Africa. 536 Indeed, ‘regionalism’ has been 
described as “the expression of a common sense of identity and destiny combined with the creation 
of institutions that express that identity and shape collective action.” 537 
As a consequence, while as Appadurai acknowledged “animated by a sense of the end of the era of 
the nation-state”, this paper clearly reveals how the moebius middle space both transcends static 
notions of camp and state borders, yet remains topologically located within the demarcations of the 
regional body. 538  
Moebius Replication across the Continent 
An acknowledgement of the transnationalism underpinning all contemporary societies, and the 
regionalism that emerges from such an understanding is not limited to ECOWAS. An array of regional 
bodies are following in its footsteps, giving rise to a ‘field’ of moebius social spaces across the 
continent. 
Notably, after tumultuous beginnings the East African Community (EAC) – which comprises Kenya, as 
well as Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda – is making progress towards realising free 
movement, and the rights of establishment and residence for Community citizens. 539 However, 
while mirroring the latent promise of the ECOWAS Community, how effectively these provisions are 
implemented, in particular as they pertain to refugees in the region remain to be seen.  
                                                           
536
 As Giddens notes, structuration embodies the “conditions governing the continuity or transmutation of structures, and 
therefore the reproduction of social systems”. (Giddens, 1984), p. 25. 
537
 (Evans, 2005), p. 196. 
538
 (Appadurai, 1996), p. 18. This paper has concentrated on the near diaspora in Africa – and as such has only included the 
‘homeland’ and ‘near diaspora’ domains of the tripartite space within its conception of a moebius space. There do exist 
strong extra-regional networks that extend to the wider diaspora, however extending the moebius space to incorporate 
these domains is beyond the remit (and capacity) of this paper. Moreover, as noted earlier these inter-national networks 
constitute primarily ‘virtual’ social fields made possible by globalisation and ‘time-space compression’ (as evidenced by the 
xawilaad system). Therefore while vitally important, they are not physically located within the moebius space and have 
limited impact upon its spatial foundations – which while ‘transcending borders’ remains in this instance embedded within 
the structural institutions of the ECOWAS regional body.  
539
 According to Article 104: 1 of the founding Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, “Partner States 
agree to adopt measures to achieve the free movement of persons, labour and services and to ensure the enjoyment of 
the right of establishment and residence of their citizens within the Community.”  See ("Treaty for the Establishment of the 
East African Community," as amended on 14 December 2006 and 20 August 2007), Articles 104 & 7: 1 (c). See also the EAC 
‘Annex on the Free Movement of Persons’ (November 2009), available at 
http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=68&Itemid=163 (accessed 22 February 2013). 
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Similarly, in 1992 the expansive Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established, 
encapsulating Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, the 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Pursuant to Article 5 of the 
SADC Treaty, in 2005 the ‘Protocol on Facilitation of the Movement of Persons’ was created which, 
in addition to establishing the rights of free movement, establishment and residence, directly 
addresses refugee and asylum seeker protection in the Community. 540 
This increasing erosion (or ‘permeation’) of state borders – while founded primarily upon economic 
motivations – heralds a significant shift in refugee response frameworks on the continent. However, 
both these regional free movement protocols remain in the embryonic stages, and like ECOWAS, 
face considerable hurdles in terms of regional capacity and policy deficiencies. 541 As was noted 
above, the fragile UNHCR-ECOWAS nexus has created a blurred ‘protection space’ – whereby ad hoc 
bi- or multi-lateral agreements remain incapable of ensuring adequate support for all refugee 
communities dispersed in multiple locations across the regional body. 542 As such, a prerequisite for 
a effective and fully-functioning moebius space is the clear demarcation of roles and responsibilities 
between Member States and regional institutions, and the activities of the prevailing refugee 
regime. 543  
The clarification and augmentation of these (exogenous) structural elements that are crucial in 
shaping the diaspora middle space will support the refugee community in two key ways. Firstly, it 
                                                           
540
 The SADC Treaty asserts the need for the development of “policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to 
the movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and the peoples of the Region generally, among Member States”. 
See ("Treaty of the Southern African Development Community," August 1992), Article 5: 2(d). Notably, the SADC 
Movement Protocol reaffirms Member States’ commitment to the UNHCR, IOM and their obligations under the 
international refugee instruments, and asserts that “[t]he management of refugees in the Region shall be regulated by a 
specific Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between State Parties”.  See ("Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of 
Persons," August 2005), Article 28: 2. See also SADC ‘Refugees’, available at http://www.sadc.int/themes/politics-defence-
security/public-securit/refugees/ (accessed 22 February 2013). 
541
 See ("Refugee Status Determination and Rights in Southern and East Africa: international workshop report," 16–17 
November 2010), p. 7.; and (K Long, 2011), p. 15. 
542
 This incoherence mirrors the dysfunctional Kenyan DRA-UNHCR Migration Regime that that undermines refugee 
protection in the country – highlighted earlier in the ‘bounded’ space case study. 
543
 This reflects the sentiments of the 2009 ExCom Conclusion on PRS, which urges states, the UNHCR and humanitarian 
partners to “pursue active and effective partnerships and coordination in implementation of durable solutions, and to 
develop new opportunities for partnership” – including through regional bodies. See the UNHCR ‘Conclusion on Protracted 
Refugee Situations  No. 109 (LXI) – 2009’, available at http://www.unhcr.org/4b332bca9.html (accessed 23 February 2013). 
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will enhance the regional implementation of the free movement protocols, benefiting both migrant 
and refugee communities alike. Secondly, a strengthened and fully-integrated regional approach will 
allow for UNHCR protection and support mechanisms that target specific refugee needs as required 
– rather than the more generalised, costly and ineffective ‘care and maintenance’ model of 
humanitarian aid programmes “which only enable refugees to survive at the level of basic 
subsistence.” 544    
Furthermore, such a targeted refugee response may profit from a regression in the prevailing African 
(and global) refugee paradigm and RSD. In particular, rather than the broad prima facie recognition 
of refugee groups displaced in the region en masse – as embodied within the 1969 OAU Convention 
– it may be useful to return to the more restrictive, yet accurate and evidence-based refugee 
ontology embodied within earlier instruments such as the 1933 Refugee Convention. Herein, certain 
nationalities (including Russians, Armenians, Assyrians, and Turks) were identified as requiring 
protection, and states of asylum charged with providing assistance accordingly. 545  
While it may not be useful (or appropriate) to delineate nationalities a priori, strengthened joint 
UNHCR-ECOWAS border screenings may allow the identification of those transnationally-
empowered groups (such as displaced Somali in Kenya, or Fulani ‘refugees’ in Guinea) who are in a 
stronger position to self-settle or draw upon extant support structures and strategies, and therefore 
require minimal (if any) UNHCR assistance. On the other hand, those recognised as having specific 
protection needs – including women, children and those with limited socio-cultural or ethnic 
affiliation (such as those refugees marginalised by the removal of humanitarian assistance in Boreah) 
– can be supported in ‘guided’ refugee settlements and through bolstered refugee-host community 
                                                           
544
 (Crisp, 2002), p. 22. Indeed, the budget spend in Dadaab for 2011 was $101,000,000. Moreover, reflective of an 
international community that is becoming increasingly disenchanted with costly and ineffective refugee response 
programmes, the projected budget for 2012 was less than half this amount – only $49,000,000 – despite a 53%  increase in 
refugee population on the previous year.  See ("Asylum Under Threat: Assessing the protection of Somali refugees in 
Dadaab refugee camps and along the migration corridor," June 2012), p. 40.  See also ("The Human Costs of the Funding 
Shortfalls for the Dadaab Refugee Camps," July 2012), p. 1.; and Médecins Sans Frontières “Dadaab: leaders must not fail 
refugees in the world’s largest camp” (1 October 2012), available at http://www.msf-me.org/en/news/news-media/news-
press-releases/dadaab-leaders-must-not-fail-refugees-in-the-worlds-largest-camp-mdecins-sans-frontires-calls-for-im.html 
(accessed 22 January 2013). 
545
 The 1933 Convention also reflected the understanding that displaced communities were best served by strengthening 
agency, economic integration and freedom of movement, facilitated in part by the widely recognised ‘Nansen Passport’ – 
sentiments which are echoed within the precepts of the ECOWAS Community and the Free Movement Protocols. See 
(Harrell-Bond, 1995), pp 3-4. 
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assistance programmes that operate alongside the free movement protocols. 546 Such strategies are 
reflected in the UNHCR ‘10-Point Plan of Action on Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration’ noted 
earlier. Indeed, the UNHCR noted almost twenty years ago, “[r]efugee problems are by definition 
transnational problems, which cannot be resolved by means of uncoordinated activities in separate 
countries”. 547  
Such an integrated ‘moebius’ approach provides a truly durable ‘solution’, as it encapsulates and 
empowers all three actors identified in the Migration Regime’s triptych outlined earlier – i.e. the 
refugee community, state(s) and the UNHCR. Notably, the creation of a fully-functioning and 
effective middle space will facilitate the functions and activities of those refugee communities 
dispersed across the diaspora – enabling the transnational support and protection that is so vital 
during displacement. Moreover, re-integrating the ‘excluded’ refugee community within the 
moebius space greatly benefits the myriad other ‘local’ and ‘migrant’ communities that inhabit this 
comprehensive middle space. For it is this holistic and dynamic fusion that ultimately shapes the 





– Ends – 
                                                           
546
 As Van Hear posits, we must “reconcile the quest for durable solutions associated with particular sites with recognition 
that transnational connections and practices provide important means for sustaining people caught up in conflict, 
displacement, and its aftermath”.  (Van Hear, 2006), p. 14. 
547
 (UNHCR, 1995), Chpt. 1: ‘Changing Approaches to the Refugee Problem’, p. 18., available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/4a4c70859.html (accessed 12 February 2013). See also supra note 493. 
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